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SANDRA BARKHOF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
CASE STUDY: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION IN SECONDARY 
SCHOOLING 
This thesis explores some of the issues concerning the concept of European 
identity. In particular, the aim is to assess how far school education is a 
suitable method to foster a European identity and support for European 
integration. In this context, the thesis aims to investigate whether the historic 
and more recent political and national developments in England and Germany 
have resulted in different attitudes to European integration, European identity 
and subsequently to a European dimension in education. The analysis also 
compares the general attitude towards national and European identity and 
European integration in England and Germany and assesses if different 
attitudes have resulted in a different implementation of a European dimension 
in education. To facilitate this analysis, the political and national development 
in England and Germany as well as the emergence of the European idea and 
the history of European integration will be discussed. 
The assessment of a European dimension in secondary education in 
England and Germany includes an analysis of documentary material and 
selected curricula. In addition, a survey has been carried out among a 
sample of German and English head and subject teachers to explore aspects 
of the practical implementation of a European dimension. The findings show 
that there are significant differences between the two countries concerning 
their understanding and implementation of a European dimension in 
education. Many of these differences can be attributed to different attitudes to 
national and European identity and European integration. 
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Introduction 
Background 
European integration is not a new idea, although it only gained considerable 
momentum in the last sixty years. Most of Europe today is politically very 
different from what it was a hundred years ago, when it was dominated by 
largely undemocratic and often multi-national empires. Modern Europe is a 
community of interdependent states that are bound into complex European 
and global networks. Many European states are members of the European 
Union (EU), an integration project in progress where initially predominantly 
economic integration has more and more led to political co-operation in 
search of 'ever-closer union'. The final political structure of the EU seems 
undetermined. It is frequently debated whether or not the EU is becoming a 
6super-state', a federal construct or a more intergovernmental alternative. 
Although there is no general agreement, many politicians tend to favour a 
European Union that exists alongside nation states. As Jacques Chirac 
(2003: 76) pointed out in a speech in 2000, neither Germany nor France is 
" ... envisaging the creation of a super European State which would supplant 
our national states and mark the end of their existence as players in 
international life". Similarly Tony Blair (2003: 80) argued in 2000 that Europe 
should be "... a superpower, but not a superstate". Although speculation 
concerning the future of the EU is not part of this thesis, one can probably 
agree with Rosamond (2002: p. 51 0) that, in any case, "... just because the EU 
does not achieve the common attributes of nation-state hood, this does not 
mean that it has 'failed' as a project of integration". 
Both political and economic European integration are pressing forward 
with the recent completion of monetary union, at least in some countries, and 
the enlargement to the East. However, it must be noted that "... it is 
questionable whether the citizens of Europe are actually welcoming these 
changes whatever and wherever they may be" (Dunkerley et al 2002: 4). 
Across Europe, both hostility towards and support for the EU and some of the 
proposed changes, such as the envisaged European Constitutional Treaty, 
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coincide with a general feeling of "... alienation, exclusion and powerlessness" 
(Dunkerley et al 2002: 4). Surveys have consistently shown that European 
citizens complain about a lack of involvement in European affairs. Despite the 
right to elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and decide on 
important issues by referendum (in some countries at least), the majority of 
Europeans feel that their voice does not count. As this thesis will explore, it 
has therefore increasingly been argued that the largely elite-driven political 
and economic integration has to some extent resulted in a lack of popular 
legitimacy and a so-called democratic deficit at European level. Subsequently, 
in the last decades, some pro-i nteg ration ists and advocates of further political 
union have concerned themselves with the possibilities of cultural integration 
and the creation of a European identity in order to generate popular support 
and furnish the "... EU's institutions and emerging system of transnational 
governance with legitimacy" (Shore 2000: 1). This, however, is easier said 
than done. As Shore (2000: 35) points out, the "... absence of popular feelings 
of belonging to the 'European construction' [ ... ] remains a crucial 
factor in 
explaining the difficulty of integrating Europeans". 
The creation of a European identity, however, faces greater difficulty 
than the establishment of traditional national identities, which were often able 
to draw on or construct certain unifying agents such as for example a 
common history, shared culture and language. The EU however, does not 
have this advantage. As Shore (2000: 64) explains "... the absence of a shared 
language, a uniform media and education systems and the 'political roof of a 
central state may distinguish the EU from the nineteenth-century nation-state, 
but they also highlight the obstacles it faces in trying to build the new Europe 
sans frontidres". Language, the mass media and mass education are often 
considered to be key forces in the processes of political socialisation, identity 
formation and reinforcement. For the purpose of this thesis, education has 
been selected for further examination as education has traditionally been one 
of the most important vehicles for identity creation. One might expect 
therefore that the extent to which a 'European dimension' is taught in schools 
will influence young people's attitudes towards the EU and European 
integration considerably, although, it must be admitted, "... awareness of 
16 
Europe and knowledge of its affairs do not necessarily entail support for it" 
(Convery et al 1997: xi). 
Aims of the thesis 
The aims of this thesis are therefore 
i) to assess in how far school education is an effective method to 
a) foster European identity and 
b) support for European integration 
ii) to examine aspects of the implementation of a European dimension 
at a sample of secondary schools in Germany and England 
Another objective in this context is to analyse different theoretical concepts 
and understandings of European identity as well as the extent to which a 
European identity can be said to exist. European integration and identity 
cannot, however, be analysed or understood out of context and need to be 
assessed in relation to the existing political structure and political identities., It 
is therefore necessary to understand the historic development of state and 
nation in Europe in general and in Germany and England in particular. The 
thesis will investigate whether different historic and more recent political and 
national developments in England and Germany have resulted in different 
attitudes to a) the European project in general and b) European identity in 
particular. The analysis will also compare the general attitude towards a) 
national identity and b) European identity and c) European integration in 
England and Germany. Furthermore, the study seeks to explore if and how 
these attitudes influence the implementation of a European dimension in 
education. Germany has been selected because opinion polls and studies 
have consistently shown a general pro-i nteg ration ist stance in relation to the 
EU, the opposite of which is true in the case of England. The study is limited 
to England, since the other parts of the United Kingdom differ to some extent 
in terms of both their national and political development as well as their 
education systems. 
1 Although the existence of sub-national and other political identities and structures is 
acknowledged, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on the national level. 
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The implementation of a European dimension, however this might be 
defined, in education is an area for extensive research. As Convery et al 
(1997: 3) point out, in general two broad approaches to the European 
dimension can be distinguished: while European, national and local bodies 
tend to follow a 'prescriptive' approach in the form of policy statements and 
other official documents; researchers in education and the social sciences 
usually prefer a more 'explorative' approach. Therefore, in order to provide a 
more inclusive assessment of the European dimension, this thesis will not 
only discuss relevant findings of previous research, but combine an evaluation 
of the European dimension as outlined in selected governmental policy 
documents and curricula with an analysis of an explorative case study. This 
case study has been carried out among secondary school subject and head 
teachers in the selected countries using semi-quantitative questionnaires in 
order to gain an insight into attitudes towards European elements in teaching. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the case study has been limited to compulsory 
secondary education in history and citizenship as Chapter Six will explain. 
The case study was combined with a curriculum assessment in the selected 
subject areas regarding the inclusion of European aspects. 
It should be stated at the outset that the relatively restricted sample 
size does not allow to claim with certainty that the findings are representative 
of the attitude and perceptions of the majority of subject and head teachers in 
England or Germany. Instead, they reflect the opinions of the teachers 
surveyed at a given moment in time and are meant to provide an insight into 
the topic. There is a need for further research to update and supplement 
these findings. The survey begins by looking at the evidence that is available 
and by making tentative conclusions worthy of further investigations or which 
might indicate areas for future development. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. The first two chapters will explore key 
aspects of the development of the state and nation in Germany and England. 
The approach is somewhat state-centric since an understanding of the state is 
crucial "... to understand the politics of Europe" (Rose 1996: 12). The historical 
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development not only explains modern political concepts relevant to this 
thesis and national attitudes, but also informs and shapes general opinions 
about European integration and identity. In this relation, it is also important to 
note how the definition of 'nation' had an impact on concepts of citizenship. 
Both chapters will also highlight how events in the twentieth century have 
considerably altered approaches to national identity and European integration, 
especially in Germany; this will also be discussed in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Three and Four will discuss the development of the European 
idea from theoretical European schemes to the actual post-war European 
integration in the twentieth century. Chapter Three will show how the 
European idea has emerged and developed over the last two hundred years 
up to the Second World War, although it must be acknowledged that there is 
no agreement " ... about what the idea of Europe symbolizes" (Rose 1996: 1). 
'Europe' in itself is difficult to pin down; various definitions stress different 
combinations of geographical, cultural, linguistic, political, historic, socio- 
demographic, economic or religious factors. Depending on the definition used, 
the boundaries of Europe change and can refer to spatial or 'imagined' 
cultural frontiers, which also vary over time. The Eastern border of 'Europe' in 
particular has been and to some extent still is subject to considerable debate. 
There is also confusion between 'Europe' and the area of the EU. An equation 
of the modern definition of 'Europe' with the EU would be an exclusive 
definition, although few European states now remain outside this area. 
Against this background, Chapter Three will highlight different 
European schemes from the sixteenth century until the Second World War. 
During this period, the most important European plans were arguably the Pan- 
European scheme of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi in the 1920s and the Briand 
memorandum at the start of the 1930s. While until the end of the Second 
World War the European idea was mostly restricted to intellectual circles, 
Chapter Four will show how, after 1945, it was put into practice. Different 
methods of European integration, namely neo-functionalism, federalism and 
intergovernmentalism will be analysed and a general overview of the 
development of the European Economic Communities (EEC), then the 
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European Community (EC) and finally the European Union (EU) will be 
provided. This is important background information for Chapter Five, which 
will examine European identity in relation to the so-called 'democratic deficit' 
and political legitimacy; the discussion of which, as Wiener and Diez (2004: 4) 
point out, requires knowledge of the organisational structure, role and function 
of the EU, which in turn entails knowledge of European integration theory and 
history. Chapter Five will also examine different approaches to European 
identity with special focus on national attitudes to European integration and 
identity in Germany and England. 
Chapter Five establishes the theoretical need for a European identity, 
while Chapter Six will explore why education is an important agent for the 
promotion of such an identity. Chapter Six will also examine and compare EU 
and national government policies regarding a European dimension at school 
by analysis of documentary material. It will assess the inclusion of European 
elements into the curricula concerning the selected subjects in both countries. 
Chapter Six will also highlight different approaches to the practical 
implementation as well as the difficulty of defining a 'European dimension in 
education'. 
Chapter Seven will present the findings of the case study. The focus 
will be on teachers' attitudes towards European aspects in teaching. The 
chapter will discuss which European aspects are considered to be important 
and which are included in teaching or offered by the school. Chapter Seven 
will also examine which problems are frequently encountered by the teachers 
when they try to incorporate European elements in teaching. Special 
emphasis will be on teacher training and knowledge as well as on the 
channels of implementation. The chapter will also discuss teachers' opinions 
with regards to the future role of the EU especially in relation to educational 
policy. Throughout the chapter will highlight any differences between 
Germany and England and assess the reasons for such differences especially 
in relation to national identity and historic development. 
20 
Overall, this thesis is a comparative study investigating links and 
relationships between national and European identity as well as national- 
political development and attitudes towards European integration. It will show 
that, generally speaking, some feel that their nationality is threatened by ideas 
of European political union and European identity, while others, who may 
have a more troubled relationship with national identity, tend to welcome this 
development. This study investigates both the often historically-grounded 
reasons for the different attitudes as well as their manifestation in the form of 
educational policy and teaching approaches to a European dimension in 
education. 
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1. State structures and development in Western Europe 
1.1 Introduction 
According to Rosamond (2002: 509), one of the issues most often 
encountered in relation to the EU, both among politicians and the wider public, 
is the fear that the EU might develop, as a consequence of further political 
integration, into some kind of European super-state which might be 
"... draining the lifeblood from the European nation states via its relentless 
accumulation of powers" (Axford and Browning 2002: 10). The structure and 
outlook of the EU is today far removed from the original set-up of the 1950s. 
The final aim of integration, however, remains unspecified. It almost seems as 
if integration has taken on a life of its own, migrating away from being a 
'method', as will be discussed in Chapter Three, to being the driving force 
towards an unknown target. Still, integration continues to be determined by 
and dependent on the EU member states, which are its "... indispensable 
building blocks" (Hague and Harrop 2002: 8). The member states decide 
through a variety of decision making procedures (which are largely 
characterised by incremental policy making and political interdependence, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Four) the direction and travelling speed of 
European integration, although EU citizens now play an increasing role. 
Since the member states have a pivotal role in relation to the development 
of the EU, it is important to highlight the key features and developmental 
stages of states in Western Europe with particular focus on Germany and 
England (or Britain). It can be expected that variations in the historical 
development may account for some of the differences between the two 
countries with respect not only to their national identity but also their attitude 
towards the EU and a European identity. Therefore, this chapter will take a 
closer look at some features and the development of the modern liberal- 
democratic state in Western Europe, while the next chapter will focus on 
national identities. 
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1.2 Key concepts of the modern state 
There are numerous interpretations of the state that reflect a variety of 
ideological understandings and conceptual associations. Although it would be 
quite impossible to discuss, as part of this thesis, the complexities of state 
theory or the variations in interpretation, it is vital to outline a selected few key 
concepts in order to create a basic theoretical understanding. First of all, the 
state itself must be defined. According to Heywood (2002: 87), on the most 
general level, a state can be defined as "... a political association that 
establishes sovereign [ ... ] jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, and 
exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions". In turn, this 
sovereign authority is usually linked to the concept of legitimacy, which 
establishes a state's rightful regime or rule that is recognised by the state's 
citizens. 
Weber's (Hague and Harrop 2001: 11) categorisation of authority is still 
regarded by many political theorists as the classic interpretation of this 
concept. Weber argued that the modern state is normally characterised by 
legal-rational authority, whereby the state's legitimacy is based on an 
established and often constitutional set of rules and regulations that invests 
authority in a specific role or position but not in a person (Hague and Harrop 
2001: 12). While the notion of state power itself is somewhat diffuse, its 
exercise is normally effectively co-ordinated through the state apparatus and 
is clearly outlined and regulated through certain rules. In accordance with the 
principle of legal-rational authority, political power in modern states is 
therefore normally exercised by the members of the state in form of functions 
and offices (Poggi 1990: 20). An often cited example of a state based on 
legal-rational authority is post-war Germany where the entire state's 
apparatus and state administration is founded on and legitimised by the 
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Weber also pointed out the importance of 
the state's monopoly on power and "legitimate violence" (Heywood 2002: 87). 
In other words, within its designated territory, the state, as the only legitimate 
political source of power, has the sole ability to exercise force (Hall 1996, 
Poggi 1990, Held 1989). 
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Members of the modern liberal-democratic state are usually bestowed 
with certain rights and duties, which describe their status as citizens and their 
relation with the state. Again, there is a plethora of approaches to citizenship, 
but on the most fundamental level, citizenship defines the rights and duties of 
an individual, which make this individual a member of a certain state (Shore 
2000: 71). Every citizen of a state is subject to the authority and jurisdiction of 
the state. Non-citizens, who live within the state's boundaries, usually do not 
enjoy the same rights and privileges. This relationship between a state and its 
citizens is normally permanent and compulsory. Moreover, citizens often have 
an emotional attachment to their state expressed in terms of loyalty or the 
willingness to defend the state (Heywood 2002: 156). This emotional 
attachment, which expresses the relationship between citizenship and 
national identity, can be reflected in different understandings and acquisitions 
of citizenship, which has important implications for attitudes to EU citizenship 
and identity as will be discussed later on. 
One key concept of political theory, and a recurrent theme in political 
discourse, is sovereignty, which is " ... among the most complex and 
controversial concepts of the modern doctrine of the state" (D'Agostino 
1993: 111). It is worth examining this concept in further detail as the 
'traditional' nation state sovereignty has undergone some changes in relation 
to supranational institutions such as the EU. Originally, "... the term 
sovereignty [ ... ] expressed the idea that there is a final and absolute authority 
in the political community" (Hinsley 1986: 1). However, with the creation of 
supranational institutions such as the EU, which has "... led to a gradual 
erosion of 'sovereignty'" (Barry 2000: 64), this definition has been challenged. 
Most states now operate within a network of global organisations, institutions 
and agreements, which Hague and Harrop (2002: 8) refer to as the "... realities 
of interdependence". Further, "... nearly all states, within and beyond the EU, 
increasingly work through global and especially regional relationships that 
dilute the traditional strength of sovereignty" (Hague and Harrop 2002: 8). 
With regard to the EU alone, there are numerous debates concerning 
the extent, direction and desirability of the EU induced change to traditional 
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sovereignty. The degree of sovereignty 'erosion' or transfer would depend on 
the final structure and constitution of the EU, which, as pointed out above, is 
as yet unknown. As will be shown in Chapter Five, there seems to be an 
assumption and concern, commonly expressed by politicians, the media and 
the public alike, that this supranational authority would necessarily take the 
form and structure of a nation state thereby depriving its member states partly 
of their sovereignty. Alternatively, the development of regionalism within the 
EU has led many to question the 'super-state' design in favour of multi-level 
governance whereby decisions are taken at the appropriate level according to 
the EU policy of subsidiarity (see Chapter Four) (Rosamond 2002: 510-11). 
Either model would involve a considerable modification to traditional nation 
state sovereignty and some degree of sovereignty transfer from the national 
to either the European or the regional level. It is therefore important to 
understand the key features of state sovereignty as well as the philosophical 
development of the concept. The following section provides a brief overview 
of both. 
Sovereignty 
As already pointed out, sovereignty is usually understood as the ultimate 
political authority whereby a state or other political body is "... fully sovereign if 
there is no higher or lower power" (Rosamond 2002: 484). Sovereignty is 
normally divided into internal and external sovereignty (Held 1989: 215). 
Internal sovereignty refers to the supreme power of a state within its territory, 
often described as the law-making power within a territory (Hague and Harrop 
2001: 7). External sovereignty refers to a state's ability to act as an 
independent and autonomous actor in the international order (Heywood 
2002: 129). 
Internal sovereignty can further be classified by the locus of 
sovereignty. The seat of sovereignty in post-war modern Germany for 
example is the constitution, which delegates the power from the people to the 
government. The German state is federal meaning that delegated power is 
executed at both territorial and national level thus creating a system of 
governance where shared sovereignty is a central feature. The federal 
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structure in Germany is based on a tradition of regional autonomy and was 
institutional ised in the 1949 constitution granting each of the eleven (sixteen 
after the 1990 reunification) Ldnder its own constitution (Heywood 2002: 161). 
As usual in federal states, the central authority is hierarchically superior to the 
territorial authorities as normally several major areas of policy, such as foreign 
policy, remain solely with the central authority. 
Britain on the other hand has an uncodified constitution and is, unlike 
Germany, essentially a unitary state. A defining characteristic of unitary states 
is that sovereign power is vested in a single national institution, which is in the 
case of the UK the Parliament (Heywood 2002: 165). However, through the 
process of devolution, as discussed later on, certain powers have been 
transferred from the UK Parliament to the new legislative institutions in Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland (Grant 2002: 300). 
The definition and understanding of sovereignty evolved over time and 
in close relation to the emergence of the modern state. In Western Europe, 
Jean Bodin (1530- 96) was one of the first political philosophers to publish, in 
1576, a discourse on sovereignty (The Six Books of Commonweao. 
Sovereignty, according to Bodin, was the constitutive power of the state 
(Bodin 1952: 42). The state could then be differentiated according to the locus 
of power, the discussion of which was a central theme in Bodin's work. 
According to Bodin (1952: 25-49) an absolutist regime was to be favoured as it 
concentrated the political power in one individual who could make the law but 
would not be bound by it. The benefit of such a system was the indivisibility of 
sovereignty as the absolute monarch would have final authority. Although 
Bodin delivered one of the first systematical approaches to the concept of 
sovereignty, he did not quite manage to integrate "the ruled" into the system 
despite being anxious so to do (Hinsley 1986: 125). Bodin thought that 
sovereign power was of divine origin, thus giving the community no right to 
restrain sovereign power. The divine origin, however, also meant that the 
sovereign was bound by morals and religion and had to observe the laws of 
God, nature and custom (Bodin 1952: 40). 
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The idea of a strong state was also favoured by Hobbes (1588-1679) 
who promoted in his Leviathan (1651) the idea that sovereignty was based 
upon the actual concentration of power, unlike Bodin who argued that the 
state's sovereignty lies within the final authority of the state's law. Like Bodin, 
Hobbes advocated a single social contract through which all individuals 
submitted to the state but in which the state as the sovereign took no part 
(Hobbes 1985: 229). The state was believed to be essential for the welfare of 
human beings as they would, if left to fend for themselves, ultimately destroy 
each other in a constant power struggle and warfare (Hobbes 1985: 223-225). 
Therefore the safety of the people could only be guaranteed if every member 
of the community surrendered their rights to the ultimate authority of the state. 
Although Hobbes acknowledged that the state could take a variety of forms, 
he preferred an absolutist monarchy. He believed that sovereign power could 
neither be divided nor limited but was omnipotent, meaning that the people 
could not act against the sovereign since the sovereign had no part in the 
contract and the community would not exist without the contract and the 
sovereign (Hobbes 1985: 232). Acting against the sovereign, however, would 
not be an issue as "... whatsoever he [the sovereign] does, it can be no injury 
to any of his subjects" (Hobbes 1985: 232). 
Influenced by the Enlightenment'2 Rousseau (1712-78) had a very 
different understanding of the contractual relationship between community 
and state. Rousseau advocated in his 1756 essay The Social Contract (Le 
Contrat Social) that exclusive sovereignty remained with the community, 
which alone "... legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be 
absurd, tyrannical and liable to the most frightful abuses" (Rousseau 
1993: 194-195). Rousseau argued, somewhat contrary to Hobbes, that people 
in their natural state were compassionate beings (the happy savages) who 
were introduced to conflict and unhappiness through the process of civilisation 
(Rousseau 1993: 182-189). To achieve freedom, Rousseau argued that 
2 An eighteenth century movement based on the belief in progress, the universality of reason 
and the power of scientific explanation whereby human emancipation was seen as a 
consequence of the spread of rational enquiry and decision making (Axford et al 2002: 564). 
The Enlightenment was rooted in the sixteenth century scientific revolution and in 
seventeenth century pre-Enlightenment philosophers. 
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individuals needed to subject their individual wills to a general will by which he 
referred to the state. The people as a whole had the power to dismiss the 
government at any time should the social contract be broken. Rousseau, 
however, by equating the political community with the state, did not provide 
for an intermediate political organ such as a government capable of exercising 
power, which arguably is one of the practical problems with Rousseau's thesis 
(Hinsley 1986: 155). Rousseau rejected the idea of a division of powers, as 
sovereignty in his opinion was indivisible. 
John Locke's (1672-1704) theory proposes an alternative solution by 
dividing state and community in such a way that the community constitutes 
the origin of sovereignty, while the state is the designated executor of popular 
sovereignty. Locke argued in his Two Treatises on Government (1690) that 
sovereignty resides with the people advocating a system of limited 
government to provide protection for natural rights (Locke 1970: 169-180). 
Although supreme and undivided sovereignty was to stay with the community, 
the legislature would obtain full supremacy, following the necessary 
delegation of these powers, while the executive would have a limited authority 
(Locke 1970: 184-191). Thus Locke established a model, which is still valid in 
most modern western states whereby the state was given the right to govern 
and the people the right to hold political power accountable (Locke 1970: 190). 
Locke's ideas were further developed by Montesquieu (1689-1775), who 
advocated a system of checks and balances whereby the execution of 
sovereignty is divided into legislative, executive and judicative. This system, 
as formulated in his work The Spirit of the Laws (1748), was incorporated into 
the American constitution in 1787 and has become one of the "... defining 
features of liberal democratic government" (Heywood 2002: 8). 
Although the above citations constitute only a small selection of the 
political theorists who have provided us with insights on sovereignty and 
political power, they nevertheless highlight the philosophical development of 
state theory, which should now be complemented with a brief overview of the 
actual state development in the two selected case studies of Germany and 
England, although where appropriate Britain as a whole will be discussed. 
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Although the focus will be on these two countries, it is important to bear in 
mind that they have not developed in isolation, but in relation to and under the 
influence of neighbouring states and political entities. 
1.3 State development in Germany and England 
1.3.1 Medieval Feudalism and patterns of power 
The Holy Roman Empire 
The era commonly referred to as the Middle Ages was characterised by a 
political system that had emerged approximately in the eighth century AD, and 
would dominate continental Western Europe until the sixteenth century (Poggi 
1978: 16). In Europe, feudal systems of personal bonds developed under 
circumstances, which would have made any other form of rule very difficult to 
maintain, as communications were time-consuming and a non-monetary 
economy resulted in the impossibility of raising taxes to create a central 
administration and ruling centre (Poggi 1978: 19). The resulting system of 
governance operated through a patchwork of political stakeholders such as 
independent cities, monarchs, territorial rulers, empires as well as the 
Catholic Church (Hague and Harrop 2001: 6). The [after's role arose because 
in the Middle Ages, " ... political authority was inextricably bound up with 
religious authority" whereby one of the Church's roles was to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the political system (Rieu 1993: 27). 
The Holy Roman Empire covered a large area in continental Europe, 
although its boundaries were never clearly defined and its inner area was 
fragmented into smaller territories with an elective emperor as the superior 
authority. Feudal society was hierarchically stratified in form of a pyramid 
based on personal relationships between feudal lords and their vassals, while 
the majority of the population constituted the bottom tier as serfs and other 
commoners. Thus social, cultural and political life was concentrated with the 
aristocracy (Fulbrook 1992: 24) whereby political power was an expression of 
social superiority and a prerogative of the privileged (Poggi 1990: 20). 
Sovereignty and political power co-existed in a confusing and complex 
29 
system, whereby political rule was determined by powerful, often temporary 
alliances and by military strength based on feudal relations. In contrast to 
modern states, "... central authority was limited and notions of citizenship and 
legal rights applying to all did not exist" (Hague and Harrop 2001: 7). 
Feudal allegiances were subject to frequent change, thus the territories 
were subject to frequent shifts and changes of borders (Anderson and Hall 
1986: 27). Although originally fiefs were not hereditary, over time many fief 
holders managed to turn their territory into hereditary fiefs which led to the 
emergence of a group of intermediate rulers (collectively referred to as 
territorial rulers or territorial princes) between the emperor and the population 
(Fulbrook 1992: 19). The authority of the emperor was further weakened by 
the elective nature of the office, which hindered the establishment of a strong 
and effective government (Hughes 1992: 3). As a result, power and authority 
in the Holy Roman Empire were separated whereby the emperor was the 
political sovereign or authority without much actual political power, while the 
territorial rulers exercised a great deal of power in their territories, over which 
they formally had no sovereignty. Thus, in Germany, the foundations for the 
modern federal structure, and indirectly therefore for the German 
understanding of sovereignty and sovereignty sharing, were laid early on. 
The dualism between the emperor and the territorial rulers started to be 
institutionalised by the Imperial Reforms at the end of the fifteenth century. In 
1489 the procedures of the Reichstag (Imperial Diet) were further regularised. 
The Reichstag consisted of three chambers (curia): the electors, the other 
territorial rulers (both clerical and secular) and finally the free imperial cities 
(which however had no vote until 1648) (Hughes 1992: 26). A similar structure 
operated at the territorial level in the Landtage (Territorial Diets). Other 
Imperial Reforms included the establishment of an Imperial Court 
(Reichskammergericht) as well as the creation of a regular imperial tax and a 
number of administrative Imperial Circles (Reichskreise). At the same time, in 
1486, the title of the empire was formally changed to 'Holy Roman Empire of 
the German Nation' (Hughes 1992: 19). 
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Centrallsed feudalism in England 
The political development of medieval England was somewhat different. 
Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, King William implemented a version 
of feudalism that sought to avoid a concentration of power at territorial or 
baronial level. As royal power was largely determined by independence of 
revenue, King William kept ownership of the most prosperous manors and 
had them managed by royal bailiffs, while any fiefs granted to the nobility 
were scattered in order to avoid the consolidation of power by the vassals 
(Rayner 1949: 34). This system of rule was consolidated under Henry 1 (1100- 
1135) who founded the royal court (curia regis), which was comparable to a 
royal cabinet composed of a group of royal specialists who advised the king, 
settled disputes between feudal lords and the king and collected the royal 
dues from the sheriffs (Rayner 1949: 35). 
Despite the efforts of the English monarchy to consolidate central rule, 
the nobility demanded more political power. In 1215 King John was forced to 
sign a Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, an essentially feudal document, which 
granted the barons certain privileges including important legal reforms such 
as the right of Habeas Corpus. The document also established that the king 
was not above the law and provided for a committee of barons, the 
predecessor of the House of Lords, to monitor the king and approve taxation 
(Lee 1998: 88). Therefore the Magna Carta established a dualistic system at 
least partly similar to that of the Holy Roman Empire whereby the king 
remained the sovereign, but elements of political power were transferred to 
the nobility. 
In 1258 the nobility, led by Simon de Montfort (1208-1265), aimed at 
increasing the feudal barons' control of the king through the Provisions'of 
Oxford, which proposed the sharing of political power between a Council of 
Fifteen (the Parliament) and in the king (Lee 1998: 94-96). Ensuing civil war 
made de Montford effectively ruler of England in 1264 (Lee 1998: 96). 
Although de Montfort's 'reign' did not last very long, it unintentionally laid the 
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foundation for the House of CommonS3 as Edward 1 (11272-1307) continued to 
implement Simon's reforms (Rayner 1949: 62). The resulting political system 
would effectively remain the same until the sixteenth century. 
1.3.2 The sixteenth century: Reformation and consolidation of political 
power 
The sixteenth century marked in many ways a departure from medieval 
structures and culture. The Renaissance spread from Northern Italy and was 
characterised by a re-discovery of Roman and Greek law and society in 
combination with a scientific revolution in an age of discovery. For example, 
Roman law and the Roman notion of citizenship were studied at European 
universities. Intellectuals learned that Roman state power and authority was 
largely based on the law, whereby the corpus luris established the notion of 
sovereignty as the ultimate law-making power (Held 1989: 217). Under Roman 
law, the exertion of authority and power was legitimate as the law was 
perceived to have originated from the people in the first place (Anderson 
1986: 3), a concept that would later inspire political philosophers such as 
Locke. Politically, there was a general trend in many parts of Western Europe 
towards a consolidation of central power, thus laying the foundations for the 
emergence of the modern state. In the Holy Roman Empire, on the other 
hand, it was the territories and not the empire that started to evolve into 
something " ... recognizable as the modern state" (Hughes 1992: 17). 
At the same time, the Protestant Reformation, although rooted in 
medieval attitudes, "... acted as a modernizing force in social, political and 
intellectual life" (Hughes 1992: 30). Previously, the Catholic Church wielded 
considerable political power in the Holy Roman Empire, especially since many 
of the territorial rulers were members of the clergy and three electors were 
archbishops (Hughes 1992: 31). The secularisation of politics, which followed 
the Reformation, was a major prerequisite for the modern state as it removed 
the Church's share of sovereignty (Held 1989: 218). Within the empire, many 
3 The 1295 Model Parliament summoned by Edward I consisted of two knights from each 
county, two burgesses from each borough and two citizens from each city 
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territorial rulers converted to Protestantism, often for political and economic 
reasons. As Protestants, they did not have to allow papal jurisdiction and 
taxation and could secularise church property (Fulbrook 1999: 43). Following a 
period of religious unrest, the 1555 Peace of Augsburg granted the territorial 
princes the right to determine the religion in their territory (culos regio, eius 
religio), which reinforced their political powers and further consolidated their 
territories. 
In England, the Tudor monarchy, which commenced with the accession 
of Henry VII in 1485, represents a break point. The Tudors established a 
strong monarchy with absolutist features that dominated the English political 
structure until the seventeenth century. In Tudor England, "... all authority 
derived ultimately from God" whereby to challenge "... the royal supremacy 
was to challenge the will of God" (Loades 1997: 10), although authority was 
shared to some extent with Parliament and the Church. The Tudor monarchs, 
however, managed to avoid Parliament and effectively established "Tudor 
despotism" by governing with the Privy Council alone (Rayner 1949: 237). 
They were able to do this as, in peacetime, the monarchy was financially 
independent of Parliament, which was usually only summoned when the 
monarch needed a special tax. 
Henry Vill (1509-1547) permanently changed political and social life 
when he broke with the papacy. In the 1535 Act of Supremacy Henry Vill 
declared that the king and not the pope was the supreme head of the Church 
of England. He ordered the dissolution of the monasteries and the 
confiscation of much of the Church's wealth. Many rich urban merchants and 
lawyers were able to buy former church estates thus greatly increasing the 
rural gentry class. As in the German territories, the religious orientation of 
society was largely determined by the monarch's religion. Catholicism was 
violently suppressed making Protestantism an essential feature of the English 
state and also of the English nation as Chapter Two will explain. 
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1.3.3 The development of the modern state 
The appearance of the continental absolute state in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century is often equated with the start of the modern era 
(Anderson 1986: 2). Absolutism refers to governments (usually a monarchy) 
with unlimited power based on a claim to unlimited right to rule rather than 
"... in the exercise of unchallengeable power" (Heywood 2002: 28). Absolutism 
was a key element in Western Europe in the transition from feudal to 
capital ist-i nd ustrial states by introducing a centralised state apparatus and a 
standing army with the only legitimate use of force within the state territory 
(Anderson and Hall 1986: 21). The formation of absolutist states led to the 
creation of a geographical map of Western Europe consisting of a relatively 
small number of sufficiently large and independent territories, which interacted 
with each other in a competitive power struggle (Poggi 1978: 60). As in Tudor 
England, absolute rule was usually legitimatised through the doctrine of the 
divine rights of kings giving the monarch the absolute sovereignty in his 
territory without any legal constraints (Hague and Harrop 2001: 32). The 
monarch's will was the law by authority of the ruler's divine appointment. 
Absolutism is reflected in Bodin's writings on sovereignty, although Bodin, as 
discussed above, limited absolutism with the notion that the ruler was still 
bound to natural and customary law. 
At the same time, the social structure of the 'subjects' in general 
changed due to a variety of developments such as increased trade and the 
onset of the industrial revolution. The emerging bourgeoisie of capitalist 
entrepreneurs perceived themselves both as a class and as more modern 
than the traditional estates. The nobility, however, retained its privileges and 
was still characterised by traditional features such as non-mobility (belonging 
by birth) (Poggi 1978: 79). Although the emerging middle class constituted a 
new actor in the political system and was engaged in intellectual political 
discussions, it had no access to noble privileges such as political 
representation (Held 1989: 218). 
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The rise of Prussia 
The political dualism in the Holy Roman Empire was finally decided in favour 
of the territorial rulers after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), which was 
concluded by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This settlement provided the 
empire with a basic constitution until its abolition in 1806 (Fulbrook 1992: 60). 
The territorial rulers gained the right to conduct foreign policy independent of 
the empire thus confirming the territorial rulers possession of "... free exercise 
of territorial sovereignty" the so-called Landeshoheit (Hughes 1992: 94). The 
emperor only retained his limited jura caesarae reservata (exclusive rights) in 
his role as feudal overlord (Hughes 1992: 95). Catholicism, Protestantism and 
Calvinism were ratified as the three official religions of the empire while the 
principle of cuios regio, eius religio was upheld. Furthermore, the Treaty made 
some major territorial changes, enlarging some of the territorial states such as 
Brandenburg-Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. The empire nevertheless 
remained important. Its protection made the survival of many small 
principalities possible, which would have been otherwise submerged into 
larger units (Fulbrook 1992: 70). Within the consolidated territories, absolutism 
became the dominant form of rule whereby the territorial rulers attempted to 
centralise their states although not many "... had the resources to act as 
European or even German powers" (Hughes 1992: 115). 
One of the more resourceful and as such successful states was 
Prussia, who emerged from the seventeenth century onwards as one of the 
most important territories in the Holy Roman Empire. The rise of Prussia 
created a new dualism between Prussia and Austria, who competed with each 
other for supremacy within the empire. In 1653 Frederick William of Prussia 
established a small standing army and an elite army corps, which offered 
status and prestige to nobles thereby incorporating the aristocracy into the 
state apparatus (Fulbrook 1992: 77). In 1701 Prussia was granted a royal title. 
Eighteenth century absolutist Prussia was largely characterised by its 
militaristic bureaucracy (Polizeistaat) based on appointed civil servants 
(Beamte) who received a fixed salary. Sovereignty in Prussia was anchored in 
the office rather than the person of the king, thus laying the foundations for 
the German legal-rational system of authority. Prussian absolutism, however, 
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also retained feudal features. Political power was still a prerogative of social 
status. Although Elector Frederick 111 (1688-1713, from 1701 Frederick I King 
in Prussia) had a policy of employing non-nobles, his son Frederick 11 
reversed this policy, "... convinced that the nobility had to be preserved as 
natural officers and administrators" (Hughes 1992: 144). The privileged and 
unchallenged status of the nobility would lead in the nineteenth century to 
considerable discontent, especially among the middle classes. 
Frederick 11 (1740-86), who saw himself as the first servant of the state, 
was an advocate and promoter of enlightened absolutism. Enlightened 
absolutism did not involve a change in the form of government as such but 
reason and law gained in importance, while the divine royal rule lost 
somewhat in significance (Hughes 1992: 146). Governments were now 
regarded as "... having a duty to promote the happiness of their subjects as 
well as security and order" (Hughes 1992: 146). As Schulze (1995: 81) put it 
U ... the absolutist state was well on the way to being turned into an enlightened 
welfare state- everything for the people, but nothing by the people". Frederick 
also implemented a range of socio-economic and legal reforms such as the 
codification of civil law (Allgemeines Landrecht, published 1794). The civil 
code regulated the relationship between the state and the 'citizens' although it 
remained a somewhat feudal document that allocated rights by social class 
and retained the privileges of the nobility. As Hughes (1992: 148) summarises, 
enlightened absolutist Prussia "... typified the partial modernization 
characteristic of enlightened absolutism. In general, reform at the top did not 
deeply affect the corporate structure of society and the old pre-absolutist 
institutional structures were not destroyed". 
Civil War and the supremacy of Parliament 
England in the seventeenth century was dominated by conflict between the 
absolutist tendencies of the monarchy on the one hand and the strive for more 
parliamentary power on the other. Both James 1 (1603-25) and Charles 1 
(1625-49) were convinced absolutists. Their relationship with Parliament 
continued to be one of mutual dependency whereby the king needed 
Parliament to approve special taxes, while Parliament could only meet when 
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summoned by the monarch, who could also dissolve it at any time. 
Parliament, being elected only by rich property owners, was therefore neither 
democratic nor a real political power. 
Charles I had dissolved Parliament and tried to rule by raising and 
extending unapproved taxes. When he had to summon Parliament again in 
1640, Parliament immediately passed two important acts: first that Parliament 
could not be dissolved without its consent and second that elections to 
Parliament should take place at least every three years (Lee 1997: 212-214). 
In 1642 civil war broke out between supporters of Parliament and those of 
Charles. After the execution of Charles, in January 1649, England became a 
republic while the old feudal-royal institutions, the monarchy, the Anglican 
Church and the House of Lords, were abolished (Lee 1997: 228). Considering 
that the republic was very much linked to Cromwell, the Lord Protector, it is 
perhaps not surprising, as Lee (1997: 234) put it, that "... the great experiment, 
the Commonwealth, the Republic, died with Cromwell" although Cromwell's 
son took over as Lord Protector in 1658 until 1660 when the monarchy was 
finally restored under Charles 11 (1660-85). 
The role of Parliament was finally strengthened, not by the failed 
republic, but when a constitutional monarchy was established in 1689 after 
James 11 (1685-88) tried to re-establish absolutist rule and convert the country 
to Catholicism. William of Orange, married to James' Protestant daughter 
Mary, landed in England, invited by conspirators against James. William 
emerged victorious and, in 1689, a Declaration of Rights offered the crown to 
William and Mary. This Bill of Rights established a constitutional monarchy 
and created a new sovereign 'the King in Parliament' (Schauer 1996: 99). It 
was now illegal for the monarch to suspend the law, to collect taxes without 
parliamentary permission and to keep a standing army in peacetime. The 
1694 Triennial Act ensured regular parliamentary elections (Black 1993: 10). 
The new constitutional monarchy was still by no means democratic and the 
franchise would remain heavily restricted until the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the seventeenth century, some essentially 
modern features had been established such as the right of Parliament to 
37 
control the sovereign. This incorporated the idea, as expressed by Locke, that 
state institutions and actions have limits and boundaries. 
The question of why a constitutional monarchy was established in 
England at a time when the majority of western European states were still 
ruled by absolutist monarchs, seems to be at least partly answered by 
economic circumstances. By the end of the seventeenth century England had 
an extensive land market, waged-labour, commercialised farming and a 
concept of private property in addition to the early establishment of a 
mercantile-capitalist middle class profiting from trade with the colonies 
(Anderson and Hall 1986: 37-38). Mercantilism, in the form of economic state 
protection policies, was a feature of many continental absolutist states in the 
seventeenth century, but was not employed by the English government. State 
regulations were only favoured in case that they actually served the market 
and the individual profit (Cochrane 1986: 69). One could in fact argue that 
absolutism was short lived in Britain because early forms of industrialisation 
demanded political changes and a more liberal economic approach. Hall 
(1984: 9-10) claims that ... it is under this constitutional system that 
industrialization occurred. ... ] the state was forced into a more liberal and 
constitutional path by the demands of the rising classes associated with these 
economic developments". 
Shortly after the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the Act of 
Union in 1707 created Great Britain, joining Scotland with England and Wales 
(Rayner 1949: 349). In 1708 a new Parliament of Great Britain abolished not 
only the Scottish Privy Council but also the Scottish Parliament (Black 
1993: 13) thus establishing a centralised unitary state, which was expanded 
through the Act of Union 1801 to include the Kingdom of Ireland. The 
relatively early establishment of a unitary state with centralised institutions 
would become an important cornerstone of British national identity as Chapter 
Two will explain. In 1776 Britain lost its main colony when the former North 
American territories declared their independence. This was followed by the 
French Revolution in 1789. The new states, the USA and the French 
Republic, were inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and Montesquieu and 
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established popular sovereignty and representative democracies with 
governments based on the idea of separation of powers. At first, the British 
government seemed to welcome the French Revolution which it was assumed 
would turn France into a constitutional monarchy. Similarly to the rulers of 
German territories, the British Parliament saw no danger that the revolution 
might spread to Britain (Lee 1997: 460). The French Revolution was largely 
thought to be a consequence of Louis XVI's incompetence (Hughes 
1992: 175). Opinions changed, however, especially when the French 
Revolution was followed first by the Revolutionary and then the Napoleonic 
Wars. 
1.3.4 Germany in the nineteenth century 
In the course of the Napoleonic Wars, large parts of the Holy Roman Empire 
were invaded. As a consequence, in 1806 the empire was abolished and a 
German Confederation under French protection as well as a number of 
French satellite states were created in its place. Many of the smaller and 
medium sized territories were reorganised into larger units. During the French 
period, the states were modernised and the power of the established 
authorities was strengthened. This period can not be regarded as liberal as 
such, but as a period of transition when important foundations for the later 
liberal-constitutional movement were created (Hughes 1992: 184). Some 
territorial states introduced constitutions and parliaments and there was even 
an increase in popular participation (Hughes 1992: 184). At the same time 
some feudal class restrictions were lifted in many states, for example in 
Prussia, which meant that nobles could now engage in middle-class business 
and middle-class members could buy noble lands (Fulbrook 1992: 99). The 
French occupation therefore had a much greater impact on the German states 
than the French Revolution itself. Increased social mobility would be essential 
for further economic and industrial development. The nobility, however, still 
retained many of its privileges. 
The Congress of Vienna in 1815, following the defeat of Napoleon, 
tried to restore order in the states of the former Holy Roman Empire. A 
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German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) was created on 8 June 1815 as a 
counterweight to Prussia and Austria. The Bund is best described as a very 
lose confederation of thirty-nine states with a federal diet, which was basically 
a permanent congress of diplomatic representatives. The constitution followed 
the established practice of the Holy Roman Empire and further cemented the 
tradition of shared political power and shared sovereignty, which would come 
to shape twentieth century attitudes to the EU as Chapter Five will explore. 
The constitution of the Bund (Deutsche Bundesakte) implemented a system of 
shared sovereignty whereby each member of the community was 
independent with full internal sovereignty while the Confederation was in 
charge of external sovereignty. Internally, most states subscribed to 
enlightened absolutism although the Bundesakte contained a non-statutory 
article urging all member states to grant constitutions. The few states that 
obliged granted its citizens some civil liberties, but no (or heavily restricted) 
political rights. 
Civil liberties and liberal rights were also at the heart of the 1848/49 
revolutions, which took place in many European cities and states including 
most of the states of the German Confederation. The main causes of the 
revolutions were middle class discontent as well as a widespread economic 
and agricultural crisis. Liberal governments were installed in some states and 
in May 1848 a National Assembly (Verfassungsgebende Versamm1ung) met 
in Frankfurt (Fulbrook 1992: 120). The aim of the Assembly was to draw up a 
constitution for Germany but its weaknesses became soon apparent. Apart 
from factional squabbles, the Assembly was essentially powerless and had to 
rely on Prussian and Austrian support, which was not exactly forthcoming. 
Eventually, the Assembly decided on the creation of a Deutsches Reich 
(excluding Austria) with a parliamentarian constitution. The imperial crown 
was offered to the King of Prussia who promptly declined the "... crown that 
was made of 'muck and mire"' (Kitchen 2006: 87). By the end of 1849 many 
rulers had regained power in their states and the National Assembly was 
dispersed. Schauer (1996: 31) attributes the failure of the revolution, to some 
extent at least, to the continued conservative-monarchist attitude of large 
parts of the population who preferred the existing state structure to that of a 
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unified German state. The liberal movement only represented a small faction 
of the population and failed to address for example working class or peasant 
issues. The whole approach was too theoretical and lacked clear leadership 
as well as actual political power and authority. 
In the following decades, the Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck, using 
a mixture of planned policy, manipulation and use of circumstances, 
eventually orchestrated the establishment of a unified German Empire in 
1871. By 1866 the German Confederation had in effect ceased to exist with 
the commencement of the Austro-Prussian war. Following Prussian victory, a 
new Prussian led North German Confederation was established while Austria 
had to renounce any influence on German affairs. As before, shared 
sovereignty and political power was institutionalised as the new confederate 
constitution gave the Prussian king responsibility for foreign affairs and the 
army, while the territorial rulers were allowed to look after their internal affairs. 
The Confederation had a Reichstag, elected by universal male suffrage, while 
the territorial rulers and governments formed an Upper House (Bundesrat), 
with a presidential committee and a Chancellor (Bismarck) as executive 
(Kitchen 2006: 113). Although the legislative powers of the Reichstag were 
limited, the introduction of universal male suffrage 4 established for the first 
time a link between political participation and the state, between citizenship 
and political power, which provided an important stimulus for the development 
of a political public and popular political culture. 
Following Prussian victory over France in the Franco-Prussian war 
(1870-1871) the South German states acceded somewhat unwillingly to the 
Confederation and the second German Empire was proclaimed in January 
1871 with the Prussian king as its hereditary emperor. Politically, the new 
empire was largely based on the structure of the North German Confederation 
and was the result of a number of somewhat uneasy compromises between 
liberal nationalism and authoritarian features (Kitchen 2006: 121). The empire 
was a federal organisation, with several political organs at national level. The 
4 Although the Reichstag was elected by universal male suffrage, the Prussian Diet continued 
to be elected by a three-class voting system. 
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legislature took the form of a Parliament (Reichstag), which was directly 
elected by universal male suffrage. The Reichstag, however, had few real 
powers apart from the right to approve the budget and new laws, although any 
new law also needed the approval of the Bundesrat and thus in effect the 
approval of the emperor, the Chancellor, who was appointed by the emperor, 
and Prussia (Kitchen 2006: 123). It was supplemented by a federal council 
(Bundesrat), composed of delegations from the different states but dominated 
by Prussia. Executive power was concentrated in the hands of the emperor 
and the Chancellor with the Cabinet of Ministers. Nevertheless, the new 
German Empire, despite its seemingly liberal-democratic features, was in 
effect a constitutional monarchy "... comprising a loose federation of quasi- 
independent states, the whole dominated by the Prussian military state" 
(Kitchen 2006: 121). 
1.3.5 Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth century: Democratisation, 
Decolonisation and Devolution 
The mid nineteenth century was, according to Budge et al (2001: 34) a critical 
period for the British constitutional monarchy as "... various developments 
came together to shape modern Britain". By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the industrial revolution had created a largely urban working class 
with about half of the population living in urban areas that had no political 
representation (Budge et al 2001: 34). The change in class structure, 
population size and concentration demanded a change in the franchise, which 
had been virtually unchanged since the fifteenth century. A series of reform 
bills in the nineteenth century transformed large parts of the population 
gradually into politically active citizens, rather than mere subjects, further 
linking the state and political participation as well as national identity as 
Chapter Two will explain. The first Reform Bill of 1832 enfranchised middle- 
class men and changed the election boroughs towards a more representative 
system in terms of actual population density (Colls 2002: 69). So far, the highly 
populated and industrialised towns such as Manchester had no or only one 
seat in Parliament while some scarcely populated rural boroughs had two or 
more seats. The Reform Bill abandoned most of the rotten boroughs 
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redistributing the seats to the large towns (Budge et al 2001: 35). The right to 
vote was extended to male heads of households, who paid EIO or more 
annual rent (Bloy 1997: 1). This still excluded the vast working class, but now 
included the upper middle classes. 
A second Reform Bill was passed in 1867, which further increased the 
number of voters. Male workers were for the first time included in the 
franchise although this was made subject to property values (Colls 2002: 110). 
A Third Reform Act in 1884 extended the urban franchise and gave the vote 
to agricultural labourers, (Budge et al 2001: 35). After the First World War, in 
1919, the franchise was extended to include all adult males and women over 
thirty, which was changed in 1928 when all adult women were granted the 
vote (Budge et al 2001: 35). 
The nineteenth century reform bills also prompted a concern to ensure 
that those, who would now participate in political power through the educated 
suffrage, would be adequately educated. Until 1870, elementary education in 
England was provided on a voluntary basis and was largely organised by 
Churches and the National Society (Sanderson 1983: 23). The state's 
involvement in education was largely limited to an annual E20,000 grant from 
1833 onward (E30,000 from 1839) to stimulate school growth and building. 
This was gradually increased to include grants for equipment, teacher training 
and running costs (Sanderson 1983: 19). In 1856 a new Education 
Department was established, but it was not until 1870 when the Elementary 
Education Act "... formed the watershed between mere State assistance and 
State provision of elementary education" (Evans 1975: 28). The 1870 Act 
essentially was designed to fill the existing gaps as by 1870 39% of children 
aged three to twelve were still not at school (Sanderson 1983: 23). The new 
education legislation came into force for a variety of reasons including the 
concerns raised by the 1867 Reform Bill and the dangers of an illiterate 
electorate. Interestingly, the recent Prussian victory over Austria in the Seven 
Weeks War was commonly linked to the Prussian elementary and secondary 
education provision, which was thought to be beneficial to national power and 
military strength (Evans 1975: 29). Nevertheless, it was not until 1902 that a 
43 
national education system was established by the 1902 Education Act. This 
act reformed school administration by creating a countrywide network of Local 
Education Authorities, which were also empowered to expand and improve 
secondary education, although this was not a mandatory obligation (Lawson 
and Silver 1973: 371-373). 
At the same time, as previously aristocratic political and educational 
privileges were gradually extended to all, the power and status of the English 
or British nobility gradually declined from the 1830s to the 1930s at the same 
time (Coils 2002: 75). In the second half of the nineteenth century, the political 
public expanded and middle-class values were more widely disseminated 
throughout society due to the rise in literacy rates and the emergence of a 
national mass press (Budge et al 2001: 39). By the 1870s both the 
Conservative and the Liberal Party had established themselves on a 
countrywide basis and became the strongest parties, which was reinforced by 
the election system (First Past the Post in single member constituencies) that 
favoured large parties with strong regional support (Budge et al 2001: 41). 
Although Labour eventually replaced the Liberal Party as second strongest 
party, the party and election system has effectively continued largely 
unchanged until the present day (Budge et al 2001: 40-41). 
The second half of the nineteenth century also saw a new wave of 
imperialism and empire creation. The British Empire, although not 
unproblematic and expensive in terms of colonial defence and administration, 
was important for the British economy, "... providing food and raw materials, 
markets, investment opportunities and destinations for migrants" (Wardley 
1994: 59). In the early twentieth century, the British Empire included almost a 
quarter of the globe. After 1945 the process of decolonisation began whereby 
former colonies were given independent status (Budge et al 2001: 557). The 
process of decolonisation, largely complete by the mid 1960s, transformed the 
empire into the Commonwealth (Rubinstein 2003: 243). Both the empire itself 
and the process of decolonisation had a considerable impact on national 
identity and nationalism as will be shown in the next chapter. 
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Finally, no assessment of the development of the British state would be 
complete without highlighting at least briefly the impact of late twentieth 
century devolution. Devolution refers to the " ... transfer of power from central 
government to subordinate regional bodies, without (unlike federalism) 
leading to shared sovereignty" (Heywood 2002: 422). Without transforming a 
unitary state into a federal system, devolution allows some degree of 
decentralisation, often to reflect "... growing regional and sometimes 
nationalist pressures" (Heywood 2002: 167). In the UK, devolution was put 
back on the political agenda in the 1960s following a revival of Scottish and 
Welsh nationalism, although devolved assemblies were not established until 
1999 (Heywood 2002: 168). The new regional assemblies, however, were not 
granted the same political status. The Scottish Parliament received tax- 
varying powers as well as primary legislative authority in domestic policy 
areas; the Northern Ireland Assembly has some primary legislative powers, 
while the Welsh Assembly is limited to secondary or 'subordinate' legislation 
(Budge et al 2001: 148-167). In contrast to the Westminster Parliament, the 
new regional assemblies are elected by proportional representation. Heywood 
(2002: 168-9) describes the UK as having now a 'quasi-federal' character 
since the new regional assemblies enjoy democratic legitimacy and as such 
have political entrenchment unlike the EU as Chapter Five will discuss. The 
process of devolution also has some important implications especially for 
British national identity, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
1.3.6 Twentieth century Germany: from Empire to Republic 
In the twentieth century, Germany's political structure changed considerably. 
The First World War was concluded by the Treaty of Versailles which came 
into force in 1920. Germany lost around one tenth of her territory including 
Alsace-Lorraine, parts of West and East Prussia and all of her colonies. The 
economically important Saarland was made a temporary League of Nations 
mandate and the Rhineland was demilitarised. Germany's military was limited 
in size while any form of war preparation was forbidden. Reparation payments 
were to be made based on the infamous Article 231 which stated that 
Germany and her allies were solely responsible for the war (Kitchen 
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2006: 221). The importance of the war and its concluding treaty for the future 
political and national development of Germany can hardly be underestimated. 
As will be illustrated below and in Chapter Two, both world wars in the 
twentieth century had a significant if not cataclysmic impact on German 
political structures as well as the fundamental underlying attitudes to political 
concepts (such as sovereignty and citizenship) and national identity, which 
would significantly inform post-1945 German attitudes to European 
integration, as Chapter Five will discuss. 
The Weimar Republic 
The Treaty of Versailles was signed for Germany by the recently established 
Weimar Republic. It had been declared on 9 November 1918 in Berlin amidst 
a revolution that had started in October 1918 as a navy mutiny, although 
mass strikes and demonstrations had already taken place throughout the last 
years of the war. The new republic was largely a creation of the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and was, at least to some extent, a 
counter measure to alternative plans for the creation of a socialist republic. In 
fact, the first years of the new republic would be riddled with high levels of 
political violence, assassinations, coup attempts, strikes and demonstrations. 
The republic was under threat from both the right and the left. The left wished 
to establish a Soviet type state and criticised the SPD for working with the old 
elites. The right was preoccupied with a struggle to revise the Versailles 
Treaty, which was simultaneously a struggle against the Weimar Republic, as 
the followers of the republic were blamed for accepting the treaty (Kitchen 
2006: 223) 
The constitution for the Weimar Republic was proclaimed on 11 August 
1919 (Fulbrook 1992: 160). It opted for a mixed parliamentary and presidential 
governmental system. It relied heavily on the 1848 constitutional proposals 
and even adopted the 1848 black, red and gold German flag in a bid to 
artificially create historical continuity and appeal to national sentiment. The 
Reich was to be a federal state whereby the old territorial structure remained 
largely intact, although the republic was far more centralised than the old 
empire (Kitchen 2006: 223). To secure political unity, the reserve rights of the 
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states were ended and the Reich's rights to raise direct taxes were 
strengthened. The Parliament was to be elected by universal suffrage, which 
was now extended to include women. A pure proportional election system 
was chosen, which led to a high proportion of small parties in Parliament. 
The bicameral Reichstag was the legislative of the new republic and 
was the representative organ of the sovereign people. Therefore, unlike the 
previous system, the Weimar constitution was inspired by the democratic 
ideas of Rousseau and created citizens, who not only participated in, but were 
the de facto owners of the democratic process. Consequently, the new 
constitution also guaranteed certain minimal education rights including equal 
access to education, free education for eight years, compulsory attendance 
for the first four years of elementary schooling, access to secondary education 
based on ability and the obligatory introduction of Staatsborgerkunde (civics 
lessons) (Hahn 1998: 55-56). 
The executive of the new republic, consisting of the president, the 
Chancellor and the cabinet, was made responsible to the Reichstag. The 
president was directly elected every seven years and had considerable 
political power (Fulbrook 1992: 60). He had the supreme command of the 
armed forces and the power to appoint and dismiss governments as well as 
the right to dissolve the Reichstag (Bessel 1997: 241). Most crucially, the 
president could make use of the Notverordnungsrecht (emergency power) of 
Article 48, which could operate as a substitute constitution. As the large 
number of small parties made the formation of clear parliamentary majorities 
impossible, the governmental power was increasingly executed via the 
Notverordnungsrecht by the president. This provision would prove to be a 
decisive reason for the eventual failure of the republic. The constitution also 
included a catalogue of basic rights, although not directly binding in law. 
Although the republic apparently stabilised in the second half of the 
1920s, these 'golden years' were of short duration and rested on shaky 
foundations (Bessel 1997: 249+252). At the start of 1930s, two main 
processes occurred simultaneously, the collapse of the Weimar democracy 
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and the rise of the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP). The Weimar 
Republic had struggled with problems from the start. It was burdened with the 
provisions of the Versailles Treaty, its legitimacy was contested and attacked 
from both left and right. It was also trying to cope with severe economic 
problems. The eventual collapse of the system can be attributed to a unique 
combination of circumstances. For example, some of the constitutional 
provisions of the political system were inherently flawed. The extensive use of 
Article 48 resulted, after 1931, in an almost complete replacement of 
parliamentary sovereignty by presidential authoritarianism (Fulbrook 
1992: 173). In addition, the population had not entirely been "... converted to 
the republican cause" (Bessel 1997: 249). 
The Third Reich 
In January 1933 Adolf Hitler, was appointed Chancellor. In March 1933 the 
so-called Enabling Act was passed, a constitutional amendment that allowed 
Hitler to pass laws without parliamentary approval. Subsequently, all other 
parties were either outlawed or disbanded themselves while the formation of 
new parties was forbidden, thus creating a one party state (Fulbrook 
1992: 180). At the same time, the state was centralised as state governments 
were given the right to pass legislation without having to consult regional 
parliaments, which commenced the process referred to as Gleichschaltung 
(Kitchen 2006: 262). This process also included a comprehensive programme 
of co-ordination, including for example the re-organisation of all societies and 
associations under party control (Kitchen 2006: 264). The result of was an 
authoritarian dictatorship, whose ideology shall be examined in the following 
chapter. The dictatorship was complete when Hitler was appointed "Fohrer 
and Reich Chancellor" in 1934 (Kitchen 2006: 270). Although no further 
investigation of the Third Reich shall be made here, it should be noted that in 
1938 Austria was included (AnschlO), followed by an aggressive foreign 
policy with regards to Czechoslovakia and Poland, which eventually led to the 
Second World War in 1939. 
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Post-war Germany 
After the Second World War, in 1945, Germany lay in ruins, both literally as 
well as economically and politically. Germany was occupied by the allied 
victors who agreed in theory on a general policy of denazification, 
demilitarisation and democratisation (Carter 1997: 436). Germany lost over 
20% of her territory, especially in the East, while the occupied zones gradually 
developed into two separate German states. By 1949 the Soviet Zone had 
undergone major political, economic and social changes and was under 
Communist control (Fulbrook 1992: 207). The Western zones retained a 
capitalist market economy and benefited substantially from the US Marshall 
Aid for political and economic reconstruction, which was a successful attempt 
to transform Western Germany into a democratic ally (Fulbrook 1992: 209- 
210). In 1948 negotiations were launched for a new constitution for a new 
state in Western Germany, which came into being in the form of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) in May 1949 while the (East) German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was founded in October 1949 (Fulbrook 1992: 210-11). 
Although 1945 is often labelled 'zero hour' (Stunde Nulo, Kitchen 
(2006: 318) points out that there were invariably elements of continuity. The 
West German constitution, for example, was "... remarkably similar to that of 
Weimar" (Roseman 1997: 368) although it was designed not to repeat some of 
the previous mistakes. The constitution was called the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) and was committed to eventual reunification (Fulbrook 
1992: 211). West Germany was to be a federal representative democracy with 
a president (indirectly elected and restricted to representational functions) and 
Chancellor (appointed by the Bundestag) as well as free general elections to 
the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag), which also had a regionally 
based Upper House (Bundesrat) (Roseman 1997: 368). As Fulbrook 
(1992: 219) points out, the democracy of the Federal Republic (and that of the 
united Germany after 1990) had some unique constitutional features. The 
election system is a mix of proportional and first-past-the-post features with a 
5% threshold, which has consistently provided stable coalition governments. 
The Basic Law also contains unalterable essential freedoms and human rights 
(Kitchen 2006: 324). The new Federal Republic was at best semi-sovereign 
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with the Allies retaining control over certain areas such as foreign policy 
(Roseman 1997: 369). In 1955, the Federal Republic regained (almost) full 
sovereignty when she became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) (Fulbrook 1992: 211). From the start, the FRG was firmly 
committed to western integration as will be shown in Chapter Four. The 
constitution itself became the nucleus of German national re-invention as 
Chapters Two and Five will explain. 
East Germany on the other hand was based on Marxist-Leninist 
principles of 'democratic centralism' with effective control in the hands of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) (Kitchen 2006: 325). The government 
and state apparatus of the GDR were organised hierarchically with the 
Council of State as the ceremonial head and the Council of Ministers having 
governmental power (Fulbrook 1992: 224). The Parliament met infrequently 
and basically served the purpose of ratification of centrally determined 
decisions (Fulbrook 1992: 225). The split between the two states attained 
gradually a more permanent character with the building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 and the fortification of the rest of the frontier. In 1973 both states 
became full members of the United Nations (Fulbrook 1992: 216). 
German re-unification followed a series of transitions in 1989 that had 
initially started in recently reformed East-Central European states such as 
Hungary, where East Germans were able to cross borders into the West or 
seek refuge in Western embassies (Fulbrook 1992: 241-42). Within the GIDR 
demands for debate and reform led to weekly mass demonstrations resulting 
in limited reforms from above (Osmond 1997: 461-463). On 9 November 1989, 
the border at the Berlin Wall was opened (Kitchen 2006: 384). Subsequently, 
further attempts were made to reform the GIDR with elections in March 1990 
and a change in leadership, although at the same time the economy and 
administration continued to collapse (Fulbrook 1992: 246). In July 1990 a 
currency union preceded German unification in October 1990, whereby the 
newly reconstituted East German Under were incorporated into the Federal 
Republic and the pre-1990 West German constitution (Osmond 1997: 466- 
467). Some modifications to the Basic Law, however, were made including 
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provisions "... for the Federal government to hand over certain sovereign 
rights to the European Union" (Kitchen 2006: 398) thus underlining the 
German commitment to European integration. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how the creation of international and 
supranational networks such as the EU has started to challenge some of the 
established political concepts. Since the EU has acquired a certain share in 
sovereignty, at least in some policy areas, the traditional role and function of 
the state has been eroded to some degree and the concept of sovereignty 
had to be redefined, at least theoretically, in terms of multi-level governance. 
This chapter has also illustrated a number of important differences in 
the state development between England (or Britain) and Germany. Feudalism 
and the subsequent political development in Germany have resulted in 
permanent accumulation of political power on territorial level, as expressed in 
the federal structure of modern Germany. The UK on the other hand has 
traditionally been one of the most centralised unitary states in Europe, 
although recently some power was devolved to regional assemblies 
(Heywood 2002: 165-168). The differences in state structure and 
development have therefore resulted in different attitudes to shared or multi- 
level sovereignty, which impact on attitudes to European integration as 
subsequent chapters will show. Whereas Germany has a tradition of shared 
sovereignty, which also became part of the traumatic political re-invention 
after 1945' in Britain, national sovereignty is an integral part of the political 
system as well as of emotive concepts such as nation and belonging, as will 
be discussed below. 
This chapter has illustrated how England started to develop as early as 
the thirteenth century into a parliamentary monarchy whereby the supremacy 
of Parliament over the king was established in the seventeenth century. 
Germany, on the other hand, remained an assortment of loosely grouped 
territorial states until the end of the nineteenth century, when a united federal 
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constitutional empire emerged. The modern British political system is a result 
of a long gradual development and has not been radically modified. By 
comparison, since unification in 1871, Germany had a political development 
marked by revolution and radical changes whereby the recent system is an 
allied creation, the result of the traumatic experiences of the Third Reich and 
the Second World War. Potential consequences of this different political 
development, especially in the twentieth century, for attitudes and policies 
towards European integration will be analysed in subsequent 6apters. 
Socially, British society was transformed by the early industrial 
revolution in the seventeenth century into a more mobile, class-based society, 
while in Germany numerous internal frontiers and the rigid medieval feudal- 
social structures hindered the economic and socio-cultural development until 
the nineteenth century. In general, the transformation into a more modern 
capitalist society in Western Europe was accompanied by an awakening of a 
political public and the search for new political ideas and concept more fitting 
to the modern society. As early as in the sixteenth century philosophers 
developed modern political concepts including notions of sovereignty and 
citizenship, which developed over time into a public demand for 
democratisation. In Britain and Germany the democratisation of the political 
system started in the nineteenth century with the gradual extension of the 
franchise, which was accompanied by the gradual improvement in education 
provision. This process lasted well into the twentieth century. This social and 
political development was also closely linked to the development of national 
identity and nationalism which will be the focus of the following chapter. 
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2. Nationalism, Nations and Nation states in Western 
Europe 
2.1 Introduction: Perspectives on Nations and Nationalism 
Having examined the development of the state and the political system in 
Germany and England it is now time to turn to the theme of nationhood. It is 
important to consider the development of nations and nationalism with 
regards to the thesis as European integration is taking place within the 
framework of the European nation states. European attitudes, identity and 
citizenship are intrinsically linked to national attitudes and identities. Any 
discussion of the future of European integration must be related to 
speculations about the future of the European nation states (Dunkerley et al 
2002: 6). As Shore (2000: 33) points out "... theories of nationalism shed light 
on European integration in two ways". The first is by explaining the role of the 
intelligentsia in precipitating the rise of nationalism, which might provide a 
relevant comparison to European integration, which is also often described as 
elite-led, as will be explored in later chapters. Secondly, theories of 
nationalism often relate the rise of a national consciousness to the 
development of communication technologies or advances in the cultural 
domain. Such theories of nation state formation (for example by Gellner or 
Anderson as discussed below), can again be related to and help explain the 
processes of European integration (Shore 2000: 33-34). On the other hand, 
the ongoing debate about the implications of European integration for the 
nation states and the controversy surrounding European identity vis-a-vie 
national identities, shows that nation states and national identity are concepts 
that are still very relevant to European governments and peoples. It is 
therefore important for this chapter to discuss in further detail the origin and 
nature as well as the historical development of nations, nationalism, nation 
states and national identity. 
Despite the vast number of publications on nationalism and nations, 
there is a persistent confusion regarding terminology and definition. This 
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confusion is mainly due to the variety of perspectives applied to the study of 
nationalism (Herb and Kaplan 1999: 13), something that Brown (2000: 4) refers 
to as "conceptual ambiguities". Brown (2000), as well as for example 
Hutchinson and Smith (1994), provide useful categorisations that attempt to 
order and group the plethora of theories on nations, nationalism and related 
concepts. A similar simplified theoretical overview is attempted below 
whereby the selection of included theories is based on their general 
prominence in the literature and their relevance for this study. This theoretical 
discussion will be followed by an examination of the development of nations 
and nationalism in Germany as well as England and Britain as a whole. 
2.2 Nations and nationalism 
Nations are usually defined in close relationship to the state and the principle 
of sovereignty, as discussed in the previous chapter, whereby the nation is 
considered to be a politicised entity, which has the common goal or destiny to 
preserve its unique character. For example, Herb (1999: 16) defines a nation 
as an entity actively seeking independence as it can only in its own state deal 
with its own affairs independently. If successful, the resulting political entity is 
normally referred to as a nation state, as discussed in Chapter One. This is 
not to say that the territory of the state necessarily matches that of the nation 
and vice versa, however both influence and condition each other (Wintle 
1996b: 17). 
Thus, nations are often regarded as having a distinct territorial aspect. 
Hastings (1997: 4) agrees by defining a nation as an entity that possesses or 
claims the right to political autonomy and identity as a people, together with 
the control of a specific territory. In addition to the original characteristic of 
territory as living space for a community, the national territory " ... creates a 
collective consciousness by reinventing itself as a homeland" (Herb 1999: 17). 
Other communities or nations are usually perceived on an 'us-them' basis, 
distinguishing insiders from outsiders. Smith (1991: 14) expands this definition 
by describing a nation as "... a named human population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
54 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members". For 
the purpose of this thesis, Smith's explanation will be used as a working 
definition of the nation. 
Definitions of nationalism are equally problematic. Dann (1996) 
distinguishes between patriotism, national movement and nationalism. Central 
to his theory is the role of society in the nation formation process, although a 
certain state influence is not ruled out. Dann (1996) believes that a political 
nation develops with the formation of a collective political national 
consciousness [Nationalbewusstsein] within a population or ethnicity by 
discovering common traditions and interests. This may be described as the 
development of an 'us'-consciousness, often in contrast to other groups and 
communities. Nation formation is thus primarily a process of social integration 
and the result, national identity, is neither absolute nor exclusive (Dann 
1996: 15). Dann (1996: 15) argues that the values and symbols of national 
identity are usually taken from the, often romanticised, past of this particular 
group of people. Nation formation is also to some extent elite driven and 
never affects all strata of a society at the same time. Similar to Gellner (1983), 
Dann (1996) claims that politically non-privileged social strata were only then 
incorporated when education, popular political culture and emancipation were 
extended to these strata from the eighteenth century onwards. As already 
pointed out, this elite-centred model may also be applied to the process of 
European integration and the formation of a European consciousness as will 
be explored further on. 
Dann (1996) identifies the rise of patriotism in the eighteenth century 
as another important factor in the process of nation formation. He defines 
patriotism as "... social-political behaviour, which focuses not on individual 
self-interests but on the bonum commune or bonum patria. Patriotism is an 
expression of a special political culture and education" (Dann 1996: 16, own 
translation). Dann distinguishes between patriotism and national movements. 
Whereas patriotism could focus on any political community, such as the 
German territorial states, national movements had the distinct aim of nation 
state formation (Dann 1996: 18). Therefore a national movement is defined as 
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an "... organised movement of a nation or of national-conscious social strata, 
with the goal to achieve political autonomy within their territory" (Dann 
1996: 19, own translation). 
Dann's definition of a 'national movement' is largely synonymous with 
what is in Anglo-American literature usually referred to as nationalism. 
Although, as Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 4) point out, there are "... important 
differences in ways of defining the concept, some equating it with 'national 
sentiment', others with nationalist ideology and language, others again with 
nationalist movements", there seems to be nevertheless an important 
difference between post-war German and the Anglo-American literature on 
nationalism. Whereby all the different perspectives mentioned by Hutchinson 
and Smith (1994) tend to be collectively known as 'nationalism' in the Anglo- 
American literature, post-war German literature has a tendency to follow 
Dann's example and distinguish between 'national movements' (value-free) 
and 'nationalism' (negative connotation). Dann (1996: 20) for example defines 
nationalism as an aggressive political behaviour, which perceives other 
nations as enemies or as inferior, whereby organised nationalism as a political 
movement was often paired with anti-democratic and anti-social tendencies. 
By contrast, in the Anglo- American literature, nationalism at the most general 
level is value-free and often referred to as the right to national self- 
determination or as "... a sentiment felt by a human group which identifies 
itself as a nation, [which] may find practical expression in an historical 
movement and a political programme" (The Open University 1988: 9). This 
difference in definition is based to a large extent on the German experience 
with nationalist ideology in the twentieth century, the devastation of both world 
wars and the subsequent re-evaluation of nations and national identity, which 
also had an impact on attitudes to European integration, as will be discussed 
later on. 
In any case, there are countless schools of thought that have 
developed an understanding of nations and nationalism as well as theories 
concerning their origin and development. The variety of perspectives is often 
simplified and grouped in two or more major categories that are frequently 
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perceived as opposing and contradictory. For instance, Herb and Kaplan 
(1999: 14) distinguish between the primordialist (or essentialist) and the 
modernist (or constructivist- instrumentalist) perspective. This differentiation is 
somewhat misleading as it compares two different principles: primordialism is 
concerned with the nature of nations and nationalism, while modernism is 
primarily concerned with the origin of nations and nationalism. 
Smith (2000: 2-4) offers a more detailed categorisation. He developed 
two pairs of opposing perspectives: primordialism versus instrumentalism 
and modernism versus perennialism. The first pair is concerned with the 
nature of nationalism. Primordialists argue that the nation is essentially 
organic, while instrumentalists argue that the nation is voluntary and 
contractual. Organic nations are often described as cultural nations, whereas 
voluntary nations are frequently referred to as civic nations, a distinction that 
was first proposed by the German historian Friedrich Meinecke in 1907 
(Kumar 2003: 21). The second fundamental debate, between modernists and 
perennialists, is concerned with the origin of nations opposing a modern origin 
with one in antiquity as shown in the graph below: 
Graph 1.1 The nature and origin of nations 
NATURE OF NATIONS I I ORIGIN OF NATIONS I 
Instrumentalism 
(voluntaristic) 
Primordialism 
(organic) 
Modernism 
(origin 
in modernity) 
Perennialism 
(origin 
in antiquity) 
It is evident that the nature and origin of nations are strongly related. In 
fact, according to Smith's (2000) theory, the modernist approach is so closely 
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related to the instrumentalist perspective that both approaches are often 
(con)fused into the modernist approach. The same applies to the 
primordialists and perennialists. This fusion is not necessarily correct as, for 
example, many would argue that some 'organic nations', such as the German 
nation, developed in relation to modernity as will be discussed below. 
Although other authors such as Brown (2000) have put forward different 
categorisations and conceptual models, the above will be used in the 
following discussion of some of the predominant and often contentious issues 
relating to the origin and nature of nations. 
2.3 The origin of nations: modernism versus perennialism 
A vast quantity of the relevant literature is concerned with the origin of 
nations. Perennialists, who believe in the antiquity of nations, argue that the 
understanding of "... nations and nationalism will only be advanced when any 
inseparable bonding of them to the modernisation of society is abandoned" 
(Hastings 1997: 9). Perennialists believe that the roots oi nations extend back 
well into the past whereby the focus can be on continuity (continuous 
perennialism) or on recurrence (recurrent perennialism) (Smith 2000: 34-35). 
Some perennialists argue that, when nationalism started to spread on the 
continent from the eighteenth century onwards, it was an importation of an 
already existing idea (Greenfeld 1994: 168). According to Hastings (1997), 
nations are based on pre-existing ethnicities or proto-national bonds, which 
develop into a nation upon production of a written vernacular and, once they 
start to pursue political objectives, the creation of a nation state. Hastings 
(1997: 3) regards ethnicity as the major distinguishing element in all pre- 
national societies, whereas nations themselves are more self-conscious and 
can consist of one or more ethnicities that have a literature of their own. 
Hastings (1997: 21) agrees with Greenfeld that one of the first ethnicities to 
turn into a nation through a written vernacular was the English, but he also 
acknowledges that it needed the French Revolution to fully actualise itself. 
According to Kumar (2003: 29), many theorists who believe in the "... more or 
less continuous history of national expression from earliest times, do not at all 
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deny that something new was introduced around the time of the French 
Revolution". 
The perennialist perspective has received considerable criticism from 
modernists such as Kedourie (1960). Modernists believe that nationalist 
ideologies, nations, national identities and nation states are modern both in 
date and character and a result of modernisation and modernity. As such they 
are a product of the accompanying structural change, which refers to the 
effects of industrialisation and advanced capitalism on society, transforming 
mediaeval feudal communities into class-based societies (Smith 2000: 28). 
Similarly, Gellner (1983) argues that modern nations and nationalism are the 
consequence of this socio-structural change, which led to a new form of social 
organisation based on education-dependent high cultures. 
Kedourie (1960) claims that the assertion that nation states have 
formed since the sixteenth century is a confusion that arises from the usage of 
nationalist categories in historiography. According to Kedourie (1994: 53) the 
"inventors of the doctrine [primordialism]" attempted to prove the natural 
division of human beings into nations by appealing to linguistics, history and 
anthropology. Kedourie (1960), however, argues that there is no convincing 
reason why people who speak the same language or belong to the same race 
should be entitled to their own exclusive government. According to Kedourie 
(1994: 53), the confusion between 'state' and 'nation' was generated through 
the particular existence of a "... European society of states in constant 
intercourse and conflict, who regulated their relations, however unwillingly and 
imperfectly, by a universally acknowledged jus gentium". 
Similarly, Anderson (1991), in his seminal study on nations, argues that 
nations are mainly modern in essence and the product of print capitalism, that 
is the rise of the capitalistic mode of production and distribution of printed 
materials to the masses. Anderson (1991) defines a nation as an imagined 
community that is created through an active process. All communities should 
therefore be assessed not by their genuineness but by the style in which they 
are imagined (Anderson 1991: 6). Historically, the possibility of imagining 
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nations arose, according to Anderson, when three important concepts of life 
lost their influence. The first concept was the idea that only a script-language 
(Latin) offered privileged access to truth. The second was the hierarchical 
feudal organisation of society and the third the idea of temporality in which 
cosmology and history were indistinguishable (Anderson 1991: 36). Under the 
impact of economic change, scientific and social discoveries and the 
development of more rapid communications, a decline in these certainties and 
a search for new concepts was initiated. 
Printed material played hereby a crucial part in the search for new 
concepts. In the Middle Ages, the market for printed material consisted mainly 
of the scholarly elite of European Latin readers. This only changed when the 
... revolutionary vernacularization thrust of capitalism" (Anderson 1991: 39) 
took place during and after the sixteenth century. This development was, 
according to Anderson, largely influenced by the Reformation as well as the 
development of administrative vernaculars in the wake of absolutist 
centralisation. In contrast to many perennialists, Anderson (1991: 41) believes 
that there is no evidence that any proto-national impulses underlay this 
development. Instead, he argues that the print vernaculars created a new 
medium of communication, allowing speakers of the various dialects to 
communicate. Another consequence of this was that spoken vernaculars, 
which were closest or identical to the print vernaculars, grew ultimately 
stronger while remote dialects declined, assisted by the forced oppression of 
dialects by many states such as France as part of a centralisation and nation- 
formation campaign. The growing community of fellow-readers of the same 
print-vernacular is according to Anderson (1991: 44) "... the embryo of the 
nationally-imagined community". It is often claimed that only nations (meaning 
nation states) can sustain and enforce both a uniform vernacular and an 
adequate educational system to produce literate citizens which form the base 
of modern society and the modern state as indicated in Chapter One. In such 
a society, the education of a person limits the culture in which they can live 
and work. The stress on culture and education implies that, as a 
consequence, people can only be politically unified with those, who share 
their education and culture. Assuming that certain comparisons between 
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national and European integration, and between national and European 
identity formation, are valid, this implies that education could also have an 
important, if not crucial, impact on European integration and European identity 
formation, as will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
In any case, proto-national bonds are a contentious issue. Many 
prominent perennialists such as Hastings (1997) consider them to be the 
basis of nations, while many modernists claim that important differences 
separate proto-national from national bonds. For example, it has been argued 
that proto-national bonds have "... no necessary relation with the unit of 
territorial political organization which is a crucial criterion of what we 
understand as a'nation'today" (Hobsbawm 1990: 47). 
Hobsbawm (1990) also believes that proto-nationalism is different from 
modern nationalism and that proto-nationalism alone is not enough to form 
nationalities, nations or nation states. Gellner (1994: 64) agrees and claims 
that "... nationalism engenders nations and not the other way round" although 
some pre-existent differentiation features, such as folklore, may be required 
as building blocks and can be artificially included in the self-image of the 
nation. This does not necessarily mean, however, that nationalism makes use 
of actual proto-national features. Similar to Anderson, Gellner (1983: 56) 
argues that many of these pre-modern bonds have either been invented or 
modified beyond recognition. Thus Gellner (1983: 48-49) rejects both the 
perennialist and the primordialist perspectives by saying that "... nations as a 
natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long- 
delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre- 
existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and 
often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and 
generally an inescapable one. " 
In an attempt to fuse both perennalist and modernist approaches, Dann 
(1996) argues that, at least in the older European states, one can distinguish 
between two sub-phases in the nation formation process and therefore 
between two basic forms of nations in Western Europe namely the estate 
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nation (st5ndische Nation) and the modern civic-bourgeois nation 
(StaatsbOrgernation) (Dann 1996: 14). In early European states, the estate 
nation was a predecessor of the modern nation. Although both are labelled 
'nations', the estate nation is different in both character and outlook. The 
estate nation was restricted to privileged social strata such as the nobility and 
clergy, who acted as an interest-community versus the territorial ruler and 
who had exclusive access to limited political rights. In comparison, the 
modern civic nation is described as inclusive, incorporating all members of the 
population of a given political and cultural community within a specific territory 
(Dann 1996: 12). Through this distinction, Dann (1996) was able to propose a 
definition, in which both modernist and perennialist arguments to a certain 
extent are valid. 
2.4 The nature of nations: primordialist or instrumentalist? 
When it comes to the nature of nations, most frequently encountered are 
distinctions between voluntary and organic nations, whereby voluntary nations 
are often equated with or referred to as civic (political) nations and organic as 
cultural nations. According to Kohn (1945) both organic and voluntary nations 
co-exist in Europe as a result of the different developments in Western and 
Central/Eastern Europe after the Renaissance and Reformation. In the West, 
these two events led to a new modern societal order, in which medieval 
concepts were theoretically and practically abandoned. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, however, according to Kohn (1994: 162-5), the Renaissance and 
Reformation were mere theoretical and scholarly events which did not change 
the social and political order or the political idea of a world empire. 
Smith (2000: 6) agrees and argues that "voluntarist or associational 
forms" of nationalism are associated largely with Western Europe, most 
notably Britain and France. According to Kohn (1994: 164), in Western 
Europe, the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political phenomenon, 
preceded by the formation of the sovereign states. In this process, the 
territorial and administrative consolidation through absolutist states, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, was an important prerogative not only for 
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the emergence of nations but also for the subsequent development of 
citizenship, popular sovereignty and liberal rights (Guibernau 1996: 55). 
The idea that nations are voluntary or contractual and thus artificial 
constructs is referred to as the instrumentalist (or constructivist) theory. This 
approach suggests that "... national identity is constructed on the basis of 
institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple and indeed simplistic 
formulas of identity" (Brown 2000: 20). Some instrumentalists, such as 
Hobsbawrn (1990), argue that nations were invented by political elites to 
legitimise their power while others, such as Anderson (1991), describe nations 
as communities imagined by their members (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 48), 
although again, a certain degree of elite involvement cannot be denied. 
Voluntary nations are usually closely related to eighteenth century 
enlightenment concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism 
instead of sentimental attachments to the often mystified past. Voluntaristic or 
contractual nations are therefore essentially modern nations. According to the 
instrumentalist model, national group membership in a Western European 
(nation-)state was linked to the person's citizenship. Stress is on active 
citizenship and active participation in this "community of choice" (Kumar 
2003: 23). The nation is in this case a contractual political association, which 
includes the right for every individual to choose to which nation s/he wishes to 
belong. A nation is thus understood as a rational territorial association of 
citizens within a nation state and depends on "... voluntary inclusion in the 
political community" (Kumar 2003: 23). This has influenced to a great extent 
the 'Western' (French or British) concept of citizenship which is usually 
expressed in the principle of jus soli, the achievement of citizenship through 
inhabitation of a certain territory. Chronologically, according to Kohn and 
other instrumentalists, it follows that there was first the state, then nationalism 
and then nation states. Nationalism served to build a nation in order to 
reinforce the cohesion of the state whereby some states such as France 
forcibly induced the process of nation formation. Kumar (2003: 22) therefore 
describes these nations as "state-nations". 
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In contrast, Smith (2000: 6) describes nationalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe as "organic" or what Greenfeld (1994: 168) labels "ethnic 
nationalism". Guibernau (1996: 55) refers to this type of nation as the "cultural 
nation" and cites Italy and Germany as the most prominent examples. In 
contrast to voluntary nations, organic or ethno-cultural nations developed 
before the emergence of a state and played an important part in the process 
of nation state formation. Historically the organic nation is usually fostered and 
promoted by an urban and academic intelligentsia in absence of a strong 
bourgeoisie. Kohn (Brown 2000: 63) also related the distinction between 
ethno-cultural and civic nationalism to social development, that is, to whether 
social transformation had produced a strong bourgeoisie and civil society, 
able to promote nationalism, or whether in the absence of a strong middle 
class, nationalism was articulated by scholars and the intelligentsia whose 
opinion was unsupported by public opinion, which did not exist. As Brown 
(2000: 63) points out, the presence of a strong middle class has also often 
been regarded as "... the key factor in the development of liberalism and 
democracy" again linking the emergence of nationalism to that of liberal- 
democratic values. 
Furthermore, primordialists claim that nations are organic entities and 
that the world is inevitably divided into nations. As Canovan (1996: 7) sums up 
"... the reason why a nation has the right to form a state and to call upon the 
allegiance of its members is that its existence and its historic destiny proceed 
from a natural order that is assumed to be the source of authoritative values". 
In general, primordialism is based on the idea that certain "... cultural 
attributes and formations possess a prior, overriding, and determining 
influence on people's lives, one that is largely immune to rational interest and 
political calculation" (Smith 2000: 5). In other words, as Brown (2000: 6) 
summarises, "... primordialist approaches depict the nation as based upon a 
natural, organic community which defines the identity of its members, who feel 
an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it". Therefore the national 
attachment and identification is permanent, an individual is born into a nation 
and will always remain a member of this nation. It is a "community of fate", not 
a "community of choice", and its membership is expressed through the 
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principle of jus sanguinis whereby ethnic descent determined national 
membership (Kumar 2003: 24). The nation is according to the primordialists 
more a spiritual entity, which binds its members together through myths of a 
common past and origin. Nationalism is seen as a state of mind, an idea and 
an attachment to the native territory and people. Kohn (1994: 165) argues that 
the justification for nationalism in this case is found in traditional ties to Volk 
(kinship, the people) and status instead of the rational concepts of citizenship 
and contract. Dann (1996) points out that the term Volk in the German political 
literature is in relation to politics identical to the nation. In addition, Volk is also 
an ethnic term, which describes a population with a common language, 
culture, religion or history. 
It is important to understand that in practice, both types of nation and 
nationalism are not as easily, some would say impossible, to separate. Smith 
(2000: 18) shows that the difference between civic-territorial and ethnic- 
cultural nations is often reduced to a theoretical argument. Both forms 
represent ideal types that are usually considered not to exist in their pure 
form, but as mixtures where political and cultural factors support each other 
(Kumar 2003: 22). 
Having highlighted some of the dominant issues commonly 
encountered in the theoretical debate, attention must now turn to the 
application of some of these theories to the development of nations and 
nationalism in England (and Britain as a whole) and Germany. For the 
purpose of the thesis, it will be assumed that, according to many historians, 
nationalism as an ideology and discourse became prevalent in Western 
Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, although it did not 
emerge without antecedents (Hutchison and Smith 1994: 5). The following 
country-specific discussion will therefore focus on the eighteenth to the 
twentieth century. 
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2.5 The development of nationalism and the nation state in Germany 
The Kultumation 
In Germany, the national movement and the process of nation formation was 
faced with a number of difficulties (Dann 1996: 45). Firstly, the Holy Roman 
Empire, which nominally held together a multiplicity of territorial states, did not 
have stable boundaries and included a large variety of other ethnic and 
linguistic groups. Thus the empire could not develop into the nation state of 
only one of these groups. Secondly, as explained in Chapter One, the 
territorial rulers were not interested in forming a national state as they had, by 
the seventeenth century, more or less successfully accumulated sovereignty 
in their own territories. Thirdly, from the sixteenth century onwards, the empire 
was religiously split, which further hindered both the formation of a unified 
nation and also the establishment of a national mass movement. 
Despite these patterns of variety, by 1800, an educated minority 
existed which believed that "... for all the regional differences of dialect and 
culture, for all the variants of socioeconomic and political structure, there were 
common elements of a German culture which served to render the Germans a 
Kulturnation, a nation defined by its culture" (Fulbrook 1997: 1). The reliance 
on an educated elite to promote a national consciousness is an example for 
the development of 'Eastern' ethno-cultural nationalism as explained above. 
In accordance with modernist theorists such as Anderson, this cultural nation 
was to a great extent made possible through the increase in German literature 
and its diffusion across the German speaking area creating a new linguistic- 
cultural community across the territorial boundaries. This cultural nation 
(reichsdeutsche Kulturgessellschaft) has often been described as the embryo 
of the modern German nation, (Dann 1996: 48). The German educated 
bourgeoisie, however, was despite their cultural-national orientation politically 
focused on the territorial state, which was partly due to the fact that any 
existing educational provision was provided at territorial or regional level. This 
led to a gap between political (fragmented) and cultural (national or Pan- 
German) identity, which is what James (1989: 34) describes as "cultural unity 
and political diversity", which is diametrically opposite to the idea of many 
66 
modern pro-Europeans who favour "political unity and cultural diversity". 
Nevertheless, the idea of a cultural nation served German patriots in providing 
a sense of togetherness in times of political division (Berger 1997a: 22). 
Other preoccupations of the German intelligentsia included various 
strands of patriotism. The French and American Revolution stimulated an 
enlightened bourgeois patriotism, which found supporters such as Herder 
(1744-1803), who at first responded positively to the French Revolution, 
hailing it as the start of a new age of freedom (Whaley 1997: 21). In 1784, he 
commented on nations that "... no greater injury can be inflicted on a nation 
than to be robbed of her national character, the peculiarity of her spirit and her 
language" (Modern History Sourcebook 1998a: 1). At the same time, there 
was a strong conviction that a German revolution was unnecessary since 
conditions were better and many of the French ideals could be achieved by 
evolution rather than revolution (Whaley 1997: 21). After 1792, with the advent 
of Robespierre's reign of terror in France, the German patriots became 
increasingly disillusioned and resigned with regards to their own national 
destiny (Dann 1996: 66). Therefore, by 1800, in addition to enlightened 
patriotism, a conservative imperial patriotism (Reichspatriotismus) developed, 
which was anti-modern, anti-revolutionary, anti-French and preoccupied with 
debates on imperial reform. It is important to note that patriotism in Germany 
was at that time a rather diffuse concept and not linked to a clear national 
geographical concept. It is equally important to remember that patriotism was 
limited to the elite. The majority of the population was organised into a 
hierarchy of social privilege, whereby mobility and literacy were limited to a 
small proportion of society. German Gymnasien at the time were 
characterised by their focus on Bildung, an emphasis on culture and humanist 
neo-classical ideals, which would directly inform the establishment of the 
Kultumation (Hahn 1998: 15-17). Elementary education on the other hand was 
limited to producing loyal and obedient subjects and was unable to produce 
genuine socialisation (Hahn 1998: 18). It is therefore deemed likely that the 
unprivileged masses thought predominantly along local or regional lines. To 
them, patriotism or the national idea remained remote and unimportant 
(Breuilly 1997: 559-561). 
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The patriotic movement developed in close relation with the anti- 
Napoleonic resistance movement after the French invasion in 1792 and the 
French occupation until 1815. Traditionally, the birth of German nationalism 
has often been described as the most important feature of the Napoleonic 
occupation whereby the Wars of Liberation (1813-15) were regarded as the 
first collective action of the German nation (Whaley 1997: 32). This, however, 
is a myth that was constructed, together with the myth of the French 
hereditary enemy (Erbfeind) and the glorification of the Volk, by later 
nationalists trying to give the German nation a romanticised common history. 
These Romanticists had a vision of a German identity rooted in folk, blood 
and soil, which was in stark contrast to classical-liberal models of nations and 
national states as political communities of equal citizens (Carter 1997: 434- 
435). The Wars of Liberation, therefore, left an important legacy and provided 
the foundations for later nationalist ideology (Whaley 1997: 35). As will 
become clear in this and subsequent chapters, war often provides an 
important stimulus for national development (or contributes to the 
development of national myths). In 1815, however, there was neither a 
coherent nationalist ideology nor a firm political orientation (Whaley 1997: 32). 
By 1815, some of the barriers to the emergence of fully sovereign 
states had been removed through secularisation, mediatisation and the 
dissolution of the empire in 1806 (Whaley 1997: 35). As explained in Chapter 
One, after the War of Liberation a Deutscher Bund (German Confederation) 
was created on the 8 June 1813. At the time, a German nation state, usually 
thought of as a new empire, was only imagined by the educated elite (James 
1989: 38). The imperial idea was celebrated by these patriots in "... romantic 
depictions of mediaeval German greatness" (Breuilly 1997: 559). The idea of a 
German cultural nation had survived the Napoleonic Wars. In the first half of 
the nineteenth century countless societies for the promotion of national art 
and culture were founded. The most important of these societies were the 
gymnast's society (Tumverein) and student societies (Burschenschaften), 
most of which had a certain patriotic or national (Pan-German) orientation 
(Schauer 1996: 23). These societies attempted to extend the elitist idea of a 
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Kultumation to interests with a broader appeal (Dijkink 1996: 22). The cultural 
nation however was not necessarily linked to a political nation as attachments 
to the territorial states and dynasties remained strong (Clark 1997: 44). In fact, 
in the nineteenth century, many territorial states such as Bavaria created their 
own regional myths and traditions thus "... Inventing and sustaining a strong 
regional particularlism, which would by no means be easily submerged in a 
united Germany" (Fulbrook 1992: 103). Such territorial particularism has 
survived to some extent in many areas of modern Germany. 
The Confederation itself was used by its member states to repress any 
liberal or national-political movements, whose significance it largely overrated 
(Breuilly 1997: 559). As a result of the oppression, patriotic groups and the 
national movement decreased drastically. In fact, the reactionary politics of 
the Confederation were so efficient that most patriotic initiatives with a political 
agenda altogether ceased. 
Nevertheless, the early 1830s were a time of acceleration of the 
national-patriotic movement in Germany (Dann 1996: 111). From the 1830s an 
increasingly industrial society meant that the previous feudal society was 
gradually replaced by a class society (Fulbrook 1992: 112-113). As explained 
by Kohn (1945), this process of social transformation had already taken place 
in other European countries such as Britain. The late development of the 
German middle class is due to a variety of reasons such as the backward 
nature of the German economy, the late industrialisation and the political 
particularism (Hahn 1995: 143). In addition, Hahn (1995: 143) claims that until 
the 1870s one must distinguish between the BOrger and the bourgeoisie. 
BOrger were associated with traditional lifestyle that is U ... the life of small 
towns and cities, traditional crafts and trades and various posts at the many 
courts and universities" while the bourgeoisie emerged rapidly after 1850 and 
was allied with the big cities, industry and capitalism (Hahn 1995: 143). 
In the period from around 1830 to the 1848 Revolution, the reactionary 
conservatism of the BOrger dominated political opinion in Germany. Middle 
class protests were often centred on socio-economic issues, such as 
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hereditary and the impenetrable privileges of the nobility, rather than on 
political demands for a new national order. The emerging bourgeoisie for 
example mainly opposed the nobility because of their blocking influence on 
the economy, while the intelligentsia's opposition was based on the 
aristocratic social privileges including exclusive access to high ranking official 
positions in the state and the military. The lack of co-operation between the 
different middle class factions considerably weakened the potential political 
power of liberalism (Schauer 1996: 26). 
Nevertheless, the gradual emergence of a class society meant that 
from the 1830s the opposition to the territorial states, to absolutism and to the 
political oppression spread from the societies to other parts of the population 
(Schauer 1996: 24). Patriots started to elevate their hopes for citizenship and 
democracy to a national level, however elusive this idea might have been. 
Still, the patriotic opposition in the early 1830s rarely co-operated across 
territorial boundaries. In 1830 to 1833 protests broke out in nearly all Western 
European states. In Germany in 1832 some 30,000 people attended the 
Hambach Festival at which demands for a unified national Germany were 
made. One of the slogan of the festival was "Long live a free, united 
Germany". 5 The national movement, however, did not agree on a particular 
political programme, as another slogan from the Hambach festival illustrates: 
"Long live the united territorial states of Germany. Long live the confederate 
republican Europe ! n. 6 At the same time, in some territorial states such as 
Saxony and the Palatinate, protestors fought successfully for liberal if limited 
constitutions, although the Confederation quickly renewed the oppression of 
popular political meetings and associations (Fulbrook 1992: 110). 
By around 1840 elementary education had ceased to be a prerogative 
of the elite and even the lowest social classes were now able to read books 
and newspapers, which increasingly had a national orientation or contained 
references to German national culture. In addition, developments in 
5 "Es lebe das freie, das einige Deutschland" (Dann 1996: 108) 
6 "[ ... ] dreimal hoch leben die vereinigten 
Freistaaten Deutschlands! Hoch, dreimal hoch das 
konföderierte republikanische Europa! " (Dann 1996: 109) 
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transportation (railways) and communications (telegraph) enabled a faster 
inter-regional exchange of ideas. The 1840s were also characterised by 
frequent social unrest, be it in the form of peasant insurrections and artisan 
riots, both rooted in economic problems or liberal pressures for political reform 
(Fulbrook 1992: 117-118). 
Following the revolutionary events in Paris in 1848, similar protests 
broke out in numerous German cities. The March movement in 1848 could be 
described as having the character of a national revolution as it achieved a 
pan-German dimension (Dann 1996: 128), although any co-ordination of 
events was limited and often non-existent. In addition, the national movement 
and the political public sphere were characterised by factionalism, which was 
to influence greatly the future national development. For example, one of the 
main political groups were the conservatives who wished to maintain the old 
order. The bourgeois national-liberals on the other hand, favoured in general 
the creation of a constitutional national state combining a monarchy with 
liberal-democratic citizen rights. They hoped to reform the existing system in 
co-operation with the ruling classes. Thirdly, the democratic movement called 
for popular sovereignty in a parliamentary and republican national state. In 
addition, there was a Catholic movement favouring a federal national state 
along the lines of the former Holy Roman Empire, and a worker's movement 
which hoped to gain social and political emancipation from a national state. 
During the course of the 1848 revolution, liberal regimes and 
constitutions were established in many German states. At the national level, in 
May 1848 a National Assembly (NationalversammIung), which had been 
elected by a rather restricted suffrage, opened in Frankfurt (Fulbrook 
1992: 119). The main task of the National Assembly was to work out a 
constitution for a new nation state and, until the national state was operative, 
to act as sovereign. As explained earlier, the latter was a lost cause, as the 
National Assembly had no real political power and did not have the support of 
the leading territorial rulers, who in the course of 1848-49 managed to regain 
control in their territories. 
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The deliberations of the National Assembly concerning a new 
constitution were prolonged until 1849. The questions regarding the choice of 
sovereign and the geographical borders of the new nation state were 
particularly difficult to resolve. When Austria boycotted the National Assembly, 
it eventually decided in favour of a small-German solution (Kleindeutsche 
L6sung) and offered the Imperial crown to the Prussian king, who, as noted in 
Chapter One, subsequently declined. The reasons for the failure of the 
national project were varied and included the unwillingness of territorial rulers 
to subsume their sovereignty to a national state, the lack of power of the 
liberal movement and a lack of popular support (Fulbrook 1992: 122). For the 
majority of Germans, to whom practical issues such as social, economic or 
rural reforms were most important, the national issue had lost its allure during 
1848 (Breuilly 1997: 563). On the other hand, some progress had been 
achieved. Rural feudal relationships, effectively abolished everywhere by 
1850, did not return and neither did the pre-revolution system of political 
oppression (Fulbrook 1992: 122). In 1850, the German Confederation was re- 
established and the participants of the 1848 revolution were left in general 
political confusion (Dann 1996: 141). 
National unity and nation formation 
The 1850s and 1860s were characterised by the continuing shift in focus, not 
only from the territorial to the national level, but also to economic integration 
between territorial states (Dijkink 1996: 22). The national movement re- 
emerged in the 1850s when it came to rely on a wide network of cultural 
movements (Breuilly 1997: 565). In 1859 the German National Association 
(Deutscher Nationalverein) was founded as German societies increasingly 
organised themselves under national umbrella organisations. Altogether the 
national movement of the 1860s was better organised and more self- 
conscious. It was also politically more realistic in its aims and targets. As 
James (1989: 61) puts it, the national movement" ... was no longer a strong 
national awakening, but rather a more sober tale of institutional arrangements 
designed to promote prosperity". Realpolitik and economic determinism 
replaced to a great extent the idealism of earlier decades. 
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The national movement, however, was in 1871 neither the cause nor 
the facilitator of German unification and nation state formation. This must be 
attributed to Prussian expansionism and rivalry with Austria (Fulbrook 
1992: 126). The Prussian Prime Minster Otto von Bismarck is traditionally 
described as the architect of German unification, although there must be 
some doubt as to whether he followed a predetermined strategy or made, at 
least at times, good use of favourable circumstances. Bismarck's conservative 
political position was distanced from the national movement, patriotism and 
democracy. His target can be described as securing unlimited political power 
for the Prussian monarchy and oppose any form of popular sovereignty 
(Schauer 1996: 32). Prussian dominance was achieved through three 
successful wars, in 1864 with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, in 1866 with 
Austria and in 1870-71 with France (Fulbrook 1992: 127). As Chapter One 
pointed out, the Prussian success, especially in the war with Austria, has 
sometimes been attributed to the "... superiority of Prussian schoolmasters" 
(Hahn 1998: 30). Therefore, it could be said that both war and education 
played a decisive role in German unification as well as, perhaps more 
indirectly, national development. 
The Austro-Prussian War removed the dualism between Prussia and 
Austria, which had been one of the most important barriers to a German 
nation state, since Austria, as part of the peace settlement, had to withdraw 
from any further intervention in German affairs (Dann 1996: 157). All states 
formerly allied with Austria, including Hanover and Saxony, were annexed by 
Prussia, considerably increasing her power and geographical area. The 
Franco-Prussian war caused a revival of national patriotism utilising the myth 
of the French ErMind. The creation of the German Empire in 1871, however, 
was not an expression of national enthusiasm, but in effect a contract 
between the North German confederation and the south German states as a 
result of the Prussian Realpolitik (Dijkink 1996: 22). Breuilly (1997: 566) claims 
that there was indeed no question that in reality the new empire was simply a 
greater Prussia. 
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James (1989: 88) points out that the German Reich was the result of a 
double compromise. First between a constitutional state and an autocracy, 
and secondly between nationalism and dynasticism. There was a somewhat 
uneasy mix of dynastic and national values embodied in the adoption of 
national symbols that were a compromise of Prussian and German attributes 
(Breuilly 1997: 566). Politically, the Reich was not a national state but a 
federation of territorial rulers, where the principle of popular sovereignty was 
not realised. Not surprisingly, education in the empire continued to be 
essentially "... an instrument for the education of subjects, not citizens ... 
[whereby] secular Protestant virtues such as diligence, industriousness and 
discipline were judged of paramount importance" (Hahn 1998: 30). 
The conceptions of what national identity meant were diffuse and 
varied. As Dijkink (1996: 24) asserts, the "... German state might have been 
created, but it appeared to possess no unity or soul [ ... ]". Liberalism, which 
after 1848 had pursued primarily the aim of nation state formation, lost with 
the foundation of the Reich much of its left wing appeal and raison d'dtre. 
After 1871, there was a certain turning away from activist liberal nationalism in 
favour of monarchical and authoritarian nationalism (Breuilly 1997: 567). 
Nationalism, which had once been a "... progressive force aimed at sweeping 
away the old regime and furthering the cause of constitutional liberties, [ ... ] 
was now conservative and bent on maintaining the status quo (Kitchen 
2006: 128). 
One of the issues dominating the contemporary nationalist debate was 
the question whether the nation should be a civic nation (Staatsnation) or an 
ethno-cultural nation (Volksnation). As James (1989: 89) points out, 7% of the 
population within the Reich did not speak German while many German 
speakers now lived outside its political borders. Therefore the creation of an 
ethnically homogenous Volksnation was somewhat unrealistic, but 
nevertheless remained the aim of many nationalists. Dann (1996: 205) asserts 
that the 1870s were the commencement of the era of ethnic-national thinking 
(volksnationales Denken). Dijkink (1996: 22) agrees that the period after 1871 
was to some extent characterised by an emphasis on German cultural and 
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intellectual superiority, fostered by the German preoccupation with Bildung, 
that was soon fed by actual economic superiority as the empire's industrial 
output and production rose. 
The Reich was turning into being the principal creator of the national 
idea, rather than being its product (Breuilly 1997: 570). As already indicated, a 
common German culture was promoted through mass education, but also 
through the mass media, while the enforcement of German as a language of 
state became more rigorous. For example, in 1885 Germany expelled Polish- 
speaking Russian and Austrian citizens from West Prussia (James 1989: 89- 
90). The increasing ethno-cultural orientation was expressed in the 1913 
Citizenship Law that used the principle of jus sanguinis, which made German 
citizenship a matter of inheritance (Breuilly 1997: 570). 
In the final years of the nineteenth century, the awareness of the 
incompleteness of the nation state and the nation itself gave rise to a new 
wave of national initiatives and movements among some parts of the 
population. It came to a development of both democratic and anti-democratic 
nationalism. Dijkink (1996: 25) points out that at the turn of the century 
cosmopolitan thinking was mixed with xenophobic nationalism, a sense of 
inferiority contrasted by megalomania. In case of the right wing anti- 
democratic nationalism, 'German' was not any longer used as a term for 
national integration, but of ethnic limitation. The 'Germaness' of nationality 
was aggressively promoted by some nationalist groups (James 1989: 90). Part 
of this movement were the antisernitic parties and societies such as the 
German Anti-Semitic Society (Deutsche Antisemitische Vereinigung) which 
was founded in 1886. These societies expressed a greater German 
connection (grossdeutsche Verbundenheit), especially with Austria, which 
was increasingly understood as a blood community (Blutgemeinschaft) (Dann 
1996: 201). In 1893 the All-German Society (Alldeutscher Verband) was 
founded, a propagandistic society of the new nationalism. It not only had a 
national orientation, but promoted the creation of a German Volkstum (Dann 
1996: 203), which was understood as an ethno-cultural community. V61kisch 
came to denote some kind of naturalness and purity and was used to 
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measure the quality of nationalist ideas (Dijkink 1996: 22). Organisations like 
these were by no means mass societies, but still had an influence on the 
population as a whole (James 1989: 90-91). 
Furthermore, the idea of the cultural nation proved useful for the 
propagation of an aggressive foreign policy as the cultural nation nearly 
always extended well beyond the political nation (Berger 1997a: 22). By the 
time the First World War broke out in 1914, the "... national idea and its 
identification with the interests of the Reich had become an end in itself for 
many Germans" (Breuilly 1997: 571). Nevertheless, Imperial Germany was by 
no means a united nation. It remained dominated by elites, lacked 
democratisation and the successful incorporation of the working classes in a 
rapidly industrialising society. Internally, no balance was struck between the 
interests of different parts of society (Fulbrook 1992: 154). 
The rise and decline of the national idea in the twentieth century 
The post-war successor of the Second Reich was the Weimar Republic 
(1919-1933). While the unification of 1871 had not managed to create a 
strong sense of German nationality, the experience of the First World War 
strengthened the sense of belonging to a national community among the 
population (Breuilly 1997: 572). It was the unprecedented scale and 
destruction of the Great War that not only prompted political upheaval, but 
also national re-orientation. The adoption of a unitary constitution and of 
national symbols was made easier after the removal of the dynasties and the 
territorial rulers, not to mention the Imperial Crown (Breuilly 1997: 572). In the 
Weimar Republic, the growth of a mass culture, enhanced through new media 
such as film and radio as well as mass consumption, added to the national 
experience of the war and helped to form what was in many ways 
"... Germany's first'real' nation state and national society" (Breuilly 1997: 572). 
State and society, however, were much divided and there were some 
reactions, largely from middle class sections, against modernism and mass 
culture (Harvey 1997: 291). As Breuilly (1997: 572) states "... Weimar [ ... ] 
demonstrates vividly that a common, even intense, sense of nationality does 
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not itself produce unity". In addition, the national self-image had been 
damaged by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, which was resented by 
many (especially on the right) who considered the treaty as an act of national 
humiliation (Stephenson 1997: 315). 
The Third Reich 
In 1933 the National Socialists (NSDAP) came to power. National Socialism 
was as such nothing new but drew from an amalgam of nationalist ideas 
especially the Mkisch ideology as well as ideas of racial, national and cultural 
superiority (Breuilly 1997: 573). The proposed Volksgemeinschaft (national 
community) appealed to those wishing to overcome the divisions within 
German society and the paralysis of government as well as those longing for 
a stronger Germany freed from the "Versailles shackles" (Bessel 1997: 256). 
To them, Hitler offered hopes for "national redemption" (Kershaw 1997: 322). 
In order to achieve the Volksgemeinschaft, institutions embodying social 
divisions, such as trade unions, parties or the language of class, were 
forbidden (Breuilly 1997: 575). The National Socialists made extensive use of 
indoctrination though propaganda, the mass media, education and the 
creation of hierarchical organisations such as the Hitler Youth. Society was 
thoroughly put through a process of Nazification (Kershaw 1997: 324). The 
school curriculum promoted the idea of German superiority, which was linked 
with imperialism to satisfy ideological demands for Lebensraum and to secure 
Germany the dominant position that Hitler felt should be accorded to her. 
Ideas of racial purity combined with xenophobia and anti-Semitism eventually 
led to the exploitation of 'inferiors' and even to genocide. It should be noted 
though that the National Socialists only converted a minority to its extreme 
racial and imperialist version of ethnic nationalism (Breuilly 1997: 576). To 
keep the masses in line, the government had to rely largely on the already 
mentioned methods of indoctrination as well as on coercion. 
Post-war partition and unification 
The Second World War had an unprecedented impact on German national 
identity, resulting in a radical political re-education and national re-invention. 
As previously pointed out, war is often the catalyst for political change and 
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stimulus for national development, which was never more true than in the 
case of post-1945 Germany. After the war, German unity ended with partition 
and the establishment of the West German Federal Republic and the East 
German Democratic Republic. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the nation 
was constituted of the German citizens, whereby German citizenship 
continued to be based on descent as prescribed by the 1913 Citizenship Law 
(Breuilly 1997: 577). Although both post-war German states rejected the idea 
of vd1kisch national identity, it nevertheless continued to shape "... popular 
conceptions of national belonging and citizenship" (Carter 1997: 434). 
Citizenship therefore continued to have an explicit ethnic component whereby 
a person usually can claim German citizenship if a parent is a German citizen, 
irrespective of place of birth (Rose 1996: 79). The national idea, however, was 
to be thoroughly based on Western values while the sovereign nation state as 
the object of loyalty and identity was undermined internally by a stress on 
federalism and externally by integration into supranational institutions such as 
the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Breuilly 1997: 578). 
Hope of reunification, however, was never completely abandoned by either of 
the two German states (Dijkink 1996: 30), although in the West German 
foreign policy conception, unification had to be closely linked to continued 
European integration (Roseman 1997: 382). As Chapter Six will show, the 
political and national commitment to European integration is also reflected in 
the school curriculum, which embraces the national re-invention as a 
European state. 
German common national identity and common heritage had been 
fractured in the course of the post-war division by extensive differences in 
relation to social class, cultural attitudes and patterns of behaviour making 
'Ossies' and Wessies' quite different social beings (Fulbrook 1997: 430). 
However, in the event, German unification had as much to do with liberal- 
democratic values as with national ideas (Breuilly 1997: 581). Die Wende 
(Change) in 1989 reasserted the importance of concepts such as Volk and 
nation for German identity as -the people participating in the mass 
demonstrations used the slogans 'we are the people' (Wir sind das Volk) and 
increasingly 'we are one people' (Wir sind ein Volk) (Carter 197: 451). 
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Following unification, Germany was eager to demonstrate its 
commitment to Western liberal democratic values and European integration. 
In January 2000 Germany introduced a new citizenship and nationality law in 
harmonisation with European standards. The new law changes the principle 
of descent Uus sanguinis) to enable the acquisition of German citizenship as 
the result of being born in Germany Uus soli). The new citizenship and 
nationality law offers a shorter mandatory waiting period for naturalisation. 
According to the German government (http: //www. qerman-embassv. orq. uk, 
accessed 2 June 2004), "... children who are born in Germany to foreign 
nationals will receive German citizenship when one of the respective child's 
parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and holds 
entitlement to residence or has had an unlimited residence permit for at least 
three years". Under the new law, such children will be given at birth both the 
German citizenship and in most cases also their parents' citizenship. 
However, these children will then have to decide before their twenty-third 
birthday which citizenship and nationality they wish to retain. Although 
exceptions are made, in general once the person has declared to keep either 
the German or the foreign citizenship, the other will be lost 
(http: //www. qerman-embassv. orq. uk, accessed 2 June 2004). This reluctance 
to allow dual citizenship and the restrictive policies dealing with the 
naturalisation of immigrants illustrate a lingering conception of citizenship as a 
matter of culture and descent rather than legal rights (Breuilly 1997: 579). 
The experiences of the Third Reich and the Second World War had a 
profound impact on German nationalism by not only discrediting the "... racial 
versions of the national idea but the national idea per se" (Breuilly 1997: 576). 
The German post-war assessment of the past relied heavily on the idea of a 
German Sonderweg (Dijkink 1996: 33). In the nineteenth century, the German 
development of a Kultumation in the absence of a nation state had been 
regarded as a unique and superior phenomenon. After 1945, this Sonderweg 
was considered a pathological deviation from the 'normal' development, while 
the Western Alliance was perceived to be the only remedy to prevent a 
renewed Sonderweg and its excesses (Dijkink 1996: 33). 
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Recently, theorists have started to dismiss the Sonderweg theory with 
the argument that 'normal' national or historic developments do not exist 
(Berger 1997b: 488-489). It might also be the case that the nationalist 
perspective may become more "... widely accepted, on account of the logic of 
some of its arguments and the inevitable erosion of the legacy of the Second 
World War' (Dijkink 1996: 34). Dijkink (1996: 34) claims that the post-war 
German concept of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) in 
place of national patriotism may be insufficient to create a sense of meaning 
and belonging. At the moment, the future of the German national idea is 
undecided; there could either be a revival, as Dijkink (1996) suggests, or a 
continuation of the post war trend of national decline in favour of 
supranational as well as regional identities. There are a number of political 
theorists who argue that nationalism and the nation state are nineteenth 
century relics that will eventually be superseded by a post-national order 
where either regional or supranational affiliations (or a combination of both) 
will replace or substitute national ideas. The possibilities of a supranational 
identity in relation to national identity will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter Five. 
2.6 The development of nationalism and the nation state in England 
and Britain 
According to Smith (2000: 36) "... it is, nevertheless, the English case that has 
stirred the greatest controversy". The controversy he refers to relates to the 
origins of the English nation and nationalism on the one hand and the 
transition after 1707 7 from English to British nationalism on the other. The 
following brief outline of the development of the English and subsequently 
British nation will focus on these two issues. As the discussion is limited, 
some aspects, such as the development of Scottish, Irish or Welsh 
nationalism, had to be omitted. 
1707 Act of Union joining Scotland with England and Wales 
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The early nation 
There is an abundance of theories regarding the history of the English and, 
after 1707, British nation. Many authors agree that the development of the 
English nation was a key event in the history of nations, as England is often 
described as a prototype of the nation. For most historians, according to 
Smith (2000: 36) "... an English national sentiment (as opposed to a later 
British sentiment) can be found no earlier than the very end of the sixteenth 
century". As Greenfeld (1994: 167) puts it, "... the original modern idea of the 
nation emerged in sixteenth century England, which was the first nation in the 
world (and the only one with the possible exception of Holland), for about two 
hundred years". 
Some perennialists, however, trace the origin of the English nation to 
even earlier periods. Hastings (1997) for example argues that English national 
development preceded every other and thus established the very nature of 
the nation. His controversial theory states that the English nation state 
survived the Norman invasion in 1066 and grew fairly steadily in strength in 
the twelfth and thirteenth century. It then emerged still more vociferously by 
the end of the fourteenth century following a vernacular literary renaissance 
and the pressures of the Hundred Year War with France, then part of the 
Anglo-Norman kingdom (Hastings 1997: 4-5). England provided the lead with 
regard to the establishment of a strong central state, the growth of 
parliamentary government, the emergence of a powerful capital city, the 
formation of political parties, the emergence of an industrial society and an 
effective press (Hastings 1997: 6). In his theory, the fourteenth century is the 
"... very latest point at which it is plausible to claim that the nation state had 
gelled so decisively that no imaginable circumstance could later have diverted 
English society into some quite other form" (Hastings 1997: 51). 
Hastings believes that in the fourteenth century the concept of 'nation' 
was widely used in a sense that was in all important aspects identical to its 
modern usage. The frequency with which the term 'nation' was used suggests 
a basis of experience; the English felt themselves to be a nation (Hastings 
1997: 15). Smith (2005: 5) agrees and argues that, although it is debatable 
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when a distinct English national identity was established, by the fourteenth 
century the expansion of the already existing embryonic nation state was 
evident, as English was elevated to court language and London was 
established as the state capital. 
Seton-Watson (1977) also agrees that a nation state emerged earlier in 
England than in continental Western Europe, but contrary to Hastings he 
locates the start of its development in the fifteenth century and stresses that 
this was the development of a modern nation, which was somewhat different 
to the mediaeval 'natio' (Seton-Watson 1977: 17). As discussed earlier, in 
Tudor England a strong absolutist state developed. The impact of state 
membership for the development of early 'proto-nationalism' was so strong 
that in the case of Tudor England "... something close to modern patriotism" 
could emerge (Hobsbawm 1990: 75). In addition, it would seem that there was 
a link or influence between developments in France and England. As Seton- 
Watson (1977: 21) claims "... the formation of the national consciousness of 
each of these two is insolubly connected [ ... ]". In his opinion one can hardly 
speak of the English or French nation before the thirteenth century, only of 
two French speaking monarchs, one in Paris and one in London. 
According to Seton-Watson (1977: 25) the formation of modern English 
took place in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and was of crucial 
importance to the development of the English national sentiment. Haseler 
(1996: 13) agrees and claims that the English language made its breakthrough 
when it became the official language of the government in 1362. The 
emergence of a standardised and increasingly popular English, which was in 
fact a new language, was crucial for the development of an English 
consciousness (Haseler 1996: 14). Therefore Seton-Watson (1977: 26) 
concludes (contrary to Hastings), that an English nation could not have 
developed before the fourteenth century at the earliest. In any case, it is of 
equal importance that pride in the comparatively early development of the 
English nation has substantially contributed to English national identity. 
82 
Tudor Protestantism and national sentiment 
In England the development of the vernacular was closely linked to the 
development of Protestantism. Henry VIII disseminated his popular brand of 
Protestantism through material printed in the vernacular (Schulze 1995: 118). 
The mass production of such material was made possible and was fostered 
by the first translation of the Bible in the fourteenth and the introduction of the 
printing press in the fifteenth century (Schulze 1995: 118). As a result, Schulze 
(1995: 117) states that a relatively compact and homogenous English 
speaking community emerged, although dialects prevailed, especially in rural 
and remote areas. 
It is often argued that religion was one of the most enduring elements 
in English national sentiment. According to Smith (2005: 7) the massive 
Puritan reinforcement of a pre-existing national identity had its strongest 
effects in England, leading by the time of the English Revolution to the 
widespread assumption that the English were 'God's chosen people'. The 
Elizabethan English national pride was therefore characterised by ideas of an 
elect nation, which served as a strong Protestant ideology in defence against 
the continental European Catholic powers. Protestantism, combined with a 
distinct national church, thus gave power to English national identity and 
provided a "... potent rationale for subsequent British foreign policies and 
for the later maritime expansion" (Smith 2005: 8). 
Haseler (1996: 14) agrees and states that the Reformation in the 
sixteenth century was a seminal event in English nation state building and not 
just in relation to language. He argues that the Reformation led to an 
incremental growth of English national sensibility, at least among the 
educated and politically active classes, that was caused by the perception of 
separateness of England from the continental religious system. Hastings 
(1997: 55) claims that the break with Rome, the secularisation and the shift to 
Protestantism brought a change in intensity of national development. Events 
such as the Spanish War and the Gunpowder Plot "... combined to heat up 
English nationalism from the middle of Elizabeth's reign while reshaping it as 
a thoroughly militant and Protestant force [ ... ]" (Hastings 1997: 55). This 
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change to Protestant nationalism, which dominated the English national 
sentiment from the Reformation until the eighteenth century, must be viewed, 
according to Hastings (1997: 59), as a re-direction of a long pre-exiting 
sentiment and also as a reorientation which took time to be assimilated by the 
nation at large. Therefore it could be argued that late Elizabethan society was 
already becoming a genuinely national society (Hastings 1997: 35). Many 
historians claim that by the end of Elizabeth's reign the nation formation 
process in England was virtually complete (Seton-Watson 1977: 20). 
National integration proceeded hand in hand with political integration 
and centralisation of the state as discussed in Chapter One. In the fifteenth 
century the Tudor dynasty established a stable political order in England after 
the War of the Roses (Schulze 1995: 123). Smith (2005: 7) claims that the 
Tudor drive for a strong centralised state, reliant on its naval power and 
warfare, set England apart and ahead of other countries on the continent. The 
king was becoming the ruler of the entire English nation and not only of the 
aristocracy. The crown had therefore acquired a symbolic national potency 
(Schulze 1995: 124). Together, crown and parliament formed the English 
nation state and through these institutions the idea of the nation became a 
palpable reality (Schulze 1995: 124). 
Besides possession of a common language, religion and a centralised 
monarchy, it was a belief in a common decent and deeds that characterised 
the English nation (Schulze 1995: 120). Social mobility was greater than 
elsewhere in Europe, which allowed the educated classes to share a common 
culture. By the end of the Tudor era, the nation had replaced the feudal 
medieval structure as Seton-Watson (1977: 30) explains: "... for hundreds of 
thousands, if not perhaps yet for all, subjects of the crown loyalty was now 
given not only to feudal superior, or church, or distant sovereign, but to the 
nation: the links which bound the population together were not only vertical 
but also horizontal". Schauer (1996: 105) agrees and believes that all social 
groups in England were conscious of certain basic ideologies. They felt united 
through their consciousness of common rights and freedoms and the idea of 
being a member of a Protestant nation. It is important to note at this point that 
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large parts of the population, mainly women, the working class and men 
without property, Catholics and those living in areas and towns without 
parliamentary representation were excluded from the (politically active) nation. 
As explained in Chapter One, Parliament itself was rather a virtual then a 
direct representation and had limited political power until the seventeenth 
century. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to early nineteenth century German patriots, 
English patriotic sentiments in the sixteenth century had no immediate need to 
rely on myths or a vision of national unity. Instead, patriotic sentiments could 
be "... bodied forth in a self-confident account of the country's political 
institutions" (Schulze 1995: 125) not unlike modern English national identity. 
National membership in Elizabethan England was based on a cultural 'us- 
awareness' that depended on common language, historical prototypes, 
religion and a notion of what England was and what it was meant to be 
(Schulze 1995: 122). 
Englishness and Britishness, 
As Colley (1992) points out, the emergence of a British national sentiment in 
the eighteenth century was closely bound to Protestantism, war with France 
and the acquisition of the empire. The emergence of a British identity was a 
consequence of the foundation of the United Kingdom in 1707. A common 
British identity, however, was not the result of integration and homogenisation, 
but instead was superimposed over existing loyalties as a response to the 
conflict with France and a desire to unify Scotland, England and Wales in a 
United Kingdom state. Again, this stresses the importance of war as an 
important incentive for national development, in this case a government- 
sponsored response to the need for patriotic British soldiers. However, as 
Coils (2002: 34) points out, the new British Union did not try to eradicate its 
constituent nationalities. The result was that the English, Welsh and Scottish 
nationalities were "strangely non-political" as they did not have a nation state 
to focus their separate ambitions (Coils 2002: 34). Nevertheless, these 
"... national feelings, not British ones, provided the heart and soul of 
identity "(Coils 2002: 43). 
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According to Colley (1992: 5), Britain was essentially an "invented 
nation". Britain in 1707 resembled a patchwork of uncertain areas of 
Englishness, Scottishness and Welshness, cut across by strong regional and 
local attachments (Colley 1992: 17). Only by the end of the eighteenth century 
better transport and greater supply of mass-produced goods as well as 
English-language books and newspapers began to reduce the peculiarities 
across the United Kingdom (Colley 1992: 14). The easy access to print 
(freeing of the printing presses in 1695) played a vital part in the conviction 
that Protestant Britons were especially privileged, although large parts of the 
population remained illiterate and British newspapers did not become national 
organs until the late nineteenth century (Coils 2002: 58). Other factors that 
helped promote national sentiment and feelings of being privileged included 
an absence of famine, freedom of trade, the high rate of urban expansion and 
a geographical mobility of the population (Colley 1992: 37). A sense of 
Britishness, however, also developed because the British, at least the 
educated elite, believed themselves to be different in political terms, 
particularly in comparison to the French. Parliament was seen in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century as the prerogative of a free and Protestant 
British people (Colley 1992: 50). 'Being British' was not as such an ethnic 
sentiment, but could be described as "... the nearest the United Kingdom got 
to a concept of citizenship" (Coils 2002: 43). 
It has often been claimed that since 1707 the new addition of 
Britishness has been harnessed to the English core (Smith 1999: 71). As 
Hastings points out (1997: 64), 'British' was for the English just an additional 
label, whereby English and British identity remained largely synonymous. 
England dominated Great Britain, both politically and demographically since, 
by 1900, three quarters of people in Britain were English (Feldman 1994: 127). 
On the other hand, for the Welsh and Scottish, British identity was an 
additional and often opposing identity while their own national identities 
provoked powerful emotional attachments (Colls 2002: 43). Seton-Watson 
(1977: 34) argues that English national consciousness merged into a British 
national consciousness, which the English tended to appropriate to 
themselves. Although many Scots and Welsh also acquired a British 
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consciousness, the majority continued to have a predominant Scottish or 
Welsh identity. In addition to the Welsh and Scottish national consciousness, 
there was also Scottish and Welsh nationalism, which emerged in defence of 
regional identity or even to seek independence. An expression of this can be 
found in twentieth century devolution, which will be discussed further on. 
Haseler (1996: 30) takes the argument a step further and points out that 
'Greater England', instead of Great Britain, would have been a better term for 
the new state. According to his theory, the English aristocracy built the new 
state based on the constitution of 1688, as the 1707 Act of Union was not 
accompanied by a new constitution. London remained the capital while 
Englishness was the only contender to be the leading culture. English 
landowners dominated the aristocracy, while the Celtic aristocracy was simply 
absorbed into the ruling class as they adopted the lifestyle of Englishness. 
The empire also helped to reconcile a majority of the Celtic aristocracy to 
England and Britain (Haseler 1996: 32). Yet, as Colls (2002: 42) points out, 
although the English dominated the Union, they were not interested enough 
"... in turning Celts into little Englanders". 
The Jacobite revolt in the 1740s was a reminder of the constant threats 
to Protestant Britishness and prompted fears about Britain's security (Colley 
1992: p. 86). Charles Edward Stuart had landed in the Hebrides in 1745 and 
penetrated into England as far south as Derby by the end of 1745 (Colley 
1992: 80). The Stuart threat effectively ended with the defeat of the rebel army 
at the Battle of Culloden in April 1746 and with the retreat of Charles Stuart to 
France. Although short-lived, the Jacobite revolt had some long-lasting 
consequences. Many patriots such as John Brown (1757) argued that the real 
danger was not posed by the Jacobites or France, but by Britain's own moral 
internal corruption and lack of cohesion and public spirit (Colley 1992: 87). The 
idea of the necessity of British regeneration led to the foundation of mostly 
urban patriotic societies such as the Laudable Association of Anti-Gallicans in 
1745 (Colley 1992: 88). A recurrent point of attack was the aristocratic passion 
for French manufactured goods and language (Colley 1992: 90). As Haseler 
(1996: 15) points out, in the eighteenth century, the English nobility was still 
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seriously imbued with French cultural and intellectual influences, which were 
now branded as un-patriotic. Efforts were undertaken to promote British 
produce and to replace the French influence. For example, the Society of Arts 
was showing the first large public exhibition of British art in London in 1761 
(Colley 1992: 91). Colley (1992: 94) explains that the societies suggested by 
the way they were organised that willingness to participate, and not rank or 
property, made out the true Briton. Participation in patriotic societies was, 
however, limited and a prerogative of the middle and upper classes. 
Nevertheless, many societies had female subscribers and the Societ y of Art's 
prizes were open to both women and the poor. 
After 1789, the nobility largely put French habits aside, as they feared 
that they might meet with the same destiny as the French aristocracy (Haseler 
1996: 23). Instead, in fear of patriotic protests, the nobility turned towards 
British patriotism and nationalism. Therefore, it has been argued that at the 
end of the eighteenth and the start of the nineteenth century a genuinely 
British ruling group emerged. As with the German Kulturnation, British 
aristocratic culture and lifestyle became a British national lifestyle, for example 
aristocratic objects of art in privately owned houses became part of the 
national heritage (Colley 1992: 179). In turn, the aristocracy's lifestyle, their 
cult of heroism and morality, became ideals of Britishness (Colley 1992: 192). 
Similarly, Haseler (1996: 18) argues that Englishness (used in the sense of 
Britishness) was built on the pre-industrial trinity of race, class and land. In the 
eighteenth century, the landed elite fused land and class in a manner that 
created the peculiar character of the English class system and became a 
pronounced part of the cult of Britishness at the heart of which was the idea of 
the British gentlemen based on the lifestyle of the landed gentry (Haseler 
1996: 19). Land, class and race meant in this sense familiarity and tradition 
(Haseler 1996: 20). 
Redefining the nation 
In the 1820s and 1830s, after the Napoleonic Wars, economic regression, 
high levels of unemployment and the demobilisation of hundreds of thousand 
of men led to social unrest. Not only the economic situation accounted for the 
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discontent, but also a general loss in direction (Colley 1992: 322). Since 1689 
there had been a succession of wars with France, which made it possible for 
the British as a whole to share fear or aggression against the common enemy 
and against Catholicism. The wars had united the British against a common 
enemy, thus providing an important focus of the national identity. After the 
Napoleonic Wars, the British had to look for different ways of re-defining 
themselves whereby a number of campaigns and movements played an 
important role (Colley 1992: 322-324). 
First, there was a movement for change in the electoral franchise. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, the government utilised patriotism and 
nationalism for propaganda to mobilise popular support (Dunkerley et al 
2002: 27). The male population had been treated equally as patriots when they 
were enlisted to defend the country. After the war, there was some 
resentment that the previous egalitarian treatment was not continued and 
expressed in equal representation in Parliament. This resentment led to 
mounting nationwide pressures to change the franchise to include all working 
men. To put it simply, consequences of war contributed significantly to 
political and national change. The reform campaigns, initiated by a range of 
political groups, used mass open-air meetings and petitions for their cause, 
extensively relying on patriotic language (Colley 1992: 342). 
At the same time there were problems arising from Ireland's 
incorporation into the United Kingdom in 1800, mainly in relation to the 
extension of full citizenship to the Irish Catholics without making similar 
concessions for the Catholics in England, Wales and Scotland. Many believed 
that the Catholic emancipation should ideally take place without making 
concessions to the traditional Protestant identity, which was one of the central 
foundations of Britishness. The issue was finally settled in the 1829 Catholic 
Emancipation Act. The argument put forward was that the intolerance of the 
sixteenth century towards Catholics was now inappropriate for an empire of 
this size and power (Colley 1992: 328). By 1815, the British Empire included a 
fifth of the world's population. The inclusion of the non-British masses in the 
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British nation is another frequently debated issue, especially after the 
decolonisation in the twentieth century as discussed later on. 
In the early and mid nineteenth century, romanticised interpretations of 
English and British history, based on myths of ancestry and descent similar to 
German Romanticism, gained a wide following. The essence of English 
Romanticism was the cult of imagination (Coils 2002: 61). There was a 
presence of a strong English or British ethnic identity, based on the study of 
origins in archaeology and so forth (Smith 1999: 72). Racism had a 
considerable following in late nineteenth century in Britain, but the liberal idea 
of self-government, an integral part of English and British national 
consciousness, tended to preclude the ethno-racist nationalism found in 
Germany at the time (Smith 1999: 72). Instead, nostalgic references to the 
peaceful Glorious Revolution 1688, the gradual growth of representative 
government and the origins of parliament were made (Smith 1999: 72). 
At the same time, developments in education, as discussed in Chapter 
One, and the mass press brought the idea of national identity to more and 
more people. From the 1870s, the school boards ensured that most of the 
population had basic levels of literacy while the railway brought most cities in 
Britain within a day's journey to London after 1850s (Coils 2002: 38). By the 
end of the nineteenth century, after the extension of the state through the 
Reform Acts, the middle classes "... had come to see themselves as the 
political nation" (Coils 2002: 307). The political nation was further extended in 
the twentieth century as both the franchise and the education system became 
more inclusive. 
The twentieth century 
As in Germany at the turn of the century, groups and societies with a patriotic 
outlook, such as the National Service League, the Tariff Reform League or the 
Navy League, were popular in Britain (Feldman 1994: 132). One of the effects 
of such societies was the association of patriotism with imperialism (Feldman 
1994: 133). This imperial patriotism presented the British monarchy as the 
core, not only of the United Kingdom, but also of the empire (Feldman 
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1994: 136). The link between empire, monarchy and imperial patriotism was 
promoted and brought to the masses through theatre plays, music, the 
cinema as well as popular postcards and imagines of the colonies (Feldman 
1994: 136). Apart from this conservative imperial patriotism, other variants of 
patriotism found supporters, such as "... the patriotism of free trade and 
liberty" (Feldman 1994: 138). 
By the 1930s the mass media had gained immense potential to 
represent the nation and was used extensively during the Second World War 
for propaganda, which incorporated national language, myths and imagery 
(Coils 2002: 39). By the end of the Second World War, the British state and 
nation was more united than ever before (Coils 2002: 64). The war had a 
decisive impact on national identity, creating widespread feelings of belonging 
and togetherness, united against the common enemy, united in the common 
effort and united in common experiences such as the bomb raids, conscription 
and general hardship. The war in general, however, had, unlike in Germany, a 
positive impact on national identity and has subsequently been successfully 
incorporated into the national myth. The experience of the war and victory in 
1945 are frequently used for invocations of sentimental-nostalgic national 
pride, especially in relation to continental Europe and the EU. Chapters Five 
will further investigate the continued importance of the war especially with 
regards to national and European identity. 
Another form of identification in Britain relates to class. Sch6pflin 
(2000: 318) argues that most modern states are defined, more or less explicitly 
in ethnic terms. England (or Britain), however, could be described as a rare 
exception where ethnicity is subordinated to class, which has helped to make 
British identity comparatively open to foreigners such as migrants. Although 
immigration took place before and throughout the twentieth century, its 
potential impact on national culture became a dominant feature of political 
debate after the Second World War as part of the dissolution of the empire. 
In fact, it has been claimed that one of the most important post-war 
developments in relation to the nation was decolonisation, which also 
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introduced the idea of a multiethnic Britain in its wake (Coils 2002: 143). The 
1948 Nationality Act " ... tried to render those- who had formerly lived in the 
Empire, on settlement, full citizens of Britain" (Coils 2002: 160). In 1962 the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act established entry categories and the use of 
work vouchers, while the 1971 Immigration Act effectively ended primary non- 
white immigration through a patriarchy clause (Kushner 1994: 417). In contrast 
to German citizenship laws, the British Nationality Act in 1981 abandoned the 
jus soli concept in favour of moves towards jus sanguinis, however, without 
defining what constitutes a British national (Coils 2002: 160-161). Immigration 
was now effectively restricted to those whose parents were either British or 
settled in Britain while 'British' citizens with no family in Britain and who were 
not born in Britain were not allowed to settle (Budge et al 2001: 654). These 
measures have been criticised by some as signs of "insular English 
nationalism" (Kushner 1994: 423). 
Finally we need to note that in addition, throughout the twentieth 
century, there were growing demands in Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales for more political and national independence from the centre, which 
eventually led to the devolution process as discussed in the previous chapter. 
As Feldman (1994: 127) points out, the United Kingdom, despite the English 
dominance, remained a multinational state. 
2.7 Conclusion 
National identity and nationalism are much debated concepts, not only in 
relation to their nature and categorisation, but also with regards to their origin. 
The development of English (or British) and German national identity has 
been quite different and was intrinsically linked to the political development, 
as this and the previous chapter have demonstrated. This chapter has shown 
how, in England, the comparatively early development of the political 
parliamentary system combined with economic factors (such as commerce, 
the overseas empire and the early industrialisation) have resulted in the 
development of a national identity largely based on civic values combined with 
a strong Protestant belief in England as the 'chosen nation'. After 1707, 
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English national identity proceeded to dominate British national identity. 
Although gradual changes and adjustments have occurred, modern English 
(and British) national identity continues to be associated with civic values 
(such as parliamentary sovereignty and liberal rights). In fact, the longevity of 
these institutions and values per se has now become an integral part of the 
national myth and national identity. 
In comparison, national identity in Germany was at least until the 
nineteenth century an elite concept, which focused almost entirely on cultural 
aspects until the creation of a German state in 1871. Even then, national 
identity continued to be associated with ethno-cultural concepts, pseudo- 
historical national myths and notions of the German Volk as expressed in the 
respective citizenship laws. Unlike in Britain, where citizenship was based on 
the principle of jus soli, in Germany citizenship and therefore nationality was 
based on jus sanguinis. Only recently, following an EU recommendation, 
Germany has amended the law to incorporate aspects of jus soli, while Britain 
has started to move towards jus sanguinis. 
Finally, this chapter has shown that war in general and especially the 
events in the twentieth century have had a crucial impact on national identity, 
especially in Germany. Modern German national identity has been 
extensively reformed by the experiences of Third Reich nationalism and the 
Second World War. In the post-war period, the negative connotations now 
associated with nationalism prompted a general search for an alternative 
'fatherland'. Subsequently, post-war German governments linked German 
political and national rehabilitation to a firm commitment to European 
integration. This also resulted in generally more positive attitudes to a 
European identity, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. Before we turn to 
European integration and identity, however, it is important to examine, in the 
next chapter, the philosophical development of the European idea in the last 
few centuries. This is necessary in order to understand the historical and 
theoretical roots of twentieth century European integration. By assessing the 
catalysts that prompted, in the past, alternative proposals for political systems 
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and co-operation in Europe, we will be able to better understand what 
triggered post-1945 European integration 
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3. The development of the European idea until the Second 
World War 
3.1 Introduction 
Having outlined the development of the national idea in Chapter Two, this 
chapter will examine the history of the European idea, which developed 
roughly at the same time as the national idea and was sometimes regarded 
as an alternative solution to governance. The continuous objective of 
European integration plans and schemes was to "... put an end to 
intracontinental warfare and enhance the welfare of all the peoples of the 
region" (Pagden 2002: 54). Generally, the idea of re-organising and uniting 
Europe can be traced back several centuries although, "... in spite of a 
genuine need and an occasional able spokesman [ ... ] [it] made little headway" 
until the twentieth century (Pegg 1983: 3). Nevertheless it is important to 
outline the most important developments, especially in the last two hundred 
years, although some earlier European plans need to be explained to provide 
continuity. From the eighteenth century the European idea gained new 
momentum in intellectual circles as a political and increasingly as an 
economic concept. After the Great War, especially in the 1920s, attempts 
were made by leading politicians to turn European integration schemes into 
political reality. In the 1930s, however, following the establishment of National 
Socialism in Germany and the subsequent Second World War, such attempts 
ended. They were revived after 1945 with new vigour leading eventually to the 
foundation of the EU. It seems therefore suitable for this chapter to examine 
the, largely theoretical, development of the European idea until the Second 
World War, while the next chapter will discuss European integration from 
1945 onwards. 
The European idea and European integration schemes were usually 
focused on Western Europe. The division into Western and Eastern Europe 
resulted from the earlier separation of the Roman Empire into a Western half, 
which formed the basis of the Christian Commonwealth, and the Eastern 
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Byzantine half. The East Roman Emperor Justinian 1 (527-565 AD) was able 
to establish caesaropapism, an absolute reign of the emperor over the Church 
(Columbia Encyclopedia 2001: 1). In Western Europe, Pope Gregory the Great 
(590-604 AD) established the foundations for the Western Roman Catholic 
Church and the Vatican, which became the secular papal power base. This 
part real and part imagined separation between East and West has been 
sustained, more or less artificially (and more or less conscious in popular 
thought), until the present day and had a certain influence on twentieth 
century European integration as well as on earlier integration schemes. 
Until the sixteenth century politics and society in Western Europe in the 
Middle Ages were dominated by the idea of Christendom and the Christian 
community. From the time of Charlemagne (742-814), the notion of Europe as 
a geographical concept was increasingly applied to the Christian parts of 
Western Europe, creating the idea that Europe and the Christian 
Commonwealth were identical (Delanty 1995: 26). As Rieu (1993: 26) explains 
the world was dominated by religious modes of thought whereby politics and 
science were "... wholly subordinate to a theological conception of the world 
[ ... ]". In medieval Western Europe, any existing unity and continuity, albeit 
very limited, was derived mainly from the language of the scholarly elite and 
was based on Christianity and the Catholic Church on the one hand and the 
" ... global inheritance of the universal might of the Roman Empire" on the 
other (Mikkeli 1998: 30). This is highlighted by the usage of the term 'Europe' 
throughout this period. As Den Boer (1995: 27) puts it, the term was deemed 
suitable for ceremonial occasions, but was "... nevertheless an example of 
literary artifice" and as yet without its modern emotional connotation. Only 
from the fifteenth century onwards did the concepts of Europe, Christianity 
and humanism develop into three key ideas of the intellectual elite of Europe, 
which started to form the respublica litteraria (Den Boer 1995: 35). 
However, the unity of Europe in the Middle Ages must not be 
overrated. In fact, as Delanty (1995: 41) puts it, this unity is largely a myth, 
created mostly by nineteenth century romantics, who constructed this ideal as 
a basis not only for early nineteenth century romanticism and nationalism but 
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also to serve as a historical dimension and justification of their European 
schemes as examined further on. 
3.2 Sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe: the reinforcement of 
the European idea 
It was not until the sixteenth century that the development of the modern 
concept of Europe became possible. This is largely due to the Reformation 
and secularisation, which dissolved the unity of Christendom and Europe thus 
making way for a more socio-cultural and political concept of Europe. The 
Reformation created religious diversity in Europe thereby ending the religious 
monopoly of the Catholic Church as well as its all-encompassing influence on 
politics and everyday life. The religious fragmentation made the mediaeval 
equation of Europe and (Catholic) Christendom increasingly impossible to 
maintain. 
European supremacy and European values 
From the sixteenth century, the term Europe, as used in intellectual discourse, 
gradually changed its context. As Delanty (1995: 30) explains, the 
contemporary image of Europe was a theoretical construction, which existed 
predominantly in comparison with 'non-European' factors. This comparison 
was enabled due to the more and more frequent exploration of the non- 
European world. In contrast to the extremely limited worldview of the Middle 
Ages, the horizon of the European elites was gradually broadened and 
obtained an increasingly global perspective. In this changing world, the 
concept of Europe came to symbolise cultural superiority and unity. This idea 
of European superiority, as cultivated by European intellectuals and 
increasingly the wider European population, proved to be influential and would 
remain largely unchallenged until after the First World War (Delanty 1995: 30). 
Thus, in addition to constituting a specific territory, Europe was now 
associated with certain values, although this was not properly articulated until 
the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Delanty 1995: 30). 
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At the same time, a theory of the balance of power between states was 
developed, following a general political stabilisation and centralisation, which 
was the result of the emergence of early modern states in Europe. This new 
political environment started to replace the old mediaeval idea of a universal 
Christian Empire, while theories of the balance of power would come to play a 
dominant role in the creation of a non-Christian political concept of Europe 
(Den Boer 1995: 39). The balance of power refers to a system of state 
interaction whereby states usually enter into balanced alliances to ensure 
peace and stability (Heywood 2002: 128). This idea, usually categorised as 
part of the school of realism, was also reflected in early European integration 
schemes in the sixteenth and especially in the seventeenth century. 
Early European integration schemes 
From the seventeenth century onwards, having faced large scale and long- 
term European wars (such as the Thirty Years War), and inspired by the 
utopian novels of the Renaissance, philosophers turned their attention to 
European peace and how it might be achieved (Mikkeli 1998: 45). Although 
some ideas of European integration had previously been formulated, schemes 
for European co-operation became now ever more popular with the literary 
elite. The predominant aim of all these schemes was to establish perpetual 
peace in Europe, although many continued to be based on traditional 
concepts such as religious unity and monarchical rule. 
In 1623, Emeric Cruc6 (c. 1590-1648) published an essay on universal 
peace and freedom of trade (Le Nouveau Cyn6e) (Pagden 2002: 14). 
According to Mikkeli (1998: 47), Cruc6 considered war to be a major barrier to 
progress and formulated a peace plan according to which envoys of the 
different states had to meet regularly to solve any problems and would be 
obliged to accept majority decisions. The plan, however, assumed a general 
peace desire among the rulers, which was not matched by the political reality 
of the seventeenth century (Mikkeli 1998: 47). 
A similar scheme entitled The Great Design of Henry IV (Le grand 
dessein de Henri IV) was published in 1620 by the Duc de Sully (1560-1641). 
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Sully considered both the Ottoman Empire as well as the increasingly 
powerful House of Habsburg as major threats to political stability in Europe 
(Malettke 1992: 84). Sully proposed to create a balance of power by 
downsizing the Habsburg's European territory and dividing Europe into a 
number of monarchies and republics. A new European senate would deal with 
disputes, levy taxes and maintain a European army. A first joint action would 
then be a crusade against the Ottoman Empire to reduce the threat to 
Europe's eastern border (Hay 1957: 115). Sully defined the eastern border 
largely in religious terms as he regarded only Roman Catholicism, Calvinism 
and Lutheranism as valid Christian religions while all others (including the 
Eastern Orthodox Church) were considered heretical and as such would not 
be permitted to join the proposed scheme (Malettke 1992: 90). 
Later in the seventeenth century, the establishment of a highly centralised 
absolutist France under Louis XIV replaced the Habsburgs as the main threat 
to the European balance of power and therefore as the main reason for the 
development of integration schemes. As Mikkeli (1998: 50) put it, "... the word 
Europe became widely incorporated in political discourse in the latter half of 
the seventeenth century, as the states of Europe fought to oppose the 
hegemonic strivings of France led by Louis XIV". The most prominent 
example in this context is William Penn (1644-1718) who in 1693 published 
his Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe proposing a 
European Peace Alliance whereby the preservation of the status quo would 
be entrusted to a European Parliament (Hay 1957: 119). Economic revenue 
rather than the political power of a member state would determine its number 
of parliamentary representatives (Mikkeli 1998: 51). The parliament alone 
would be entitled to use force in case of any disputes. Penn was also one of 
the first to acknowledge the economic advantages of European integration. 
He argued that European integration would save the money spend on warfare 
and would make trading between European states easier (Mikkeli 1998: 52). 
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3.3 The eighteenth century: Enlightenment and secularisation of the 
Europeanidea 
The process of secularisation continued into the eighteenth century. The 
mediaeval symbiotic unit of church and state had by now ceased to exist as 
states and secular rulers increased in importance (Delanty 1995: 70). Although 
religion continued to play an important role in the self-image of Europeans, it 
had by now lost its central position. The term Europe was, especially in 
Protestant political thinking, in regular use and a sense of belonging to 
Europe, to a shared continent, can be said to have germinated at least among 
the educated urban population of Western Europe (Mikkeli 1998: 60). 
European culture and clivilisation 
In fact, among the European urban educated population, an artistic and 
scientific community, a r6publique fitt6raire, clearly inspired by the humanistic 
sixteenth century respublica litteraria, had emerged (Den Boer 1995: 60). By 
the eighteenth century the "... feeling of belonging together, prevailing among 
the European intellectuals, in the republic of letters, had been growing 
stronger and stronger' (Mikkeli 1998: 60). As part of the Enlightenment, many 
philosophers started to acknowledge European culture and European values 
in their own right. 
Rousseau for example claimed that Europe was united through 
religion, law, customs, literature and trade, while Montesquieu associated joint 
trading, political tolerance as well as the idea of freedom with Europe (Mikkeli 
1998: 60). Voltaire described Europe in his Le sidcle de Louis XIV (1751) as a 
commonwealth of interconnected states with the same religious background 
as well as distinguished European manners and customs such as the 
principles of civil law and politics that were unknown to the non-European 
world (Den Boer 1995: 60). Many of these suggested European values, as well 
as the Enlightenment tradition itself, would be put forward again in the 
twentieth century as potential features of a shared cultural European identity 
as will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Under the influence of the Enlightenment, these ideals and values were 
essentially non-Christian and " ... excessive reliance on the Christian tradition 
was even regarded as being injurious to the fostering of pan-Europeanism" 
(Mikkeli 1998: 61). Furthermore, the Enlightenment ideals became associated 
with 'civilisation' as the eighteenth century progressed. The expression La 
civilisation europ6enne was first used in 1766 and was increasingly employed 
after the French Revolution (Den Boer 1995: 64). The equation of Western 
Europe with civilisation replaced the previous symbiosis of Western Europe 
and Christendom, although the effect, a feeling of European supremacy, 
remained the same (Den Boer 1995: 63). In addition, the concept of civilisation 
encompassed a belief in progress and science that further separated the 
'modern' world from traditional religious superstition. The emphasis on 
Europeanism, however, continued to be an intellectual prerogative whereby 
'Europe', despite its linguistic and ethnic differences, was an expression of 
spiritual and intellectual unity (Pegg 1981: 4). 
European integration schemes continued to flourish in the eighteenth 
century. For example, in ca. 1712 L'Abb6 de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) wrote 
Project for Eternal Peace in Europe (Projet pour rendre la paix perp6tuelle en 
Europe), in which he agreed with Penn and Cruc6 that the present political 
situation, characterised by an imbalance of political power, was the reason for 
constant warfare (Mikkeli 1998: 55). Saint-Pierre proposed a European 
Republic, a federation of states based on the model of the Holy Roman 
Empire (Shennan 1991: 6). The member states would remain sovereign, but 
each would send a senator to a European Council (Mikkeli 1998: 55). The 
prime objective was to secure the peace, to maintain the status quo in Europe 
and to defend the interests of the princes and monarchs, who would, as Saint- 
Pierre idealistically believed, willingly engage in such a scheme (Mikkeli 
1998: 55). Saint-Pierre's model, albeit a little utopian, nevertheless maintained 
an influence on European integration theory well into the twentieth century, 
when it was regarded as a prophecy for the creation of the United Nations and 
the League of Nations (Den Boer 1995: 43). 
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Thus, in the eighteenth century, the idea of European modernity started 
to be firmly linked with the emergence of the Western European polity of 
nation states as discussed In Chapter One. In this political climate the national 
idea referred to the particularism and relativism of culture, while the European 
idea gradually acquired the character of a normative idea associated with 
civilisation In connection to the notion of European supremacy over non- 
Europeans in terms of culture, commerce and economy (Chebel d'Appollonia 
2002: 175). At the same time, an integrated 'Europe' increasingly lost its 
appeal as a political alternative to the nation state (Delanty 1995: 66). Only a 
few philosophers such as Voltaire thought that 'Europe' was replacing the 
nation-state. For his part, Rousseau envisaged an age in which everyone 
would be Europeans (Delanty 1995: 71). 
The Influence of the French Revolution 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution influenced both 
supporters and opponents of the new political order. As Den Boer (1995: 66) 
points out, the realisation of belonging to a European community was more 
conscious among conservative thinkers and politicians who expressed a 
desire to restore the old pre-revolutionary order. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) 
for example published In 1790 his highly contested essay Reflection on the 
Revolution in France (Black 1993: 111). Burke considered Europe to be a 
cultural unit shaped by a common historical heritage based on common 
institutions such as the Christian faith, monarchical rule, Roman law, similar 
customs and education (Mikkeli 1998: 60). Some of these would later be 
(re)discovered as foundations for a European identity as shown in Chapter 
Five. Burke thought that key European values were religion and the 
"gentlemanly spirit" (Mikkeli 1998: 60), which was a reflection of contemporary 
perceptions of English or British Identity as outlined in the previous chapter. 
Burke concluded that the European states were so similar to each other that 
they could practically be regarded as constituting one big nation (Mikkeli 
1998: 60). 
At the end of the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth century, 
intellectuals started to assign a historical perspective to the European idea, 
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which served both as an existential explanation and justification. 'Europe' was 
now subjected to often Idealised historical interpretations and romanticised 
visions of medieval religion and politics, which were popular especially among 
Romanticists as well as opponents of the French Revolution (Den Boer 
1995: 69). Such nostalgic reflections on the Middle Ages can for example be 
found in Novalis' work Die Christenheit oder Europa (Christendom or Europe, 
1799). Novalis (1772-1801) considered the Middle Ages to be a source of 
inspiration that should serve to revive Christian faith in Europe after " ... the 
religious vacuum left by the French Revolution" (Friedrich 1997: 82). 
Mediaeval Christendom was thought of as a utopian alternative to European 
modernity and its secular Ideologies (Delanty 1995: 80). Novalis argued that in 
a new Europe the Christian faith should again play an important and unifying 
role (Mikkeli 1998: 64). 
3.4 The nineteenth century: Romanticism and early European 
federalists 
Thus, while the concept of European culture was developed retrospectively in 
the eighteenth century, the history of European culture as an idea only 
originated in the nineteenth century when the Romantic Movement reached its 
peak (Den Boer 1995: 69). The nineteenth century Romantics frequently 
investigated the roots of European civilisation and often presumed that there 
had been a conscious Idea of Europe throughout the Middle Ages. 
Romantic Movement and political reality 
The Duc de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a nineteenth century romanticist and 
utopian socialist (Friedrich 1997: 97), sentimentally looked back to the days of 
a "united Christian Europe" and forward to the days when free trade would 
make Europe an economic community (Hoggart and Johnson 1987: 108). At 
the height of the Napoleonic Wars In 1813, he described his vision of Europe 
that should serve the common good and be united through communal 
institutions and a single parliamentary government (Pegg 1983: 4). 
Resembling the Ideas of twentieth century federalists, Saint-Simon argued 
that Europe would have to be a gradually developed federal community 
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composed of member states, which also should have a parliamentary political 
system (Mikkeli 1998: 72). The European Parliament should be composed of 
elected representatives who should be inspired by European patriotism and 
make decisions in the interest of Europe and the people and not serve the 
rulers or national governments (Mikkeli 1998: 73). The aims of Saint-Simon's 
European Union were similar to that of the modern EU and focused on 
maintaining peace and promoting wider political, social and economic 
advantages for the population. Saint-Simon, however, also designed an 
'Upper House' made up by the wealthiest Europeans, who were to be elected 
by the 'King of Europe' (Mikkeli 1998: 73). 
The Romantic Movement was revived from the 1830s onwards. The 
new Romantics included theorists such as the Italian nationalist Mazzini 
(1805-72) who founded the 'Young Europe' movement in 1834 in Bern. 
Especially during the revolutionary years of 1847 and 1848, the idea of a 
United States of Europe appeared in many political pamphlets and 
publications (Mikkeli 1998: 79). As Mikkeli put it (1998: 80) "... the Romantics 
entertained great projects and beautiful visions in the nineteenth century" 
although their visions had little in common with political reality in the 
nineteenth century, which clearly belonged to the nation state. 
Indeed, the political reality in the second half of the nineteenth century 
was characterised by nationalisation at every level, where even rural 
communities and young children were re-educated into national citizens as 
discussed in Chapter Two (Den Boer 1995: 75). The attitude of many 
politicians at the time, and their focus on the nation state, is expressed in a 
statement by Bismarck, who claimed that 'Europe' was nothing more than a 
geographical expression (Den Boer 1995: 76). Even more than before, a 
concept of Europe that went beyond the geographical dimension was largely 
restricted to the intelligentsia. In Germany, for example, opponents of 
Bismarck's Realpolitik remained influenced by Kant's Zum Ewigen Frieden 
(Perpetual Peace, 1795), which stresses the importance of a League of 
Nations or federal Europe. Kant felt that the creation of such a community of 
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people would be the only way to regularise the relations between the states 
(Chebel d'Appollionia 2002: 175). 
Popular Culture and democratic-federal European schemes 
Another important development at the time, as previously discussed, was the 
gradual propagation of education and literacy, which combined with the 
proliferation of the national mass media, led subsequently to the spread of 
public opinion and popular culture to wider parts of society. Until now, 
civilisation as a universal European definition had largely been identified with 
elite culture. With the development of national political publics, however, the 
concept of civilisation became 'nationalised' and European civilisation was 
subdivided into various national cultures (Den Boer 1995: 73). Hence, by the 
late nineteenth century, nationalism replaced to a large extent the enlightened 
cosmopolitanism of the previous century, although the European tradition 
continued to exist in several political schools of thinking. 
The emergence of popular culture and the process of democratisation 
altered not only the perception of the concept of civilisation, but also the 
historical interpretation of Europe. While previous European integration plans 
had focused, in accordance with the principles of balance of powers, on the 
co-operation of states and their rulers, some democrats now started to 
abandon the traditional 'European peace plan' in favour of a federation of 
nations, similar to the one proposed by Saint-Simon (Den Boer 1995: 73). 
Although the federalist movement was largely restricted to a small 
literary circle, it also had some more prominent supporters such as Victor 
Hugo, who argued at the international peace conference in Paris in 1849 in 
favour of a European federation (Pegg 1983: 4-5). He, together with a group 
of similar minded personalities, developed this idea further at the 1867 
Geneva peace conference where they established the International League 
for Peace and Freedom, which soon published a journal entitled Les Etats- 
Unis dEurope (The United States of Europe) (Pegg 1983: 5). However, as 
Delanty (1995: 79) put it, Victor Hugo's ideal of a United States of Europe was 
an anomaly in an age of nationalism. It is probably not surprising that in this 
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political environment, " ... at the eve of the war, the idea of European 
integration had made little if any progress in the corridors of power" (Stirk 
1996: 10). 
One of the main reasons why the deep-rooted awareness of "... sharing a 
vague but common European destiny" survived at all, was the continuing 
assumption of European supremacy over non-European nations (Den Boer 
1995: 77). More than ever before, as Den Boer (1995: 77) explains, the mid 
and late nineteenth century, dominated by imperialism and colonialism, was 
an era of boundless belief in European superiority and of unlimited European 
self-confidence. It was not until the First World War that the idea of European 
supremacy ceased to exist as a dominant political idea (Den Boer 1995: 78), a 
development that was accompanied by a revival of European federalism in 
the 1920s (Mikkeli 1998: 73). 
3.5 The European idea between the wars 
In 1918, after the First World War, European self-belief was in ruins, along 
with large parts of a continent that was now dominated by widespread 
pessimism and depression. The intervention of the US in the war had 
demonstrated how the old European era was gradually giving way to a new 
Western or Atlantic era (Bugge 1993: 86). After the war, the US would become 
an increasingly influential power in Europe, although the US influence on 
European affairs was largely passive with no official participation in the 
European reconstruction process (Stirk 1996: 23). For example, although 
Wilson had suggested the creation of a League of Nations in his Fourteen 
Points, the US did not join the League when it was founded in 1919. 
Nevertheless, post- 1918 European politics and economies were 
progressively more part of an international system not any longer dominated 
by Europe and the European states. 
Some of the immediate challenges in the post war years included the 
political turmoil in Germany; the need to restructure large parts of Europe after 
the collapse of both the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire, as well as 
the Soviet challenge in relation to a more general fear of communism (Bugge 
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1993: 86). The Treaty of Versailles set up the aforementioned League of 
Nations, which was not confined to Europe and was strongly influenced by 
eighteenth century Enlightenment globalism. It was the first international 
entity "... that was intended to establish universal jurisdiction" (Heywood 
2002: 151). The League was supposed to promote international co-operation, 
but membership was not compulsory. Moreover, it did not have real political 
power, which made it a rather inefficient organ for maintaining international 
peace (Wistrich 1994: 21). The League did not infringe on the national 
sovereignty of its members and lacked the power to apply effective sanctions 
to ensure compliance with its decisions. Nevertheless, the League symbolised 
a general desire, triggered by the First World War, for co-operation and 
peace. 
In addition, and surpassing the remit of the League of Nations, whose 
relative impotence had quickly disappointed its advocates, twentieth century 
philosophers wanted to establish a stable political structure in Europe that had 
been missing for centuries. Spurned on by the disaster of the First World War, 
"... it was possibly partly this feeling of the vulnerability of European civilisation 
that prepared the soil for a recognition of the advantages of unity over free 
competition" (Mikkeli 1998: 92). 
However, in the first years after 1918, there were only a few 
campaigners for full-scale European integration as more pressing needs 
engaged people, politicians and theorists alike. For example, most French 
theorists at the time were preoccupied with achieving French security, not 
through co-operation and reconciliation, but through control over Germany. 
Nevertheless, by 1922, the continued failure to establish a stable order in 
Europe prompted some people to turn back to the idea of European Union, 
although their perceptions and visions of Europe varied greatly depending on 
their political background (Stirk 1996: 18). In 1923, at the height of the Ruhr 
8 crisis, the German writer Heinrich Mann reminded his readers in an article 
that Victor Hugo had said in 1871 "... down with frontiers. The Rhine for 
8 the Ruhr occupation in 1923 by French troops when the French reparations committee 
found that Germany had defaulted their reparation coal deliveries (Heater 1992: 121) 
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everyone! Let us create a Republic, let us form the United States of Europe" 
(Pegg 1983: 26). In this spirit, numerous European movements sprang up in 
the 1920s, the most prominent of which probably was the Pan-European 
movement of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, who "... perhaps did more at this 
time than anyone else to popularize the European idea" (Pegg 1983: 28). 
Kalergi and Paneuropa 
Kalergi believed that only a politically united Europe could overcome the crisis 
faced by wide parts of Europe after the First World War. He envisaged a 
united federal Europe under exclusion of the British Empire, whose interests 
he considered to be too different. However, both Europe and Britain were to 
share the task of global Europeanisation, whereby Britain was to act as 
mediator between Paneuropa and Panamerica (Bugge 1993: 97). 
Paneuropa's main function would be to secure peace in Europe and give 
Europe a constructive world role as an equal member of a Triple Alliance with 
the USA and Russia (Calleo 2001: 24). Kalergi argued that, in return for small 
concessions on national sovereignty, all European countries could prosper 
economically and obtain lasting peace (Pegg 1983: 28). Internally, Paneuropa 
would have a supranational structure based on obligatory arbitration and 
multilateral co-operation, while externally a Paneuropean defence alliance 
would be established to protect smaller states from external threats (Bugge 
1993: 98). Kalergi's ultimate aim, a United States of Europe, would be a 
gradual creation, following a step-wise plan, which would firstly institute a 
governmental conference, then a system of arbitration treaties and thirdly a 
common market and customs union, which Kalergi believed to be the best 
method to revive the economy (Stirk 1996: 26). Kalergi regarded nationalism in 
Europe as a dying ideal and stressed, similarly to many modern definitions of 
European identity, the importance of Pan-European ideals such as Christian 
faith, European arts/science and culture, the Christian-Hellenistic tradition etc 
(Stirk 1996: 26). 
Pan- European movement and Franco-German relations 
Based on these ideas, Kalergi founded in 1923 the Pan-European Movement 
and managed, for the first time in the history of European integration 
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schemes, to win the sympathies of leading politicians such as Edouard 
Herriot, Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, who became the honorary 
president of the movement in 1927. The combined Franco-German support 
was crucial as Franco-German co-operation lay at the heart of Kalergi's 
scheme. Until 1924, when Herriot replaced the anti-German Poincar6 as 
French Prime Minister, Briand was made French foreign minister and Gustav 
Stresemann German foreign minister, the Franco-German relations had been 
somewhat unfriendly. The combined efforts of these politicians, however, led 
to Franco-German rapprochement, which was at its height in 1925, when the 
Treaty of Locarno paved the way for the admission of Germany to the League 
of Nations in 1926 and guaranteed the borders in Western Europe thus 
alleviating to some extent French security concerns (Calleo 2001: 24). In 1925, 
the German SPD even incorporated support for the United States of Europe 
into their Heidelberg programme (Stirk 1996: 28). Despite the support of some 
leading politicians, however, Pan-Europa was never a popular mass 
movement and any progress in the inter-war years towards European 
integration was largely elite driven (Stirk 1996: 28). As will be explained in the 
following chapter, the same could be said about European integration in the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
The Briand Memorandum 
Briand believed it possible for Europe to achieve a federal union in the near 
future and began to plan a federal initiative in 1929 (Pegg 1983: 106+111). 
The whole venture was based on French security interests (Bugge 1993: 105). 
As Hoggart and Johnson (1987: 109) explain " ... it is interesting that while 
Briand's plan involved the merging of all European nationalities into a United 
States of Europe, his major concern was Franco-German relations [ ... ]". As 
will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the same approach would also 
be taken by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman after the Second 
World War, when he proposed a Franco-German coal and steel community in 
1950, not so much because he was an ideological advocate of European 
integration, but " ... because France had not succeeded in preventing or 
delaying the economic recovery of Germany and it looked as if Germany was 
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about to resume her role Europe's industrial giant" (Hoggart and Johnson 
1987: 109). 
Inspired by a desire to involve Germany more permanently in some 
kind of European network that would guarantee France a certain degree of 
control over German development, Briand proposed in 1929 at the League of 
Nations conference at Geneva that the time had come for closer European 
economic co-operation (Bugge 1993: 104). Earlier he had declared that "... it is 
necessary to organize Europe, not against any country or any group of 
countries, but to strengthen the conditions of peace, to put an end to the state 
of anarchy that will give rise to conflicts as long as actions are not sufficiently 
coordinated to organize the vital interests of the peoples of the continent" 
(Pegg 1983: 112). Although Briand realised that the chances of establishing a 
European bond were slim, he was determined to put forward a plan for 
European integration (Pegg 1983: 140). On 17 May 1930, he submitted a 
Memorandum on European Federal Union arguing that due to the common 
ethnic background, shared civilisation and geographical proximity, the 
European nations should co-operate instead of contend with each other (Pegg 
1983: 141). The first step of such a co-operation was to be the ratification of a 
treaty establishing the principle of a European moral union and confirming the 
solidarity between the states involved (Bugge 1993: 104). Structurally, the 
main organ for co-operation would be a European Conference that was to 
function in close co-operation with the League of Nations (Pegg 1983: 141). 
Between its sessions, a smaller political committee with its own secretariat 
was to function as executive. There was no provision for any means of 
popular or democratic legitimisation (Stirk 1996: 36). Contrary to his original 
suggestion at Geneva, the memorandum gave preference to political co- 
operation and demanded the subordination of economic to political issues 
(Bugge 1993: 104). Briand believed that political rapprochement was critical to 
the establishment of a common market. 
This explains partly why the reception to the memorandum was overall 
polite, but not particularly encouraging with Britain, Germany and Italy being 
the most resistant to the plan (Pegg 1983: 142). Subsequently, Briand tried to 
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persuade the League of Nations to establish a European Council, but strong 
resistance allowed solely for the creation of a 'Study Commission for the 
European Union' over which Briand would preside (Pegg 1983: 154). This 
Commission ceased to exist after only a couple of meetings. 
Bugge (1993: 105) lists a number of reasons why the Briand 
memorandum failed to achieve its targets. Firstly, its main advocates died 
around that time, Stresemann in 1929 and Briand himself in 1932. Secondly, it 
has been argued that the plan was characterised by a lack of political courage 
and realism. It tried to create a supranational European Union but promised 
not to touch the political sovereignty of the member states. Thirdly, the strong 
opposition, especially from Britain, successfully limited the outcomes of the 
plan thereby rendering it largely ineffective. Fourthly, the worldwide Great 
Depression following the Wall Street Crash in 1929 resulted in a turn towards 
economic protectionism. Another reason was the rise of the NSDAP to power 
in Germany. The new regime, entrenched after the 1934 Enabling Act, 
effectively stopped all European integration plans, as they were not 
sustainable without German co-operation. Finally, the League of Nations itself 
resisted the Briand memorandum as it was perceived as a potential 
bureaucratic rival in Europe. All in all, as Heater (1992: 142) argued, the 
Briand plan was altogether too vague and left too much to future negotiations. 
Nevertheless, Briand's scheme for European integration was the first to be 
devised by a leading European politician and the first to be officially 
considered by European governments. Therefore, Briand managed, at least to 
some extent, to move the theoretical idea of European integration towards 
actual implementation (Heater 1992: 145). 
Mitteleuropa 
Although the above discussed early twentieth century schemes for European 
integration were dominated by proposals for federal unity, there were some 
alternatives. One of the more prominent of these alternatives was the idea of 
Mitteleuropa (Central Europe), which originated in nineteenth century 
Germany from the dissatisfaction with the geographical borders of the 
German Empire. Many Germans, including the Austrians, had been excluded 
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when the empire was created and considered the artificial division between 
imperial and other Germans as illogical and unsatisfactory (Delanty 
1995: 107). Mitteleuropa was revived following the German victories in the first 
years of the First World War, which inspired Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) 
to write his influential Mitteleuropa in 1915 (Stirk 1996: 20). 
According to Bugge (1993: 90), Naumann envisaged a union between 
Austria and Germany and proposed that post-war Europe would be divided by 
two permanent trenches, one between Germany and France and one 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. Mitteleuropa itself should take the 
form of a loose confederation with a common Central European market and 
was considered to be the natural successor of the mediaeval Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation. Naumann's plan was criticised by 
contemporaries mainly for its ambiguity. The German SPID rejected the idea 
as imperialistic, while some economists worried that Mitteleuropa would be 
isolated from international trade (Bugge 1993: 90). Other states suspected 
that Naumann's condescending characterisation of other cultures was in fact 
promoting German hegemony (Stirk 1996: 21). Although in the 1920s and 
1930s some theorists and politicians contemplated Mitteleuropa as a potential 
German foreign policy, it was never a serious alternative due to its internal 
weaknesses (such as different German and Austrian ambitions) and the 
overwhelming superior power of its opponents, notably the USA (Stirk 
1996: 18). When in 1931 the Austrian Chancellor and the German Foreign 
Minister proposed a German-Austrian customs union, the scheme received 
widespread suspicion from other European governments and eventually had 
to be abandoned (Stirk 1996: 39). 
3.6 Conclusion 
Over the centuries, the main rationale and raison d'6tre of European 
integration plans was a desire to put an end to warfare and to create lasting 
peace in Europe. Some European schemes, especially the earlier ones, also 
had religious aims and strived to unify Christendom against real or perceived 
non-Christian threats, most notably the Ottoman Empire. Later, from the 
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sixteenth century onwards, the aim was to prevent war by achieving a balance 
of power in Europe. According to this theory, war was the result of hegemonial 
desires of states and rulers, which could only be kept at bay if some form of 
intervention prevented any one state from becoming to powerful and thus 
upsetting the balance of power. Thus, European peace plans were usually 
prompted by major wars (such as the Thirty Years War) when philosophers 
thought that either a supranational entity or some forum for European co- 
operation and arbitration needed to be created in order to mediate and thus 
create peace. This European forum or institution was at the heart of most 
peace plans. Some plans accorded this forum more power than others, but in 
general, the states involved would ultimately remain in control. 
Nevertheless, in an age when first absolutist rulers and then the nation 
state and nationalism reigned supreme, such plans failed to create the 
required governmental or popular support. It was not until after the First World 
War, and the scale of destruction it created, that European integration 
schemes generated the support of active politicians. Neither the Pan- 
European Movement, the Briand Memorandum or initiatives inspired by 
Mitteleuropa, however, led to tangible results. In the last years before the 
Second World War, support for European movements declined drastically for 
a variety of reasons including the introduction of national economic protection 
policies (a result of the Great Depression), the establishment of fascist 
regimes in Germany and Italy as well as the lack of British support for 
European integrative schemes. At the end of the 1930s, "... Europe was [now] 
less integrated than it had been in the 1920s and even in the years before 
1914" (Stirk 1996: 45). Although the First World War had sparked so far 
unprecedented interest in European integration, the catalyst that would 
eventually bring the European idea to fruition was the Second World War as 
will now be explained in the following chapter. 
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4. European Integration after 1945 
Introduction 
As the previous chapter illustrated, schemes for European integration have 
been a recurrent topic among philosophers for some centuries and have been 
discussed, more or less, by the emerging educated political public in the 
nineteenth century. Politics and political debates, however, were dominated in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by nationalism and 
imperialism. European integration until 1914, therefore, never outgrew its 
status as a mere theoretical idea. This started to change when the First World 
War gave new substance to the potential merits of European integration for 
the peace process. The devastation caused by the war initiated a so far 
unheard of popularity of European integration schemes in the early 1920s 
such as Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Movement. This movement 
managed to gain, for the first time in the history of European integration 
schemes, some support of acting politicians. Other initiatives, such as the 
Briand memorandum, also won limited support, but in the 1930s the world 
economic crisis, subsequent economic protectionism and the rise of fascist 
regimes effectively slowed any attempts for European integration to a virtual 
standstill. It was not until after the Second World War, as this chapter will 
explain, that the unprecedented destruction of the war, which had shaken the 
very foundations of Europe, prompted the European governments to seek a 
lasting solution that would create permanent peace and prosperity in Europe. 
As Nugent (2003: 11) points out, the Second World War marked a turning 
point in Western Europe that would eventually lead to political co-operation 
and even integration that would have been inconceivable before the war. The 
aim of this chapter is to outline the gradual process of European integration 
after 1945 as well as the broad theoretical concepts used to explain the 
integration process. 
114 
4.2 General assumptions and limitations 
Before going into any further detail, it is important to state a few necessary 
assumptions and limitations. Firstly, for the purpose of this thesis, it will be 
sufficient to concentrate on the development of Western European integration 
in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC), founded in 1957, 
and its successors namely the European Union (EU), created in 1992. There 
were other integrative initiatives, both in Eastern and Western Europe, notably 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM), the (failed) European Defence Community 
(EDC) and others such as NATO, the UN, the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Eastern European Council for Mutual Assistance 
(COMECON). Despite their importance, it is impossible to deal with them all in 
full. 
Secondly, although it will be noted that external powers (such as the 
US and the USSR) and events (for example the Cold War and German 
unification) had a crucial influence on European integration, there is not 
sufficient space to discuss these developments in greater detail. 
Thirdly, post-war European integration gave rise to a discipline of its 
own, namely integration theory, which has in the past fifty years harboured a 
great variety of schools of thought (Den Boer 1995: 17). As O'Neill (1996: 49) 
stresses " ... no single theory of regional integration can expect to offer a 
definitive account of the immensely complex international process that is 
European integration". As the focus of this chapter is not on a detailed 
analysis of European integration theory, emphasis will be on some broad 
theoretical concepts such as federalism, neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism in order to better illuminate post-war European 
integration. Although some of these theories have emerged in comparative 
politics, it has to be acknowledged, according to Rosamond (2000: 15-16), that 
some theorists argue that European integration is not suitable for theoretical 
generalisation, but should be treated as a historically rooted phenomenon, 
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arising in specific conditions and thus without meaningful precedent or 
contemporary parallel. 
Finally, the history of post-war European integration is often described 
as a gradual evolution interspersed with sudden bursts of action and can as 
such be grouped into a series of stages (Mikkeli 1998: 112-114), although 
some might argue that this categorisation is too simplistic. According to 
Mikkeli (1998: 112-114) the first stage from 1945-50 was characterised by 
debates on the underlying principles of co-operation and a search for suitable 
forms of European organisation. In the second stage, from 1950 to 1957, the 
functional organisations took shape followed by a third stage (1960s to the 
mid 1980s) when European integration was dominated by intergovernmental 
agreements and a revival of national economic protectionism due to the 
1970s economic depression. From the mid 1980s a revival and acceleration 
of European integration took place. In contrast to the previously prevailing 
intergovern mentalism, the federal-functional approach achieved now new 
popularity. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union 
followed by an unprecedented deepening and widening of union with the 
introduction of the single currency, the Euro, in 2002 and the fifth enlargement 
with the accession of ten new members (mostly in Eastern Europe) in 2004 
with further enlargement scheduled for 2007. For the purpose of this thesis, 
this chapter will be structured based on this chronological categorisation. 
4.3 Functional Federalism or federal Functionalism: 
European Integration from 1945 to 1960 
The federalist idea and post-war Europe 
As the previous chapter has shown, the idea of European integration had 
been largely abandoned in the 1930s and especially during the Second World 
War. However, the war did not totally eradicate the ethos of 'Europe'. A 
noteworthy example is the 1941 Ventotene Manifesto composed by Altiero 
Spinelli (1907-1986), whose plan for a federal Europe was adopted by the 
Italian Resistance and resulted in 1943 in the formation of the European 
Federalist Movement "to overcome 'international anarchy'" (Dedman 
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1996: 17). After 1945, the supranationalists believed that the nation state was 
obsolescent, even though there was no agreement as to the most appropriate 
replacement. As O'Neill (1996: 21) puts it "... the postwar mood for change was 
fuelled in large measure by the assumption that the nation state had outlived 
its historic usefulness in a century of immensely destructive total war". 
Organisations were founded in Europe that advocated a certain degree of 
economic and political unity such as the United Europe Movement in Britain or 
the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe in France. They found 
joint expression in the 1946 European Union of Federalists (Mikkeli 
1998: 113). 
Federalism, as a very broad theoretical concept, includes a wide 
spectrum of views, which made it a controversial concept in European 
integration. As mentioned in Chapter One, federal systems are characterised 
by a division of authority between central and regional governments. They 
usually originated as historical compromises involving a permanent contract 
between territorial units, which yield a measure of authority to a common and 
centralised institution whilst retaining at least some degree of autonomy, 
although there is no core prescriptive about the division of powers (Rosamond 
2000: 24-25). Such an institution will have some degree of independence from 
the governments of the member states or territories (Pinder 1998: 46). 
Federalist supporters of European integration emphasised that priority should 
be given to making formal changes in political institutions and procedures as 
the key to securing social harmony and democracy (O'Neill 1996: 22). In 
general, they thought that a European federation might be achieved either 
revolutionary or gradually (Rosamond 2000: 27). Many gradualists argued that 
European federalism would have to be cultivated as a popular movement to 
create the impetus for a federal pact among political elites (Rosamond 2000: 
28). 
After the end of the war in 1945, however, there was a rapid return to 
traditional political and parliamentary life, at least in Western Europe. In the 
East, many new governments were dominated by Communist parties thus 
creating a division in Europe between two spheres of influence dominated by 
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the two superpowers (Ladrech 2000: 29). In this political climate, the wartime 
ideas for a federal united Europe were quickly abandoned as the European 
governments were pre-occupied by more urgent matters. The scale of the 
devastation after the war was so enormous that the rebuilding of Western 
Europe in the late 1940s had to rely to a great extent on the US and the 
Marshall Plan. The latter was official termed the European Recovery Program 
(ERP) and was a US initiative, which involved large scale financial aid and 
loans to Western European countries, although the Plan had originally been 
offered to East European countries as well (Ladrech 2000: 29). The 
distribution of this aid was handled by the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC). It promoted international co-operation 
through its own intergovermental character as well as through the US 
encouragement for European integration (Mikkeli 1998: 115). 
Another primary political goal after 1945 was to maintain peace in 
Europe and avoid another major war (Mikkeli 1998: 111). The European 
governments and allied forces needed to address the German question as 
well as that of increasing hostility between the two superpowers. In addition, 
the spread of communism was considered to be a threat, which could only be 
warded off by the creation of a strong united Western Europe (Mikkeli 
1998: 109). These issues were powerful imperatives for the allies to ensure 
Germany's future within a strong Western Alliance (Rosamond 2000: 22). 
Under the circumstances, some form of European integration was 
perceived to be beneficial by most European governments, although the 
details of integration were contentious. The creation of a federal European 
Union, however, was not as such on the agenda of the European 
governments. In addition, and much to the disappointment of the federalists, 
there was no popular revolt against the established political order as people 
had to deal with the more pressing problem of rebuilding their lives (Stirk 
1996: 85). In addition, federalism suffered from endemic weaknesses and 
factional divisions with regards to strategy and objectives, which reduced its 
potential to have an impact on events (ONeill 1996: 25). In general, the 
proposed federal Europe was far too experimental and too radical to be given 
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serious consideration by politicians. In the end, as O'Neill (1996: 25) 
concludes, "... the federalist prospectus barely dented the European political 
establishment"; and the nation-state system, criticised and discredited by 
many, was never seriously in danger of being replaced by an alternative 
system. Therefore, although many architects of European integration such as 
Henri Spaak or Robert Schuman were prepared to articulate avowedly 
federalist goals, they acknowledged that neither a revolutionary nor a gradual 
federalist approach would be feasible within the current political climate 
(Rosamond 2000: 29). Many realised that, given the political reality, European 
integration could only be achieved by a more functional approach, which 
would stress economic co-operation and a minimum level of political 
institutionalisation. 
Functionalism and neo-functionalism 
Originally, functionalism essentially was the theory that governments are 
primarily responsive to human needs (Heywood 2002: 147). Functionalists like 
Mitrany (1888-1975), although not himself a theorist of European integration, 
analysed the functions of international societies under disregard of their ideal 
form (Wiener and Diez 2004: 7). Functionalism provided an alternative model 
for post war Western Europe by proposing sectoral instead of regional 
integration, the latter being discarded by Mitrany who argued that regionalism 
would only reproduce the faults of the nation state (Rosamond 2000: 37). 
Neo-functionalism was a revision of functionalism and has come to be 
the most influential theory of European and regional integration (Heywood 
2002: 148). To some extent, as will be discussed shortly, the neo-functional 
approach reflected and represented the reality of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
One of its main contributors was Ernst Haas (1924-2003), who provided an 
analysis of the process and progress of European integration in terms of 
supranationality, sub-national actors and spill-over (Rosamond 2002: 499). 
Spill-over was the main characteristic of neo-functional theory and assumed 
that gradual economic integration of particular economic sectors across 
nations would create functional pressures for integration in related economic 
sectors. It was believed that the full advantage of integration of one sector 
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could not be achieved unless related or dependent economic sectors were 
also involved (George 1991: 21). The integration of coal and steel would for 
example yield substantial benefits for key economic actors, but its full 
advantage could only be achieved when related economic sectors such as 
transport or finance/taxation would also be involved (Rosamond 2000: 60). 
Neo-functionalists argued that the economic spill-over would eventually 
result in political spill-over (political or even federal integration) since 
increasing integration would require greater regulatory complexity to guide the 
integration process (George 1991: 23). Furthermore, in order to secure the 
success of continued integration, it was considered important that the 
supranational institutions should secure enough autonomy to escape 
tendencies of states to dissolve the international organisations once the 
preferences of those states have been met (Rosamond 2000: 62). 
Although the integrative processes were regarded as largely automatic, 
many neo-functionalists agreed that some political activism was needed to 
direct, co-ordinate and sponsor the processes of functional spill-over 
(Rosamond 2000: 61). This role was assigned to non-state actors pursuing 
national or other self-interests (Schmitter 2004: 46). Haas (2003: 147) 
explained that European integration basically came about when political 
parties and interest groups accepted that action should be taken at the 
supranational level. These interest groups and political parties would then 
start to organise, function and redefine their interests on the supranational 
level as political spill-over would require the successful process of loyalty 
transfer from the old national to the new supranational authorities (Waaver 
2004: 172). 
In contrast to federalist integration schemes, there is little talk of 
mobilising the general population. In general it could be argued that 
"... federalism opted for a radical 'bottom up' model of political change. 
'Europe' was a grand project that would be build by a cooperative compact 
between enlightened elites and their people. Functionalism, on the other 
hand, adopted a 'top down' model of international change" (O'Neill 1996: 23). 
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Neo-functionalism argued that popular support would follow a successful elite 
sponsored integration. Given that the new supranational institutions would 
address popular needs systematically and efficiently, this would lead to "... a 
movement of mass allegiances away from established modes of authority" 
(Rosamond 2000: 66). Neo-functionalists, however, tended to over-estimate 
the visibility of the benefits of the new institutions and also their ability to 
command loyalty (Rosamond 2000: 66). It has been also been claimed that 
mass allegiances would not be forthcoming without an additional sense of 
belonging (Rosamond 2002: 102) as will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
The Council of Europe 
In the 1950s, the change from a federalist to a functionalist approach was 
strongly influenced by the lessons learned from the Council of Europe. The 
establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949 was, together with the North 
Atlantic Treaty, a first significant step taken in a bid to create political stability 
in Western Europe (Stirk 1996: 103). The Council of Europe was Western 
Europe's first post war political association although it lacked substantial 
political power and was designed to be a purely advisory assembly (Urwin 
1995: 35). The draft treaty of the Council of Europe had originally proposed a 
more powerful institution, that had been viewed by federalists as the first step 
towards European Union, but it had to be substantially diluted in order to 
accommodate Britain. 
Britain had refused to be part of any supranational organisation. 
Although many British politicians accepted that European unity was a valuable 
ideal, they also felt that British participation was not compatible with their 
commitment to the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American relationship 
(Urwin 1995: 31). In addition, Britain was not prepared to accept any loss of 
sovereignty implied by integration. As Nugent (2003: 25) points out, there were 
a variety of reasons for this, including pride in the long established 
parliamentary tradition; the belief that dilution of sovereignty was neither 
desirable nor necessary since Britain was still a world power, as well as a 
certain dislike of the idea of being dependent on continental countries and 
governments. As Dedman (1996: 22) points out, after the war, Britain saw 
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herself still as one of the 'Big Three' (USSR, USA and UK) rather than "one of 
the big three in Europe". Churchill (2003: 11) for example said in a speech in 
Zurich in 1946 in relation to the Council of Europe: "... Great Britain, the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia [ ... ] 
must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe [ ... ]", thus implying that 
Britain must support European integration but not necessarily be part of it. 
The continental governments, however, regarded British participation as a 
guarantee for security against any possible resurgence of German militarism 
or the Soviet threat (Urwin 1995: 28). Thus, in order to secure British 
involvement, the Council was reduced to being "... in many ways [ ... ] little 
more than a continuation of the traditional format of co-operation, transcribed 
to a bigger stage, and could not itself move forward to a supranational or 
federalist future" (Urwin 1995: 36). Due to its intergovernmental nature, its 
vague aims and the fact that many of its members, notably Britain, were 
unwilling to go beyond voluntary co-operation, the Council was severely 
limited when it came to furthering European integration, which was one of its 
main aims. On the other hand, as Heywood (2002: 147) points out, it managed 
to serve (and still does) as a useful forum for discussing common interests. In 
addition, the Council issues reports and consultative documents as well as 
conventions (Sakwa and Stevens 2000: 253). 
One of the lessons learned from this episode was that Britain would not 
be interested in anything more than loose intergovernmental co-operation. 
More comprehensive integration attempts would therefore have to go ahead 
without British participation. It was also concluded that the general political- 
federal approach had not worked and that subsequently the economical- 
functional approach was to be followed (Heywood 2002: 147). In the end, the 
chosen method of integration was a hybrid creation that was characterised by 
"... technical co-operation in some fields leading to further co-operation and 
integration in others through the guidance of determined elite politics (neo- 
functionalism). [ ... ] the option of appealing directly to the people, asking them 
to transfer power to European supranational institutions has been exercised 
(federalism), but overall neo-functionalism has dominated federalism" (Waaver 
2004: 174). 
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The functionalist approach at work: the foundation of the ECSC 
In 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman (1886-1963) proposed 
a Coal and Steel Community through which the Western European coal and 
steel resources should be pooled and jointly administered by the member- 
states and a new supranational institution (Urwin 1995: 44). The rationale of 
the plan was that this co-operation would resolve historical antagonism 
between France and Germany thus helping to avoid future European wars 
(Rosamond 2002: 505). The Schuman Plan has often been hailed as the most 
significant document presenting the post-war goal for integration (Mikkeli 
1998: 116). Although the method, co-operation within an economic sector, was 
decidedly neo-functional, Schuman was a federalist and considered the plan 
to be "... the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable 
to the preservation of peace" (Schuman 2003: 14). The plan had been devised 
by Jean Monnet (1888-1979), who, although not as such a formal advocate of 
federalism, had favoured a supranational government over 
intergovernmental ism (Heywood 2002: 147). 
Monnet had realised, however, that any political-federal method would 
not work because the European countries remained strongly attached to their 
political sovereignty (Trausch 1999: 2). Subsequently, he adjusted his practical 
recommendations for supranational change in order to reflect these political 
realities. As O'Neill (1996: 27) points out "... this pragmatism clearly 
distinguishes his functionalist method from the visionary approach of the 
federalists". Monnet considered it most important that the integration process 
was launched on a realistic basis, thereby making it capable of sustaining 
supranational co-operation against the opposition from the political elements 
who felt threatened by the process (O'Neill 1996: 27). As pointed out above, it 
is often argued that the theory of neo4unctionalism was in fact inspired by the 
reality of European integration and was formulated especially to explain this 
phenomenon. There is an obvious resemblance between the so-called 
'Monnet method' of integration and the propositions developed by the neo- 
functionalists (Rosamond 2000: 50). 
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The Schuman Plan was presented to the French government as an 
instrument to keep check on Germany's potential (Urwin 1995: 45). After the 
war, German Ruhr coal and steel production had been placed under the 
International Ruhr Authority, while the Saar area was under French 
occupation. The other allied forces now proposed to abandon controls on 
German industry despite strong French opposition (Stirk 1996: 121). The 
situation insured both French and German support for the Schuman Plan for 
different and quite contradictory reasons. To the French, it meant continued 
control over German industry while the German government believed that a 
more integrated Europe would enable a reconstructed Germany to regain 
acceptance and rehabilitation (Urwin 1995: 28). 
Quite crucial to its eventual success, the Schuman Plan enjoyed the 
support of leading politicians: Robert Schuman himself (French Prime Minister 
1947-48 and Foreign Minister 1948-1952), Alcide de Gasped (Italian Prime 
Minister 1945-1953) and Konrad AdenaLier (German Chancellor 1949-1963). 
These mutual acquaintances were all generally pro-European with a similar 
Christian Democrat political background, which earned them the nickname 
'Black Front' (Mikkeli 1998: 115). 
Under such favourable circumstances, Schuman and Monnet were 
anxious that their scheme should not suffer from the kind of obstructionism 
that Britain had displayed with regards to the European Council. Therefore, 
membership of the proposed European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was based on prior acceptance of the necessity of supranationalism. This 
prerequisite effectively resulted in Britain declining the invitation to join the 
ECSC, which was founded in April 1951 by Belgium, France, West Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Nugent 2003: 518). 
With the supranational structure in place, the ECSC was the first 
organisation of its kind to go beyond consultative or intergovernmental co- 
operation (Urwin 1995: 47). The High Authority, however, was far from being a 
sovereign body. Monnet had originally designed the High Authority to be a 
supranational body with responsibility for planning, which would have 
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effectively taken economic co-ordination out of national hands (George 
1991: 3). This structure, however, met with considerable national resistance 
reducing the High Authority to a somewhat ineffective and cautious body that 
was virtually controlled by the Council of Ministers, which represented national 
interests. Nevertheless, this supranational structure was to be the blueprint for 
all future European projects. Apart from the supranational High Authority, the 
ECSC contained various institutional innovations of lasting importance such 
as a Common Assembly and a Court of Justice (Waever 2004: 168). In 
addition, the ECSC helped to create a European atmosphere among the 
member-state leaders and paved the way for the creation of the EEC in 1957 
(Urwin 1995: 56). 
From the ECSC to the EEC 
Although neo-functionalist theory advocated a more or less automated spill- 
over of integration into other economic sectors, it became apparent as the 
1950s progressed, that the six founding members of the ECSC were in no 
rush to progress the sectoral integration by including new economic sectors 
into the network (Urwin 1995: 59). Instead, the next integration initiative was 
partly set in motion by a US proposal, made against the backdrop of the Cold 
and the Korean Wars, to integrate West Germany into the Western Alliance. 
This caused distress among many European countries, most notably France, 
who was not ready for German rearmament (Nugent 2003: 38). Therefore, in 
1950, the French Prime Minister Ren6 Pleven (1901-1993) proposed the 
creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) as a possible solution to 
the problem (Dedman 1996: 74). 
As before with the ECSC, Britain stated that she was not interested in 
joining the proposed EDC due to its supranational character, especially after 
Germany suggested that a successful EDC should be subordinated to a 
European Political Community (EPC) that would co-ordinate foreign and 
defence policies (Urwin 1995: 64). In the end, the attempts to create a 
common defence policy proved abortive and the plan finally failed in 1954 
when the French parliament declined to sign the agreement (George 
1991: 62). As a result, German rearmament was subsequently organised 
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within the framework of NATO. Shortly after, in 1957, the Saar region was 
returned to Germany after a referendum in the Saar rejected the 
'Europeanisation' of the area (Kitchen 2006: 333). In the ensuing climate of 
French-German rapprochement, European integration could resume and gain 
new heights in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome created the European 
Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) in addition to the ECSC. 
Both the EEC and EURATOM treaties had a functional design and 
were modelled on the ECSC in the hope that the economic integration might 
spill over into the political sphere. One of the main goals of the EEC was the 
establishment of a common market as well as the creation of an 'ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe' (Heywood 2002: 148). To achieve its 
goals, the EEC was furnished with a supranational structure based on the 
ECSC model with the general split between executive, legislative and 
judicature. The EEC executive, the Commission, was comprised of nine 
commissioners who had to swear an oath of loyalty to the European 
Community instead of serving national interests (Urwin 1995: 81). The 
Commission's role was to be the principle policy initiator, but with fewer 
powers than the ECSC High Authority to impose decisions on the EEC 
member states (Nugent 2003: 43). Any Commission proposals had to be 
accepted by the Council of Ministers, the main decision making institution, 
before they could become EEC law (George 1991: 5). In addition there was a 
European Parliamentary Assembly, later the European Parliament, which was 
initially indirectly elected and had a largely consultative role (Dedman 
1996: 96). Finally a European Court of Justice was set up to interpret the 
Treaty and make sure that the other organs were fulfilling their obligations 
(Urwin 1995: 83). 
The first years of EEC operation were rather promising especially since 
both the economic and the political climate in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
were favourable to European integration. The overall economic boom with the 
Wirtschaftwunder in Germany and the trente glorieuses in France as well as 
the successes of the EEC and continued rapprochement between France and 
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Germany promoted economic growth in a variety of sectors (Ladrech 
2000: 30). Politically, the situation was much improved by the continued 
rapprochement between France and Germany within an overall more relaxed 
global climate (Urwin 1995: 86-7). "In short, progress in the first years after 
1957 was sufficiently gratifying to all who had backed the formation of the 
EEC, and sufficient to oblige other states to take more account of it" (Urwin 
1995: 87). 
In 1967 the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM were formally merged (by the 
so called Merger Treaty) into the European Community (EC) with a single 
Council of Ministers and a single Commission for all three Communities 
(Nugent 2003: 57). However, by the mid 1960s, the optimism surrounding 
European integration was stifled as the global and European political and 
economic climate worsened caused by for example the new USA-USSR 
hostility following the Cuba crisis and the slowing of economic growth (Urwin 
1995: 103). Within the EEC, several governments, including Germany and 
Italy, were opening up to more leftwing parties while the conservative 
Christian-Democrats (who traditionally supported European integration) 
declined. 
4.4 The era of I ntergovern mentalism: European integration from the 
1960s to the mid 1980s 
Enlargement, Gaullism and the turn to I ntergovern mentalism 
In 1961, Britain's Prime Minister Macmillan announced that Britain would 
apply for EEC membership (Rubinstein 2003: 267). Since the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, Britain's pet project for Western Europe had been a restricted 
inter-govern mental co-operation in form of an industrial free trade area with no 
surrounding external tariff and no supranational/political structure except 
possibly an executive administrative body (Waever 2004: 166). This so-called 
'Grand Design' collapsed in 1958 due to a lack of support from the Europe of 
the Six who decided to go with the EEC instead (Urwin 1995: 94). 
Subsequently, Britain and six other European countries formed in 1959 the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), effectively dividing Western 
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Europe economically into the EEC and EFTA. However, EFTA seemed to be 
short-lived when only a year after its formation, three of its members states 
including Britain applied for membership of the EEC. 9 
Macmillan was a fairly dedicated European, although he and many 
other conservative ministers were opposed to the implied limitations on British 
sovereignty (Rubinstein 2003: 267). Nevertheless, the EEC and European co- 
operation offered an alternative of success in the face of apparent political 
and economic decline. As Rubinstein (2003: 268) explains, Europe offered a 
replacement for the Commonwealth, now an outmoded vehicle for asserting 
British power, while for others the EEC represented the economic equivalent 
of NATO (without the USA) and as such "... the economic facet of European 
democracy's defence against Soviet Communism". In addition, the nature and 
status of the 'special relationship' with the USA had weakened (Nugent 
2003: 26). Nevertheless, the decision to co-operate with 'Europe' remained 
controversial ever since, especially whenever further threats to British 
sovereignty occurred (or were perceived) (Rubinstein 2003: 268). 
Despite a general positive attitude towards EEC enlargement, France 
under Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application for 
membership in 1963 (and also the second application in 1967). Officially, de 
Gaulle objected to British membership due to the strong Anglo-American 
relationship. De Gaulle feared that the US influence in Europe would increase 
should Britain enter the EEC. However, de Gaulle also feared that the British 
would threaten French supremacy on the continent and decrease her 
influence within the EEC. As he put it in a French statement on 16 May 1967: 
"[ ... ] Compared with the motives that led the Six to organize their unit, 
we understand for what reasons, why Britain-who is not continental, 
who remains, because of the Commonwealth and because she is an 
island, committed far beyond the seas, who is tied to the United States 
by all kinds of special agreements-did not merge into a Community with 
9 In 2005, the remaining members of EFTA were Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein, although Norway has applied in the past to join the EU while the other three 
countries are considering application. 
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set dimensions and strict rules. While this Community was taking 
shape, Britain therefore first refused to participate in It and even took 
toward it a hostile attitude as if she saw in It an economic and political 
threat. [ ... ]" (Modern History Sourcebook 1998b: 1) 
De Gaulle (2003: 34) opposed the idea of Britain "... dragging the West 
into an Atlantic system which would be totally incompatible with a European 
Europe [ ... ]". In fact, de Gaulle had ambitious plans for the EEC himself 
including a restructure in order to increase intergovernmental co-operation 
and to weaken the supranational elements. De Gaulle, although superficially 
favouring greater political co-operation, wished to base this co-operation 
purely on a perceived national interest and not on a commitment to a united 
Western Europe (George 1991: 11). Thus, de Gaulle's ideal was an 
intergovernmental 'Europe of the States' under French leadership, instead of 
a more or less federal 'European State' (Urwin 1995: 105). It has even been 
argued that de Gaulle regarded the EEC simply as an intergovernmental 
instrument to safeguard French interests in Europe (Mikkeli 1998: 121). 
In 1965 the mounting tensions between France and the EEC 
culminated in the so-called "empty chair crisis" when France withdrew from 
EEC business mostly due to disagreements over the Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP) (George 1991: 11). By blocking all Community business, de 
Gaulle hoped to enforce his intergovernmental vision of the European future. 
Internal pressures on de Gaulle, however, to resolve the situation were also 
mounting and the French elections clearly indicated that parts of the French 
population (especially the farming community) were not too happy with de 
Gaulle's anti- European policy (Urwin 1995: 113). 
The crisis came to an end in 1966 with the Luxembourg compromise, 
which effectively enshrined the sovereignty of the member states (Heywood 
2002: 148). One of the most important outcomes was the institutionalisation of 
the national right to veto whereby in future a member-state had the right to 
veto any matters that would have a negative impact on vital national interests 
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(Weaver 2004: 168). 10 This was a clear reminder of the relative fragility of the 
EEC and the continued importance of national self-interests and state 
structure in Western Europe. It demonstrated that member-states would 
question the nature of economic and political integration in Europe in a bid to 
secure their sovereignty and national interests although most had 
acknowledged by now that unilateralism was not beneficial in the climate of 
increased global economic competition and the Cold War. The Treaty of 
Rome had already expressed an uncertainty about the structure of the EEC 
that resulted in a mixture of federal and intergovernmental elements. The 
compromise in 1966 " ... effectively swung the balance towards 
intergovernmental ism" (Urwin 1995: 130). 
The events of the 1960s and the resurgence of nationalism ended the 
dominance of supranational neo-functionalist philosophy. Neo-functionalism 
was subjected to a gradual demise and revision. It was criticised for example 
for its underestimation of the residual power of nation statehood and the 
national preferences that remain at the very heart of the regional process 
(George 1991: 29). The 1960s crisis showed the limitations of this co- 
operation, although the member states continued to be engaged in a unique 
form of transnational co-operation (O'Neill 1996: 50). Another criticism of neo- 
functionalism was that it failed to take into account the wider international 
dimension (George 1991: 32-33). After 1965 when "... the member states 
reasserted their hold on the Community process, and caution if not rising 
pessimism about the project began to prevail over the earlier mood of 
expectancy, the theoretical initiative moved elsewhere ... A new model centred 
on i ntergovern mentalism began to dominate [ ... ]" (O'Neill 1996: 45). 
Intergovernmentalism is closely related to realism and neo-realism. " 
Intergovernmentalists believe in state interaction on the basis of sovereign 
independence, whereby sovereignty is preserved through a process of 
unanimous decision-making that allows states to veto at least over matters of 
10 This national right to veto would remain in place until 2001, when the Treaty of Nice 
extended qualified majority voting and abolished the national right to veto in some areas. 
" Both of which argue that states are the basic units in global politics, a fact that was 
considered unlikely to change by integration projects (Rosamond 2000: 76). 
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national importance (Heywood 2002: 148) as has been institutionalised by the 
Luxembourg compromise. The Intergovernmentalists argued that the tensions 
in the 1960s arose because European integration was taken into areas of 
controversy were further integration would challenge the autonomy of the 
governments. In other words, " ... areas of key importance, where national 
interests were deemed to be at stake" (Rosamond 2000: 77). Neo- 
functionalism, it was concluded, had under-estimated these forces by 
supposing that nationalism would cease to exist eventually as the 
supranational institutions would take over the loyalty of the affected population 
(Rosamond 2000: 78). 
From the 1960s, intergovernmentalism came to characterise European 
integration and had powerful supporters such as Margaret Thatcher (in the 
1980s), who used the national veto somewhat excessively (Budge et al 
2001: 91). Intergovernmental ism was then even further embedded in 
European integration through the creation of the European Council in 1969, 
which was effectively a regulated summit meeting of the heads of national 
governments, coming together thrice annually with a rotating presidency 
(Urwin 1995: 174). The Council was in the position to lay down new guidelines 
for future EC progress and resolve disputes between member-states. The 
decisions of the Council were characterised by interest trade-offs and 
compromises without aspiring to be a supranational institution (Urwin 
1995: 175). 
The Council of Europe and global interdependence 
The intergovernmental turn in European integration can also be illustrated by 
the summit meetings of the early 1970s. The summit meetings served to 
reaffirm the belief in European economic and political integration although 
they were basically intergovernmental meetings. As Urwin (1995: 164) puts it 
"... the first summit meeting of the Nine in Paris in 1972 simply confirmed that 
the institutional matrix of the EC had undergone a fundamental shift in 
structure, with the Commission being more obviously treated at best as a 
partner of national governments rather than a supranational entity. " The new 
approach to European integration was in many ways the opposite of federalist 
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hopes and was to dominate EC policies until at least the mid-1980s (Urwin 
1995: 164). 
The summit meeting came about after one of the main obstacles to 
EEC progress, Charles de Gaulle, had been replaced in 1969 by Georges 
Pompidou as French President. Pompidou immediately called for a summit of 
the six heads of states in The Hague. One of the decisive catalysts for the 
summit was the new Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt. Ostpolitik was primarily an effort to open up the East European 
countries to Western economic and cultural influences while maintaining and 
accepting the bipolar status quo (Calleo 2001: 104). The German attempt of 
reconciliation with the Soviet bloc had renewed fears of German power within 
the French government. Germany on the other hand was eager to accept the 
proposals for closer European co-operation as a means to illustrate 
Germany's commitment to peace and to gain support for the Ostpolitik. 
The Hague summit's main progress was that it accepted the 
enlargement of the EEC, which had been so effectively blocked by de Gaulle 
(Dedman 1996: 119). The agreement on enlargement was in best 
intergovernmental tradition a trade-off that did not come to pass because 
France was eager to have Britain as a member, but because France could 
bargain for a re-financed CAP in return. Subsequently, Britain along with 
Ireland and Denmark became full members of the EEC, while Norway decided 
against membership (Urwin 1995: 144). The British Prime Minister, Edward 
Heath, was committed to Britain's entry into the EEC, which he considered to 
be a collective economic entity, a replacement to the empire and a potential 
power block to rival America and Russia (Rubinstein 2003: 295). Although 
mainstream opinion was in favour of joining the EEC, opposition came from 
anti-European Conservative and Labour factions who feared a loss of British 
sovereignty, the end of the advantages enjoyed by the Commonwealth and 
potential disadvantages for British agriculture. On a more emotive basis, there 
was also some residual anti-Catholicism to joining the largely Catholic EEC 
(Rubinstein 2003: 299). 
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Another important point raised at the Hague Summit was the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), a project that had been developed for some time 
and was considered to be a necessary prerequisite for a true economic 
community (Urwin 1995: 154). EMU was thought to follow the rules of spill- 
over as it was argued that the full potential of a customs union could not be 
achieved without fiscal and tax harmonisation or even a single currency 
(Urwin 1995: 154). The main contributors to the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in the late 1970s were Helmut Schmidt (German Chancellor 1974- 
1982) and Giscard d'Estaing (French President 1974-1981) (Calleo 
2001: 168). The EMS was eventually established in 1979 and had as its main 
purpose the protection and stabilisation of exchange rates. 
However, enthusiasm for such ambitious economic projects was 
somewhat dampened by the economic crisis following the 1973 oil shock and 
subsequent national protection policies, which are to some degree 
comparable to the protectionism that had followed the 1930s depression. As a 
result, European integration stagnated during the later 1970s and the early 
1980s when much time was spent on struggles over the budget and the highly 
controversial agricultural policy (Rosamond 2000: 98). This stagnation was 
one of the main reasons for the growth of Euro-sceptisicm in the 1970s and 
early 1980s as well as British reservations towards the EC. It also caused the 
postponement of the administrative reforms that would emphasise the role of 
the European Parliament and the democratic decision-making process 
(Mikkeli 1998: 126). The popular mood of the late 1970s and early 1980s was 
therefore characterised by perceptions of the EC being dominated by the 
controversial CAP and concerns about the growing bureaucracy in Brussels 
(Wa9ver 2004: 176). 
As already mentioned, at the same time neo-functionalism was 
criticised for failing to put European integration into the wider global context. 
In the 1970s, it became apparent that many of the difficulties faced by the EC 
were related to factors that originated outside the EC, such as the oil crisis 
and the Cold War. Therefore, traditional European integration theories were 
substituted and partly replaced by the theory of interdependence, which 
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placed the EC within the global network instead of regarding it as an isolate 
state-centred phenomenon (Rosamond 2000: 94). 
In the meantime, the European Parliament (EP) in particular was not 
satisfied with the intergovernmental attitude to policy making. The EP hoped 
that it could boost its influence and status by pressing for direct elections, 
which had been provided for in the Treaty of Rome in Article 138. Until then, 
MEPs had been nominated by their national parliaments (Nugent 2003: 212). 
Although especially the British and French governments were strongly 
opposed to the idea, the French Constitutional Court ruled in 1976 that direct 
elections would not present a challenge to national sovereignty as long as the 
power of the European Parliament would not be increased (Urwin 1995: 167). 
Subsequently, the first direct elections were held in 1979. The elections, 
however, did little to increase the EPs status as European elections tended to 
be dominated by national issues and were often treated as an evaluation of 
the popularity of national governments and parties (Urwin 1995: 170). 
4.5 European integration revival in the 1980s and 1990s: European 
Union and the Single Currency 
The Single European Act and the Single Market Programme 
Although the final years of the 1970s had witnessed some integrationist 
developments such as the direct EP elections and the EMS, the EC continued 
to be suffering from considerable pessimism in the early 1980s (Stirk and 
Weigall 1999: 243). This pessimism was largely due to the stagnation in the 
EC reform process as well as the generic economic recession that had 
resulted in growing unemployment in many EC member states. Despite this 
stagnation several attempts were made to revive the EC early in the 1980s, 
most notably the Genscher-Colombo Draft European Act in 1981 and 
Spinelli's Draft Treaty on European Union in 1984. The most important 
initiative however was a series of meetings of the European Council in 1984 
and 1985 when plans for institutional reform of the EC and for a single internal 
market by 31 December 1992 were agreed (Wasver 2004: 176). 
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Several circumstances contributed to the revival of European 
integration and secured support for the single market project. The end of the 
Cold War and German unification considerably changed the environment in 
which the EC operated: "... within the originally limited geographic scope of the 
EC, the institutional arrangements, supported by the protective umbrella of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the self-restraint of a divided Germany, had helped to 
manage those disparities ... [but] the unanticipated reunification of Germany 
and the opening up of [Eastern] Europe were forcing those disparities back on 
the agenda" (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 284). Kohl's way of reassuring the other 
EC members was by stressing that a united Germany would still be a loyal 
member of the EC and NATO. Nevertheless, these external factors prompted 
the EC to seek consolidation and self-strengthening in order to be able to deal 
with the challenges of a restructured Europe (Nugent 2003: 61). Some 
federalists even argued that "... the ending of the bipolar world within which 
the EC had grown up, and EFTA's drift towards it, made it possible, for the 
first time since 1945, to believe that the dreams of pre-war federalists such as 
Coudenhove-Kalergi of a united Europe might be on the threshold of 
realization" (Urwin 1995: 244). 
Internal factors included the support from the Franco-German axis, 
which had for a long time formed the cornerstone of the EC, enshrining the 
reconciliation of the two states as well as being the locomotive that pulled the 
EC forward (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 274-275). The two main protagonists 
were the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French Prime Minister 
Francois Mitterrand, who advocated institutional reform in form of Treaty 
amendment and called in 1990 for an intergovernmental conference on 
political union which would run alongside a conference on economic and 
monetary union (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 245+275). At the same time, in 1984, 
the decidedly pro-European Jacques Delors was appointed President of the 
Commission. He pursued a revitalisation of European integration and 
envisaged a People's Europe in which Europeans could come to regard the 
EU as a second homeland (Delors, 2003: 62). Thus the Single Market was not 
only chosen for economic reasons. As Stirk and Weigall (1999: 246) point out: 
"... the fact that efforts to counter the malaise of Eurosclerosis, and to inject 
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new optimism into both the European Community and the idea of regional 
integration, crystallized around the idea of completing the market through 
'Europe 1992' and institutional reform was no accident". Indeed, the common 
market appealed not only to the governments, but also to manufacturers. With 
the increasing global competition from the early 1980s onward, the 
fragmentation of Western European economy was regarded as a real problem 
(Stirk and Weigall 1999: 246). 
Although there was some resistance to the project, most notably from 
the UK, the Commissions final proposal on the Single Market was published 
in the 1985 White Paper entitled 'Completing the Internal Market', which 
recommended around three hundred measures that needed to be addressed 
to enable the Single Market (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 247). At around the same 
time the Dooge report recommended a series of institutional reforms, which 
found opposition among several member states including Britain (Stirk and 
Weigall 1999: 247). In 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) came into effect. It 
laid down the timetable for the completion of the internal market that would 
provide for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital by 
1992 (Rosamond 2000: 99). The SEA also incorporated a number of policy 
areas such as environment and research into the EEC Treaty and gave legal 
recognition to European Political Cooperation and to the summit meetings 
(Nugent 2003: 59). 
Furthermore, as Nugent (2003: 60-61) points out, the SEA also 
addressed some persistent and unresolved issues including the 'democratic 
deficit', which was "... increasingly seen as needing attention as the 
Community exercised ever more power over a broad range of policy areas but 
in a political context where its decision-makers were not democratically 
accountable". This problem, especially in relation to popular support and 
European identity, will be addressed in further detail in the next chapter. The 
institutional reform of the SEA, however, was not as far-reaching as many 
reports had demanded, but it was a "... reasonable comprehensive attempt [ ... ] 
to streamline some of its activities" (Urwin 1995: 234). The institutional reforms 
were limited to the introduction of majority voting and the creation of co- 
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decision procedure with the EP and left many, who had lobbied for more 
substantial changes, disappointed (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 248). 
Nevertheless, the importance of the SEA, especially with regard to the 
internal market, must not be underestimated. As Stirk and Weigall (1999: 249) 
put it: "... the adoption of the single market programme was ... a catalyst for a 
new phase of European integration which was, together with the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire, to transform the agenda of the Community and wider 
Europe". Nugent (2003: 59) described the SEA as a "... major boost to the 
European integration process". 
For example, the SEA sparked a renewal of interest in monetary union. 
For those, who supported further European integration, a monetary union was 
a logical consequence of the Single Market. Neo-functionalists thought that 
the internal market carried high spill-over expectations for a single currency 
and single monetary authority with all the necessary political implications 
(Rosamond 2000: 99). Many federalists were equally enthusiastic and hailed 
the monetary union as a first step towards a European federation (Stirk and 
Weigall 1999: 251). As Rosamond (2000: 103) describes it: "... the single 
market programme also prompted a partial resuscitation of federalist theory 
and of normative arguments about the desirability of a constitutional 
settlement to accompany the deepening of the integration process". 
This apparent deepening of European integration implied by the 
proposed monetary union caused considerable controversy among the 
member states. Especially the more Euro-sceptical members such as Britain 
were anxious to avoid the transfer of currency authority to the EC. Although 
differences remained between the states with regards to EMU content and 
implementation, all EC members (apart from the UK) agreed to the framework 
outlined by the Delors Committee in their 1989 Report on Economic and 
Monetary Union (Nugent 2003: 306). The plan set up a three stage 
progression, which would eventually lead to a single currency, and was 
endorsed against strong British reservations (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 252). 
Nevertheless it was acknowledged that the EMU would probably not involve 
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all member states, some of which might not be able to join, while others would 
not be willing to (Stevens 2000: 154). 
The Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the European Union 
Alongside the scheme for EMU, a three pillared structure was suggested for 
the proposed European Union (EU) consisting of the existing EC (plus the 
EMU), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Co-operation in 
the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 276). 
The resulting Treaty on European Union (TEU, also commonly referred to as 
the Maastricht Treaty) was as such a revision of the existing treaties. Several 
issues had to be dealt with separately while special allowances were made for 
Britain over the single currency and the Social Charter, which effectively 
meant that the Treaty met on the lowest common denominator although the 
EC competence was extended in a variety of areas (Urwin 1995: 254-256). 
Therefore the Maastricht Treaty opened up the possibilities for opt-outs and a 
'Europe 6 la carte'. It has been warned that this 'multi-velocity' integration 
could easily lead to new divisions in Europe, to the creation a second class 
member states and to disruptions to European integrity (Stirk and Weigall 
1999: 281). At the same time, many Eastern European states announced their 
desire to apply for accession to the EU, which counted fifteen members at the 
time the TEU was ratified. 
The new European Union (EU) committed its members to both political 
and monetary union explicitly aiming to create an 'ever closer union' 
(Heywood 2002: 148). The phrase 'ever closer union' replaced the proposed 
'federal union' after repeated British complaints (Nugent 2003: 63). Some of 
the main innovations of the TEU included (apart from the EMU) an increase of 
the power of the European Parliament and the acknowledgment of the 
general principle of subsidiary (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 277). Subsidiarity 
refers to " ... the transfer of decision-making from central to peripheral bodies" 
and is " ... the principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest 
appropriate level" (Heywood 2002: 432). Interestingly, both 
intergovernmental ists and federalist evoked the principle of subsidiarity; the 
former to restrict the actions of the EU (to areas that cannot sufficiently be 
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dealt with by the member states) and the latter to increase the power of the 
regions and ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 277). European citizenship was also 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty whereby every citizen of a member state 
automatically became a citizen of the EU. The significance of EU citizenship, 
especially in relation to the democratic deficit and European identity will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
The EU and the nation state I 
As Heywood (2002: 148) illustrates, the new EU is rather difficult to categorise 
as it has both intergovernmental and supranational features whereby EU law 
is binding on the member states and the power of some EU institutions has 
been expanded at the expense of the member state governments. The mixed 
intergovernmental and supranational elements of the EU led theorists to 
realise that the traditional prognoses regarding the future final structure of 
'Europe' (either a federal supranational state or an intergovernmental 
organisation) were perhaps no longer valid. With the foundation of the 
European Union, it has become evident that integration now permeated into 
areas of politics, which had so far been considered by many as prerogatives 
of the state. The level of sovereignty transfer required by the TEU was 
considered by many as ambiguous or even problematic, as sovereignty, by 
definition, is considered to be absolute and indivisible. These issues are best 
illustrated with the example of the EMU. As mentioned above, the proposal for 
monetary union had sparked considerable controversy, reflecting "... the fact 
that [ ... ] the EC remained a grouping of nation states with conventional 
national interests (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 251). Although many hailed EMU as 
a 'stepping-stone' to the creation of some kind of European state, others, 
especially British politicians, refused to acknowledge any potential political 
implications of EMU and consistently stated that the EMU was an economic 
matter (Shore 2000: 93). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the EU with 
"... its single currency, its Central Bank and treaty control over money supply 
and borrowing, [ ... ] takes on the powers of a sovereign state, albeit a 
transnational state without a democratic government [ ... ]" (Shore 2000: 94). 
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In light of this controversy, debate became soon dominated by the 
exploration of " ... the fundamental question of the role of the nation-state and 
national governments, both as agents of integration and as plausible ways of 
organizing and ordering social and political life" (Rosamond 2000: 105). In 
comparison to earlier decades, European integration theory was now in 
general more focused on the governance approach that analyses the multi- 
level policy making structures of the EU (Wiener and Diez 2004: 9). The 
sensitive issue of sovereignty transfer was now often carefully described as 
'multi-level governance' or in terms of autonomy rather than sovereignty 
(Rosamond 2000: 155). Not surprisingly, these issues also led to fresh 
debates concerning the future development of the EU and the desirability of a 
constitutional settlement to accompany the integration process (Rosamond 
2000: 103). 
4.6 The future of the EU 
Overall, there was a loss of confidence in the first few years post-Maastricht. 
The EU struggled with a series of commitments and challenges including the 
potential wave of Eastern European membership applications, which urged 
the Copenhagen Council in 1993 to issue an official statement. It declared 
that Eastward enlargement was possible in theory if the potential member 
12 states could fulfil a series of requirements (European Council 1993). The 
potential impact on the EU was so enormous that in 1994 the Essen Council 
agreed that any Eastern enlargement would not take place until the EU itself 
had undergone considerable institutional reforms (European Council 1994). 
The extent and form of these reforms were vague and controversial. In 
general, Germany favoured a more federal Europe, while in 1996 France 
proposed the creation of a strong Europe without strong institutions (Stirk and 
Weigall 1999: 282). The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty was signed on 2 
October 1997 and entered into force on I May 1999. The negotiations had 
12 The requirements included: to be a stable democracy, respect human rights and the rule of 
law, protect minorities, have a functioning market economy, adopt common rules, standards 
and policies that make up the body of EU law. 
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been speeded up by the 1997 government change in Britain and the more 
positive attitude of the new Labour government towards European integration 
(Nugent 2003: 72). The Amsterdam Treaty amended, consolidated and 
renumbered the EU and EC treaties. Although it was an important treaty, it did 
not contain major reforms, which many found disappointing (Nugent 2003: 80). 
Most importantly, it failed to resolve the crucial issue of institutional reform 
and contained no agreement on weighting of the votes in the Council or on 
the composition of the Commission (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 283). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam also failed to prepare the EU institutions for 
enlargement, which had to be addressed by the consecutive Treaty of Nice, 
which was signed on 26 February 2001 (Nelsen and Stubb 2003: 67). It 
addressed institutional issues in preparation for enlargement and also 
provided the EP with further powers (Nugent 2003: 92). Subsequently, the first 
group of new members (ten in total) joined the EU in 2004 with further 
enlargements scheduled for 2007 and beyond. 
In addition to the enlargement, the final stage of the EMU has been 
completed and on 1 January 2002 the Euro coins enter circulation in the 
twelve participating member states. The single currency and the enlargement 
highlighted the fact that although the EU can now be described as an 
"economic heavyweight", it still has a limited framework for political co- 
operation (Stirk and Weigall 1999: 250). In a speech at Brussels on 9 October 
2002 the President of the European Council, Romano Prodi, announced that: 
"[... ] enlargement is [ ... ] important primarily for political and ethical 
reasons. Enlargement is the fulfilment of the European project. This 
project has given us half a century of peace and prosperity, and it 
should be extended to the whole continent. [ ... ] We must understand 
that, without a radical and intelligent reform of the institutions, 
enlargement could turn out to be an unsustainable success. The new 
European Union needs a clear, stable geographical shape and 
institutional framework that is understood by all our citizens. In other 
words, the time has come for a European constitution. [ ... ]A constitution 
that guarantees the rights of all citizens and the role of the Member 
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States. A constitution that preserves cultural and linguistic diversity, 
while also reinforcing solidarity. A constitution that enshrines the 
creation of a democratic EU, a true union of peoples and states" 
(http: //europa. eu. int/, accessed 23 May 2006). 
Subsequently, in 2004, the member states, as well as the three 
applicant countries, signed and adopted the Treaty establishing the European 
Constitution. The aim of the constitution is to bring "... together for the first 
time the many treaties and agreements on which the EU is based. It defines 
the powers of the EU, stating where it can act and where the member states 
retain their right of veto. It also defines the role of the EU 
institutions"(http: //news. bbc. co. uk/, accessed 23 May 2006). Prior to the 
ratification process, a special flash Eurobarometer survey on the Future 
European Constitution in 2004 showed that the majority of the population 
(77% in total, but only 51 % in the UK- the lowest figure of all member states) 
in the member states supports a constitution, which is perceived to be 
important for the functioning of the EU institutions (European Commission 
2004: 21). The same survey also showed that in total 71% of EU citizens felt 
badly informed about the constitution. The required ratification could not be 
completed as a referendum in France and the Netherlands in 2005 rejected 
the Treaty. Eurobarometer 64 showed that support for the concept of a 
European constitution remained high at overall 63% and has even risen in 
many member states (European Commission 2005: 23). As yet, it is too early 
to assess if the constitution will be ratified in the future or to analyse the 
potential impact of a EU constitution on European identity perceptions. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Post-1945 European integration was set in motion by the experience of both 
world wars, which occurred in relatively short succession; and the destruction 
caused by the Second World War, which had been on an unprecedented 
scale. It would seem that such cataclysmic events were necessary to launch 
the European idea, although, as this chapter has shown, the European states 
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in question would remain sceptical, to varying degrees, of relinquishing 
sovereignty and power to a supranational entity. In fact, the nation state as 
such, although discredited by many, was never in any real danger of being 
replaced by a radically different form of governance (such as a European 
Federation for example). 
The architects of European integration soon realised that the federal 
approach of political integration was unrealistic and should be replaced by a 
more pragmatic, functional method. While previous schemes for European 
integration focussed almost solely on the political arena, now economic 
integration was chosen in the hope that co-operation in one sector might spill- 
over into related sectors and subsequently into the political sphere. Often 
referred to as the Monnet method of integration, it successfully completed a 
number of treaties, establishing both economic co-operation and 
supranational institutions. Hypothetically, one might even speculate that a 
similar approach of economic integration might have also been successful 
after the First World War, considering that several circumstances (such as the 
general French security policy in relation to Germany; the dismal state of the 
economy and the contentious issue of the Saar and Ruhr area) were similar 
both in 1918 and in 1945. 
Although European integration, as predicted by neo-functionalist 
theory, has developed some self-propelling spill-over mechanisms, its speed 
and direction remains both vulnerable to external factors and, in end effect, 
determined by the member states. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s 
external factors such as the oil crisis and global economic depression 
triggered a new wave of national protectionism, which subsequently resulted 
in European policy being dominated by intergovernmentalism. European 
integration only picked up again in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, the reasons 
for this (including a favourable economic climate and the support of leading 
politicians) were not as such under the control of the EC (EU after 1992). In 
Britain, the Thatcher government was replaced by a more pro-European 
leadership and in Germany, Chancellor Kohl was anxious to progress 
European integration in the wake of German unification. Therefore, any 
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widening and deepening of European integration seems to rely to some 
degree on events and persons over which it does not, as such, have any 
control. This does explain partly why post-war European integration has 
progressed in leaps and bounds with interspersed intervals of stagnation. 
Today, at the time of writing (2006), the EU encompasses a vast 
geographical area, spanning the European continent from the Atlantic far into 
the East. This is not just a geographical area, but also contains a multitude of 
cultures, languages and nations with great disparities. Some of these 
countries now share a single currency. Although it would be fair to say that the 
EU has never been more integrated, it has been pointed out that a set of 
central institutions does not necessarily add up to a political community. It has 
become apparent that European integration has so far been driven by elites, 
but it has been argued that the success of a potential federal Europe will 
depend on the "... EU's ability to acquire democratic legitimacy and authority 
which, in turn, hinges on its capacity to forge a popular sense of belonging 
and loyalty to EU institutions and ideals" (Shore 2000: 21). In other words it 
could be argued that further political integration, which is by no means desired 
by everyone concerned, can only be successful if it is based to a certain 
degree on popular support and a sense of popular identity with the EU, which 
will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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European identity 
5.1 Introduction 
So far it has been shown that European integration in the past usually 
followed the so-called Monnet method of functional and elite driven integration 
leading to the gradual establishment of a complex network of multi-level 
interactions. This top-down approach, it has frequently been argued, has 
resulted in strong EU institutions that now require "... an even stronger 
legitimacy" (Lipponen 2003: 86). It would seem, however, that the neo- 
functionalist prediction of loyalty transfer and wider popular support, which 
would render the EU popular legitimacy, has not as yet materialised. As 
Lipponen (2003: 86) pointed out in a speech given in 2000, the "... Monnet 
method does not reflect the reality of day-to-day politics. [ ... ] The EU cannot 
be run as a functionalist elite-driven project, which is bureaucratically 
managed on the basis of a top-down philosophy". Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that the lack of popular support and thus popular legitimacy can 
be related to the lack of direct lines of accountability between the decision- 
makers and the citizenry within the EU. Lipponen (2003: 85) claimed that the 
"... alienation from the people which is due to lack of democratic legitimacy, 
lack of transparency and too much bureaucracy [ ... ]" is one of the 
fundamental problems of the EU. As the Eurobarometer 64 (European 
Commission 2005: table annex) shows, in 2005 a total of 59% of European 
citizens thought that their voice did not count in Europe and 72% did not feel 
involved in European affairs. 
Shore (2000: 226) explains that it is generally accepted by many 
theorists that decision-making in the EU is somewhat undemocratic and rather 
the result of "... covert deals, bargaining and compromises struck between 
Ministers and their permanent representatives in the Council of Ministers, 
conducted behind closed doors". The European Parliament is, according to 
Shore (2000: 226), not a legislature as such and does not elect a government. 
It could even be said that it would be misleading to speak of a democratic 
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deficit, since, according to some, the EU was explicitly constructed as a non- 
democratic structure (Hobsbawrn 1997: 268). The existing system of indirect 
representation would probably be sufficient if there were reasons to believe 
that the majority of citizens are supportive of the integration process and 
content to leave the decision-making processes to the appropriate elites. 
Public opinion polls, however, have suggested that the EU currently lacks the 
tangibility and intelligibility that would enable it to capture the imagination and 
therefore gain the voluntary support of its citizens (Graham 1998a: 12). In fact, 
the lack of popular enthusiasm is often described as one of the most striking 
features of the history of integration (Stirk 1996: 287). For example, indicative 
results of the latest Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005: 9), have 
shown that only half (50%) of European citizens think that their country's 
membership of the EU is a good thing. 
As Shore (2000: 19) argued, Europeans essentially have not embraced 
the 'European idea' as anticipated or hoped for. It is important to note in this 
context, that the EU task, that is how to transform a 'Europe of the elites' into 
a 'Europe of the people', does not simply entail increasing popular support, 
but also creating a European public per se (Shore 2000: 19). The European 
institutions' legitimacy rests on their claim to represent not only the member 
states, but also the European public or demos, which, however, barely exists 
as a self-recognising entity (Shore 2000: 19). According to Eurobarometer 64, 
although on average 48% of EU citizens consider themselves to be both a 
national of their own country and a European, 41 % identify only with their own 
nationality (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005: 3). Not 
surprisingly, the national leaders decided at a meeting in 1992 that "... the EC 
had to become more open and receptive to public opinion" (Urwin 1995: 258). 
This decision was taken after the rejection of the TEU by the 1992 Danish 
referendum, which was a wake-up call for the EC, which had so far been 
" ... unaccustomed to popular revolts" (Urwin 1995: 257). Another referendum in 
France only just approved the TEU with a narrow majority of 51% (Urwin 
1995: 258). 
146 
Shore (2000: 20) states that "... the essential ingredient that is missing 
from the European Union is the political identification of the peoples of 
Europe". Graham (1998b: 42) agrees and argues that the successful 
integration of Europe and the formation of a European public might demand 
an iconography of identity that would complement national, regional and local 
identities. The EU takes the same view and argues, for example in the 1993 
Green Paper on the European dimension of education (COM (93) 457 final), 
that Europe is not a dimension that replaces others, but one that enhances 
them. As Feneyrou (1993: 37) points out "... introducing the European 
dimension into our lives does not entail conflict with other levels of belonging". 
Van Oudenaren (2000: 16) believes that the extent to which a European 
identity emerges will determine in part how successful the EU will be in 
managing the conflicting demands of deepening and widening European 
integration. Nugent (2003: 502) even argues that the absence of a firm 
common identity would make it very difficult to construct and maintain a strong 
and fully effective political system. It is possible that the growing impact of the 
EU on the daily life of its citizens, for example through the introduction of a 
common currency, may lead to greater solidarity between its citizens 
(Anderson 1991: 47). However, as pointed out above, there has been so far no 
significant shift in political loyalty or popular sentiment (Shore 2000: 18). 
National identity in the EU member states is yet to be rivalled by a sense of 
European solidarity (Anderson 1991: 46). 
5.2 European identity 
Definitions of political identity 
The concept of identity is usually highly ambiguous, multi-layered and 
artificial; generally incorporating values, beliefs and aspirations, which are 
used to construct structures of sameness, identifying individuals with like- 
minded people while excluding others. In general, recognisability takes 
precedence over reality, the response happens because something is familiar 
and not because it is known to be true (Spiering 1996: 119). Identity itself, as 
an image of association and self-projection, is usually made up of several 
separate identifications, some of which may be contradictory, some may be 
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stronger and most will change over time (Wintle 1996b: 22). Similarly, with 
regards to political identity, Graham (1998a: 2) argues that identities, and their 
defining criteria, overlap in complex ways and on different geographical scales 
and are perhaps best visualised as a multiplicity of superimposed layers. 
Thus, individuals can identify in the political-cultural sense with imagined (and 
potentially conflicting) communities at a variety of scales: supranational, 
national and sub-national. At the same time, identity does not always remain 
territorially fixed or exclusive through time (Graham 1998b: 42). 
As discussed in previous chapters, the predominant form of political- 
cultural identity in modern Western Europe to date is national identity, 
although people retain a multiplicity of allegiances or identities, which may 
reinforce or weaken this national identity (Smith 1999: 229). Since the end of 
the Second World War, nation states and national identity in Western Europe 
have been increasingly challenged to some extent by supranational or global 
developments on the one hand and regionalism on the other. For the purpose 
of this study, this chapter will concentrate on the impact of new political 
structures in Western Europe, namely the EU, on established networks of 
governance and political-cultural identities. Of crucial importance are hereby 
the interdependencies of democracy, legitimacy in political governance, 
popular support and political identity, which may yield the argument for a 
European identity. 
European identity, legitimacy and the democratic deficit 
Traditionally, the nation state's claim to legitimacy is often based on 
aspirations to unity of a largely heterogeneous population in terms of public 
culture, political community as well as popular sovereignty (Smith 1999: 232). 
In turn, the links between state and community are re-forged and 
disseminated for example through rituals and ceremonies, political myths and 
symbols, the arts and history textbooks (Smith 1999: 233). If one would apply 
such concepts to the EU, it could be argued that a legitimate and democratic 
EU would require a similarly integrated public sphere with a common political 
culture; a civil society with interest associations; non-govern mental 
organisations and an appropriate party system (Habermas 1997: 263). It could 
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also be argued that this is not the case at present and that European 
integration continues to be driven ahead by engaged political actors and other 
elites on behalf of the population. For example, since the Council of Ministers 
continues to make the most important EU decisions, it could be said that EU 
policy is decided mostly by agents, who have their reference point, as far as 
legitimisation and responsibility goes, in the member states and not in the EU 
(Grimm 1997: 249). It follows, according to Stirk (1996: 288) that the popular 
legitimacy of the EU remains dependent on the domestic legitimacy of those 
elites. The EU, however, is not just an inter-governmental institution of the 
traditional type, but has sovereign rights conveyed to it by the member states 
that it exercises with direct effect without being a state itself (Habermas 
1997: 259). 13 Following the Maastricht Treaty, which increased the EU 
institutional competence, the need to establish direct democratic legitimisation 
for European policies, and not one derived from member-state governments, 
has become vital to the survival of the EU (Grant 1998: 160). 
As already pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, many 
theorists argue that the EU was not originally devised as a democratic 
institution. Indeed, according to Stirk (1996: 288), the few feeble existing 
democratic provisions, such as the direct elections to the European 
Parliament, were added as an afterthought. It has also been claimed that the 
democratic deficit had arisen because 
"(1 ) ... of transfers of sovereignty to the community level where 
decisions are taken in secret and often by the unaccountable Council; 
(2) due to the still rather minor role of the European Parliament, the 
only Community institution directly and democratically elected, but one 
with comparatively marginal involvement in the EU legislative process; 
(3) because the executive power of the Community lies exclusively with 
the Commissions and the Council" (Dunkerley et al 2002: 15). 
Since the 1970s, the creation of a European identity has often been 
seized upon as a possible mean to address the democratic deficit. It was 
13 in the modern sense of a constitutional state characterised by a monopoly on violence and 
a domestically and internationally recognised sovereignty as discussed in Chapter One 
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thought that the construction of a European identity, of whichever description, 
could raise levels of popular support which in turn would remedy the situation 
where increasing political integration without adequate democratic provision 
has led to a lack of political legitimacy. Several key texts from the 1970s and 
1980s directly address the issue: the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration 
concerning European identity, the 1975 Tindemann Report on European 
Union, the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union and the 
1984 Adonnino Report (Wintle 1996b: 10). The 1975 Tindemann Report is 
broadly recognised as one of the first significant EU statements on the 
importance of promoting a European identity. The Adonnino Report 
recommended, as part of a 'People's Europe' campaign, the adoption of 
European symbols. Subsequently, in 1985 a standardised European passport 
was introduced as well as a flag and an anthem, all of which are traditional 
icons of the nation state. The issue was taken up by the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union, declaring in article 128(l): "... the Community shall 
contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while 
respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time brining 
the common cultural heritage to the fore" (httr): Heuror)a. eu. int/, accessed 
12/01/2006). This was followed by the 1993 De Clerq Report which focussed 
on the necessity of more effective communication of 'Europe' to its citizens 
(Dunkerley et al 2002: 117). In 2002, the common currency, another traditional 
symbol of national unity, was introduced in most of the EU member-states. 
The introduction of these European symbols has been accompanied by 
public campaigns designed to raise public awareness, promote the symbols 
as 'European' icons and generate a sense of 'us' Europeans hoping that 
awareness and familiarity would produce support (Dunkerley et al 2002: 118). 
However, as Grant (1998: 161) puts it "... attempts at creating a community by 
providing more information, telephone hot-lines and web sites [ ... ] are scarcely 
sufficient, nor do they impact on the vast majority of the EU's population". 
Shore (2000: 226) agrees and somewhat dismisses these manufactured 
efforts as being unable to capture popular loyalty. He believes that, to be 
effective, these symbols must be meaningful and should only come after 
political legitimacy has been established. 
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Symbols of national identity on the other hand are meaningful to its 
members as they derive from and express a deep-rooted sense of belonging 
based on a variety of factors, as discussed in Chapter Two, such as ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic or civic ties. Although the creation of European symbols 
might have been to some extent successful, they seem to lack this foundation 
for identity formation. Grant (1998: 161) states that "... the EU entirely lacks 
[ ... ] an overarching origin-myth to underpin its legitimacy, and it may prove 
impossible to create and rationalize one ex post facto [ ... ]". European identity 
appears to be ineffective and superficial, a "... utopian dream of intellectuals 
and idealists with little chance of mobilising mass consciousness" (Shore 
2000: 17). It is therefore not only the lack of democratic provision or popular 
support that creates a democratic deficit, but also the lack of a European 
people, demos or community which would be represented by the European 
democracy. Therefore what obstructs democracy in the EU is not only the lack 
of cohesion of EU citizens as a people, but also their weakly developed 
collective identity and low capacity for trans-national discourse (Grimm 
1997: 255). This also means that the democratic deficit could not simply be 
removed by institutional reform, such as the creation of democratic structures 
(Grimm 1997: 255). 
Generally speaking, it is often proposed that European legitimacy and 
identity should be bound into a complex political system whereby the EU, the 
member states and to some extent the regions share sovereignty and thus 
legitimacy. As explained in Chapter One, it is still uncertain if sovereignty and 
political legitimacy can be shared in this way and if such a European identity 
can be created (Grant 1998: 161). Again, the term 'creation' implies that the 
formation of a European identity would have to rely heavily on stimulus from 
above, a reflection of the artificial nature of the EU itself. However, before 
debating possible means of creating a European identity, the possible 
characteristics of such a European identity need to be discussed. 
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5.3 Approaches to European identity 
Some European politicians have argued that a clearly distinct European 
identity is needed in order to give the EU a solid socio-intellectual and cultural 
base (Boxhoorn 1996: 133). The problem, however, of how to define Europe 
and a European identity has occupied politicians, historians and geographers 
for centuries (Phillips 2003: 81). In general, as Soysal (2002: 2) points out, 
'Europe' in itself, never mind a European identity, is a "really diffuse idea", that 
can be understood in a variety of meanings such as geographical, cultural or 
political, neither of which always overlap with the territory of the EU. Some 
say that a European identity should consist of the diversity of cultures in 
Europe ('unity in diversity' being the official EU statement), while others claim 
that this diversity will in fact be a stumbling block to the unification process 
(Boxhoorn 1996: 133). Although there are many quite different theories 
regarding the creation, definition and characteristics of European identity, 
many theorists tend to agree that there is something, no matter how elusive, 
that brings Europeans at least partially together (Wintle 1996b: 12). 
As with national identity, one can distinguish two general approaches 
to European identity. The cultural approach is mainly concerned with attempts 
to establish a shared cultural platform upon which a uniquely European 
identity could be build. The civic approach on the other hand proposes that, 
especially in light of the controversies surrounding the cultural approach, 
European identity should be more closely linked to citizenship. In practice, 
most theorists advocate a mixed approach that combines cultural and civic 
elements. 
Cultural European identity 
As opposed to the mere geographical or even the geo-political concept of 
Europe, the idea of Europe can be understood as an essentially cultural 
construct that cannot as such claim universal validity (Delanty 1995: 12). Or, in 
other words, "... Europe is not so much a place as an idea. [ ... ] Europe is not 
only a neutral geographical term but a word expressing a sense of group 
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identity, a form of collective consciousness not unlike national consciousness 
[ ... ] or the sense of belonging to a particular age group or generation. " (Burke 
1980: 21). This often idealised and contentious view of Europe as an 
identifiable entity with specific European values and culture rooted in a shared 
history can be found among many advocates of European integration, who 
believe that "... transcending the differences, divergences and conflicts 
between peoples and states there has long been a certain commonality and 
identity of interest in Europe based on interrelationships between geography 
and historical, political, economic, social and cultural developments" (Nugent 
2003: 9). 
However, a potential European cultural identity, which would be more 
than the sum total of its constituent cultures, is not easy to pinpoint despite 
the numerous shared experiences that would have had a formative influence 
(Wintle 1996a: 1-2). As Graham (1998b: 43) explains, European identity would 
have to embrace and accentuate notions of 'multiculturalism', striving to be 
inclusive of all the continent's peoples in the sense that multiculturalism 
"... provides the only viable basis for a meaningful axis of European identity". 
An ideal European identity would not subsume other (national and regional) 
identities but instead be "... reflective of the complex dismantling of the 
synonymity of territoriality, sovereignty, nationalism and the state in the new 
Europe" (Graham 1998b: 45). 
Smith (1999: 240) lists a variety of shared characteristics and 
experiences that may be useful to the development of a European identity and 
may count as uniquely European. Firstly, the vast majority of European 
languages are Indo-European and belong as such to a common linguistic 
group. Secondly, there are few geographical barriers that interrupt the 
protected geopolitical space between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, 
although any territorial classification is contentious, especially in relation to the 
Eastern borders of Europe. Thirdly, Christianity is often attributed to be a 
European characteristic, despite the prior division into Western and Eastern 
Churches, the internal split following the Reformation and the existence of 
large non-Christian groups in many modern European countries. Other shared 
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traditions and heritages, which are often cited as European values, include 
Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, the Renaissance, 
humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism and classicism. Smith 
(1999: 242) argues that together these form not a "unity in diversity" but a 
"family of cultures" made up of partially shared historical traditions and cultural 
heritages. The distribution of these factors across Europe, however, is highly 
variable and some member-states or cultures share particular traditions only 
marginally. Furthermore many belong to the sphere of high culture, reflecting 
the aspirations and perspectives of the intelligentsia and not of the mass 
population (Schlesinger 1994: 321). In fact, according to a study entitled How 
European see themselves (European Commission 2000: 12), only a minority 
of 38% of EU citizens agreed that a shared European cultural identity exists 
(49% disagreed). 
In addition, all these traditions and values cannot mask the fact that 
Europeans arguably differ from each other as much as from non-Europeans in 
respect of language, territorial characteristics, religion, economic and political 
system as well as in terms of ethnicity and culture. Furthermore, although 
these values may have originated in Europe, and can thus be regarded as 
historical European achievements, today they no longer represent strictly 
European values. Therefore, the universality of these values makes it near 
impossible, according to Soysal (2002: 2), to define a territorially and culturally 
bounded European identity, especially as Europe fails to create a cultural and 
symbolic 'other'. The existence of such an 'other' might be necessary, as 
Barrett's (1992: 351) findings reveal, since identity or self-categorisation is 
usually activated vis-6-vis the 'other' or within a comparative context. 
However, the creation of such an 'other' is ambiguous and may involve 
membership restrictions as well as potential notions of superiority in 
comparison to those excluded. Moreover, the idea of constructing a European 
cultural identity often produces fears that this might be an attempt to replace 
existing regional and national cultural identities. 
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Civic European identity 
Considering the controversial nature of a cultural European identity, many 
authors suggest a different approach. Weiler (1997: 287) for example argues, 
that the concept of a European demos should not be based on imagined or 
real trans-European cultural affinities, shared histories or the construction of a 
European 'national myth'. Instead, a civic approach might be more suitable 
whereby European identity is based on European citizenship. In this case, 
European identity can be understood as a "... loose confection of civic ideas", 
such as democracy or human rights, which would differ from traditional 
national identity, which is normally at least to some degree bound to national 
histories, cultures or territories (Soysal 2002: 2). 
According to [sin and Wood (1999: 4), citizenship can be described as 
both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of 
rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual's 
membership in a polity. According to this definition, citizenship literally 
provides an identity that is shared with others carrying similar papers 
(Spiering 1996: 114). In this respect, citizenship serves as an identity marker 
that "... simultaneously 'brands' the population that is to be governed whilst 
reminding individuals of their nationality and the state to which they belong" 
(Shore 2000: 71). Could this also work for the European Union? 
European Union citizenship was officially introduced on 1 November 
1993, but created neither enthusiasm nor anxiety among the new citizens, 
most of whom "... were either unmoved by or unaware of it" (Shore 2000: 67). 
EU citizenship was designed firstly to improve the status of nationals residing 
in a member state other than their own. Secondly, it was intended to help 
reduce the democratic deficit and to form the basis for European identity 
construction. It was thought that EU citizenship would encourage individual 
member state nationals to feel part of the integration process, thereby 
enhancing the political legitimacy of the EU and ensuring that there is 
sufficient consensus among the peoples of Europe to allow the integration 
process to proceed (O'Leary 1998: 86). 
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EU citizenship, however, proved to be not unproblematic. Shore 
(2000: 72) points out that unless individuals internalise the values and norms 
associated with European citizenship, it will not constitute a meaningful badge 
of social identity and the identity building processes might not work. In 
addition, citizenship of the EU is not an autonomous and distinct notion with 
regard to the nationalities of the individual member states (Nascimbene 
1998: 64). If a person lives in the EU, but is not a citizen of a member state, 
then s/he cannot be a citizen of the EU. European citizenship is thus 
determined by national citizenship and therefore, indirectly, by national 
identity (Dunkerley et al 2002: 18). This is complicated by the different national 
approaches to citizenship in the EU. Not surprisingly, the EU has proposed to 
establish "... certain uniform rules on the acquisition and loss of member state 
nationality" and "... has called for a replacement of the principle of ius 
sanguinis by ius soll' (OLeary 1998: 104). Subsequently, in 2000, Germany 
introduced new citizenship laws in harmonisation with European standards as 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
On the other hand, there are those who argue that the real problem is 
related to the understanding of and the expectations associated with 
European citizenship, which were somewhat erroneously based on 
comparisons with the nation state and nation building processes. Both Soysal 
(1997) and Delanty (1995) argue that European citizenship rights should be 
decoupled from traditional ideas of state and nation and should instead be 
based on more universal human rights. This could prove, however, rather 
difficult. As Dunkerley et al (2002: 19), explain, the "... adoption of nationality 
as a base for Union citizenship means that the key factor for defining its 
content was the preservation of national sovereignty rather than the fostering 
of individual rights". Dunkerley et al (2002: 22) also doubt that the introduction 
of a European citizenship has helped to reduce the democratic deficit. They 
argue for example that the electoral rights in the country of residence do not 
increase the citizen's influence on the EU as the important decisions 
concerning the EU are still taken at national level and in the Council of 
Ministers. 
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It must also be remembered that all of the above considerations 
regarding European identity are focused on the area of the EU, excluding 
other non-EU states, nations and people who would still describe themselves 
as Europeans (Wintle 1996b: 10). In addition, it will also be very difficult to 
establish a European identity in the face of the continuing dominance of 
existing political-cultural identities. As Smith (1999: 233) points out, the 
advantages of national identity over the idea of a unified European identity are 
that national identities are vivid, accessible, well established, long popularised 
and still widely believed. The EU on the other hand, as Wintle (1996b: 19) 
explains, is characterised by a weak ideology, the persistent particularism of 
its members as well as frequent internal adjustments in terms of political 
content and membership. As stated in Chapter One, the aim of European 
integration is as yet undetermined. As the EU is still under construction, it will 
be difficult for the public to associate with it until its final form has been 
established. This fact reinforces the conundrum whereby it can be argued that 
popular support and public affiliation are needed to enable and legitimise 
further European integration, but neither will be easy to obtain until the EU 
has settled into its final shape. This is especially significant with regards to 
education, which we will focus on later. Phillips (2003: 82) for example points 
out that it becomes difficult to instil an awareness of Europe in young people 
or, with regards to the subject of this study, to create a European dimension 
for the curriculum if "... perspectives on what constitutes 'Europe' change as 
the descriptions change" (Phillips 2003: 82). 
Phillips (2003: 83) also believes that teaching about Europe will always 
be "... seen through the prism of individual nations". EU identity constructions 
are assumed to interact with the existing national identities of the member 
states. It would appear that the incorporation of a European identity into 
national identities tends to be easier the more this resonates with national 
political cultures and institutions. Thus, as Risse and Engel mann-Marti n 
(2002: 293) argue, some nation states might incorporate 'Europe' more easily 
than others. National identity and self-image can also be expected to 
influence and inform the prevalent definition of and associations with the EU 
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and a European identity. This can be illustrated with an analysis of attitudes to 
European identity in Germany and England. 14 
5.4 European and national identity in Germany 
As discussed in Chapter Two, after the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945, 
German nation state identity was thoroughly reconstructed. Nationalism had 
been discredited by the experiences of the Third Reich and the Second World 
War and was now redefined as 'constitutional patriotism'. National identity 
was to focus not on the nation, but on democratic values embodied in the 
Basic Law that were upheld as the proper object of patriotic devotion (Stirk 
1996: 290). In addition, the political elites began to look to 'Europe' as a less 
problematic 'fatherland. European integration became a substitute for the 
own defeated, divided and occupied country, whereby Europeaness replaced 
at least in part traditional notions of nation state identity (Risse and 
Engelman n-Marti n 2002: 301). Subsequently, as Risse and Engel ma nn-Marti n 
(2002: 287-298) explain, since the 1950s, the political elites and governments 
of the Federal Republic of Germany have thoroughly tried to Europeanise 
German national identity. Konrad Adenauer considered German integration 
into the West as the best means of overcoming Germany's past and of 
regaining national sovereignty. In the process, European institutions became 
central to the way German political elites conceive of the country's national 
interest and to the way in which Germans conceive of themselves (Berghahn 
et al 1997: 180). European integration was so closely linked to national identity 
and national rehabilitation that political debates hardly ever questioned the 
need for European integration (Risse and Engel mann-Marti n 2002: 301). 
After the fall of the GDR in 1989 and unification in 1990, Germany has 
continued her policy towards European integration. It has been argued that 
this is largely due to a profound commitment among the majority of Germans 
14 As perceptions and attitudes towards the EU may vary in the different parts of the UK, it 
was decided to concentrate on England in accordance with the case study although 'England' 
and 'Britain' can sometimes be difficult to differentiate. Due to the terminology used by the 
consulted sources, it is sometimes unavoidable to use the terms Britain or UK instead of 
England. 
158 
to prevent Germany from ever becoming a source of instability in Europe 
again (Berghahn et al 1997: 181). In addition, it seems that Germany in 
general has less trouble than other member states with the idea of shared 
sovereignty. This has as much to do with the post-war experience of limited 
sovereignty and a divided nation as with the German federal system, which 
created a confidence with multiple layers of authority (Berghahn et al 
1997: 182). Thus, it could be argued in general that the positive German 
attitude to and understanding of European integration and the political 
structure of the EU are strongly correlated with their own domestic order 
(Risse and Engelman n-Marti n 2002: 315). 
The German attitude to the introduction of the Euro can also be related 
to the post-war German national identity. The political elites, particularly 
Helmut Kohl, considered the Euro as part of the following equation: support 
for the Euro equals support for European integration, which in turn equals 
"good Europeaness" and therefore "good Germaness" (Risse and 
Engelmann-Martin 2002: 307). This line of argumentation made opposition to 
the Euro difficult to uphold as opposition could have been regarded as 
nationalistic "bad Germaness". Nevertheless, opposition to the Euro existed 
among wide parts of the population, usually in the form of the so-called 
'Deutsche Mark patriotism'. After its introduction in 1949, the Deutsche Mark 
acquired a strong identity-inducing value as a powerful national symbol of 
German post-war prosperity (Risse and Engel ma nn-Marti n 2002: 312). At 
government level, the enthusiasm for European integration has also trembled 
slightly, for example when Chancellor Kohl was unexpectedly cautious about 
the extension of supranational decision-making in the negotiations leading to 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Nugent 2003: 24). The reasons for this are 
usually given as internal problems and priorities, for example the costs of 
unification. 
In general though, the German public has supported European 
integration in terms of a passive consensus for a long time. The latest 
Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, full report Germany 2005: 16-20) 
indicates that 40% of Germans have a positive image of the EU, while 53% 
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believe that membership is a good thing (in comparison to only 34% in the 
UK). On the other hand, the majority of Germans (56%) do not think that their 
voice counts in Europe, underlining the popular belief in the democratic deficit, 
especially since 71% feel that Europe is something happening without their 
participation. Nevertheless 53% are proud to be Europeans. Only 30% saw 
themselves as German only. 
5.5 European and national identity in England 
The English or British approach to national and European identity is 
somewhat different. The Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK 
executive summary 2005: 3) found that in the UK 61% are proud of their 
nationality (in comparison to only 19% in Germany) and 63% saw themselves 
as British only. 85% of UK respondent thought that Europe was happening 
without their participation. A 2002 BBC talking point (http//: news. bbc. co. uk/, 
accessed 23 May 2005) entitled Can there be a common European identity 
illustrates some of the opinions prevalent among the British public. Although 
the answers are probably far from representative, some common themes 
seem to emerge. It appears that many people believe that a common 
European identity would replace existing national or regional identities as a 
European identity would create a "homogenised mass of European clones". 
Many respondents also feared a loss of national sovereignty to a European 
"super state". Similarly, the latest Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, 
UK executive summary 2005: 6) found that 53% of UK respondents (the 
second highest figure in the EU) were against the development of a European 
political union, although it is likely that this was influenced by the highly visible 
and often negative debate on the European constitution in the British media at 
the time. 
It would seem that many respondents assume European and national 
identity, as well as the EU and national sovereignty, to be virtually non- 
compatible and mutually exclusive. Or, as Hugh Gaitskell, then leader of the 
Labour Party, remarked in a speech at the party conference in Brighton in 
1962, membership of the EEC would mean "... the end of Britain as an 
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independent European state [ ... ] it means the end of a thousand years of 
history" (Rubinstein 2003: 276). In addition, some respondents said that they 
did not wish to lose their sovereignty to a non-democratic EU that is run by 
un-elected bureaucrats. Finally, some respondents could not imagine a 
shared European identity since, in their opinion, English or British people have 
not much in common with their European neighbours. Overall, the current 
predominant attitude to European integration, although by far not shared by 
all, is expressed in a statement by Gordon Brown (Daily Telegraph 31 July 
2003): "... the only way forward [for Europe] is inter-govern mental, not federal 
[ ... ] not a superstate [ ... ] in line with long-held British values - 
internationalism, enterprise, fairness, political accountability. [ ... ]a new vision 
for Europe: that, as a trade bloc. [ ... I the national state 
is and will remain the 
focus of our British identity and loyalty. " 
Unlike Germany, it would seem that especially England has been 
suffering from fears of sovereignty and identity loss to the EU, since England 
has no previous experience of sovereignty loss or with federal systems as 
such. It has also been argued that England has no previous experience of 
identity loss. As discussed earlier, English national identity became largely 
synonymous with British identity after 1707, while other identities in the UK, 
such as Scottish national identity, had to struggle to resist being subsumed 
into the emerging British national identity. This has provided Scotland with the 
experience that union does not necessarily mean identity loss (Kumar 
2003: 271). 
Although, as shown in Chapter Four, in the lead up to Britain joining the 
EEC, mainstream opinion was at first in favour of 'Europe', which was seen as 
a solution to Britain's economic problems, especially in light of the post-war 
economic success of the EEC members. Since then, however, Britain has 
been a somewhat awkward partner, especially during the Conservative 
Party's term of office from 1979 to 1997 (Nugent 2003: 26) when more 
significant opposition to deeper involvement in the EEC (EU) arose within the 
Conservative Party and among large parts of the media (Rubinstein 
2003: 310). The Conservative government almost invariably "... sought to resist 
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supranational developments" while the majority of the continental member 
states tended to be, in varying degrees, more integrationist (Nugent 2003: 26- 
27). Hostility towards 'Europe' was increased by events in the early 1990s, 
especially after 'Black Wednesday' in 1992 when interest rates were raised 
dramatically after a currency crisis related to the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). By 1993, large parts of the press and other opinion-leaders became 
almost obsessed with hostility to Europe and especially further increases in 
the central power of the European bureaucracy (Rubinstein 1993: 339). Since 
the Labour Party came to power in 1997, the British government has been 
more co-operative, although it remained in the slow integration stream 
insisting for example on opt-out options from certain treaty provisions that 
would have interfered substantially with British national sovereignty (Nugent 
2003: 27). The reasons for these often, but by no means always, sceptical 
attitudes towards European integration and the EU are manifold and, in order 
to understand them, it is necessary to investigate the underlying English 
images of 'Europe' and their historical roots (Smith 2005: 1). 
Nation and sovereignty in England 
First of all, as a paper by Baker (2005: 1) stresses, there is a strength and 
durability of belief in national sovereignty and independence which can be 
described as extraordinary by modern European standards. In England, the 
terms of sovereignty and independence are often used interchangeably and 
remain emotive concepts that are often associated with power, authority, 
individualism and a sense of national self-determination. They also have a 
strong historical connotation evoking feelings of patriotism, tradition and 
national pride based on the long history of the English law and the unique 
character of the English institutions as indicated in Chapter One and Two. As 
Smith (2005: 2) points out, the regulative approach of the EU, which is 
extending into the political and cultural sphere, has caused English 
Eurosceptics; to fear the EU as a threat to the established English political 
system. 
As illustrated in Chapter Two, it can be argued that national identity has 
developed in England over centuries. This part real, part perceived antiquity 
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not only characterises English national identity, but also plays an important 
role in English attitudes towards 'Europe'. The island location and the 
resulting English preoccupation with naval power and the overseas Empire is 
widely considered to be a crucial defining factor of English identity and 
attitudes towards 'Europe'. The physical separation from mainland Europe 
often coupled with an old fashioned patriotism and an inherent conservatism, 
resulted in what is commonly referred to as 'island mentality' (Ichijo 2005: 12). 
An expression of this can be found in the common use of the term 'Europe' 
meaning continental Europe (Kumar 2003: 241). A study by Dr Atsuko Ichijo 
for the LSE's European institute (2005: 3) summarised this common attitude in 
the following equation: "Europe as 'elsewhere' and Britain as 'different'". 
Similarly, Margaret Thatcher (2003: 51) said in a speech in 1988 in relation to 
the Second World War "... it was from our island fortress that the liberation of 
Europe itself was mounted". This also denotes an uncertainty as to whether 
England or Britain is part of 'Europe' and often creates a 'them' versus 'us' 
situation, in the past particularly with regard to the French and Spanish 
Catholics. Ichijo (2005: 12) claims that Britain is hardly ever mentioned in 
British media coverage of EU related topics, thus strengthening the persistent 
'them and us' mentality by distancing Britain from Europe and the EU. The 
study also noted the often cited special relationship of Britain with the USA 
(Dijkink 1996: 46). Generally, it was felt that Britain had more in common with 
the USA than with her European neighbours. In addition, many British 
respondents in this study exhibited a general alienation from politics in 
general and admitted to a lack of knowledge about Europe. According to 
Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005: 6) 
62% of British respondents (in comparison to a 52% EU average) claimed that 
they did not know how the EU works. 
Finally, it must be noted that the Second World War seems to inform 
perceptions of national identity, as well as European attitudes, to a similar 
degree in both Germany and England. While in Germany the experience of 
nationalism and the war led to the above described re-assessment of national 
identity, the same time period had the almost opposite effect on English and 
British attitudes. In England, and in Britain as a whole, the war strengthened 
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feelings of patriotism and even feelings of moral 'superiority' in comparison 
with continental Europe. Thus, while German national identity was discredited 
by the war, British national identity was affirmed and strengthened by the 
belief that Britain and the allied forces were the morally superior saviours of 
'Europe'. The memory of the war, reinforced and transmitted through the 
mass media since the war, has become a firm part of national identity and the 
national myth: " ... the memory of the war is now at the heart of British national 
identity" (BBC "War Stories" 2006). Therefore, while Germany in the post-war 
period turned towards Europe in search of a substitute political identity, 
England and Britain had no need to do so and even detached herself further 
from 'Europe' (Smith 2005: 10). 
Nevertheless, Britain's entry into the European Union has not only 
been welcomed by many, but has been hailed by some as an opportunity for 
the British to renegotiate their identities. The idea was put forward that for 
example a 'Europe of the Regions' might help to dissolve 'outdated' national 
identities and help to create an overarching European or even cosmopolitan 
identity (Kumar 2003: 241). Indeed, as the BBC talking point in 2002 
(http: news. bbc. co. uk, accessed 23 May 2005) illustrated, there are quite a few 
English or British citizens who embrace a European identity, usually perceived 
to exist in addition to their own national identity. Judging by the responses, 
albeit anecdotal, it would seem that this attitude is most common among 
people who have lived in other European countries or are of foreign nationality 
now living in Britain. Thus it would seem that knowledge of and in depth direct 
experience of other European countries have a strong impact on people's 
attitudes towards the EU and their European neighbours, a hypothesis that 
shall be further explored in Chapter Seven. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In sum, this chapter has discussed some of the ambiguities surrounding 
European identity especially in relation to national identity. Although the EU 
has made some attempts to stimulate a European identity through the 
creation of a European iconography, relatively little is yet known, as Checkel 
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(2003: 352) points out, about the socialisation and identity-shaping effects of 
the EU on national agents. 
This chapter has shown that support for the EU varies considerably by 
member state, for example between Germany and England (or Britain). 
Research findings consistently show that in general Germans tend to feel 
more European and have a more positive attitude to European integration 
than English people. Some of the factors that influence attitudes towards the 
EU stem from different understandings of national identity. In the case of 
Germany and England, the different experience of the Second World War and 
the post war period, which has left Germans with a negative impression of 
nationalism and a search for alternative identities, seems to have shaped 
attitudes to national and European identity considerably. 
This chapter has also discussed possible definitions of European 
identity. Generally speaking, advocates of European identity agree that a 
European identity should exist alongside existing identities rather than 
replacing them. Although the concept remains vague and ill-defined, in 
general two broad approaches to European identity can be discerned. Those 
who argue in favour of a cultural European identity base their approach mostly 
on European values and shared historical European roots in an attempt to find 
commonalities among the cultural diversity of Europe. Alternatively, those who 
favour a civic European identity, base this identity on European citizenship 
rights. Both approaches are problematic for a number of reasons as this 
chapter has explained. Nevertheless, despite its contentious nature, the idea 
of European identity has frequently been put forward by those who hope that 
a more widespread European attachment might increase popular support, 
give the EU stronger political legitimacy and address the democratic deficit. 
As the terminology implies, the process of creating a European identity is also 
largely elite driven and tends to rely on top-down approaches, which will be 
explored in further detail in the next chapter. 
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6. The European dimension in the school curriculum 
6.1 Introduction: European citizenship, identity and education 
So far, the previous chapters have shown the links between political and 
national developments and their influence on shaping attitudes towards 
European integration and European identity. The development of the 
European idea, which was often considered as an alternative form of 
governance and a solution to the problems caused by national rivalry, has 
also been illustrated as has the subsequent actual post-war integration 
processes in Europe. Chapters Four and Five have explained that elite driven 
integration processes as well as the different popular attitudes to European 
integration are some of the reasons for the apparent lack of popular support 
for the EU with implications for the political legitimacy of the EU. In addition, a 
democratic deficit has been mentioned by many as another consequence of 
the elite driven integration, the intergovernmental approach as well as the 
institutional set-up of the EU. The previous chapter concluded that 
theoretically a European identity is needed in order to boast popular support 
and address the democratic deficit and political legitimacy of the EU. As the 
European Youth Forum Jeunesse (2002: 6) points outs, following the creation 
of EU citizenship and a European trans-national community life, the 
'European project' now needs to "... capture people's imagination to ensure 
citizens' allegiance and secure the future legitimacy of the European Union". 
The economic-political structure of the EU must now be "... anchored in the 
minds and hearts of its citizens by instilling in them the sentiment of belonging 
to a common European entity with shared values and ideals" (European 
Youth Forum Jeunesse 2002: 6). While the previous chapter investigated 
possible forms and characteristics of such a European identity, the possible 
means to create this identity have not as yet been discussed. 
As already pointed out, it seems unlikely that a European identity will 
be created through grass root movements or automated loyalty transfer, as 
the EU does not generate the sorts of passions and allegiances that people 
166 
feel towards their nations (Dunkerley et al 2002: 121). In the past, the EU has 
modelled its attempts to create a European identity on traditional nation state 
methods and has focused largely on the establishment of European icons 
such as a flag, anthem, passport and, in some countries, a single currency. 
As Novoa and DeJong-Lambert (2003: 50) observe, "... in a certain way, [.. ] 
nineteenth-century processes of identity building are being replicated 
nowadays in Europe". However, as the previous chapter pointed out, while 
neo-functionalists were probably right in presuming that European integration 
has led to the emergence of a European orientated elite, such sentiments and 
beliefs cannot as yet be attributed to the majority of the wider population. 
Therefore, in the last decades, the EU has increasingly started to look for 
other methods of identity stimulation and has again turned for inspiration to 
traditional state sponsored methods of national identity formation or 
fortification. Some traditional methods such as standardisation of language 
and culture would not be suitable since the EU seeks to maintain 'unity in 
diversity'. Others, however, such as the use of the mass education system 
and its potential to impart knowledge about and create support for Europe, 
have generated considerable interest. 
As previously explored, in the nineteenth century, the rise of mass 
education helped to disseminate elite concepts of national identity to the wider 
population and the previously illiterate masses. A central purpose of the 
educational expansion was to instil from an early age what it meant to be a 
citizen of the respective nation state. Thus, mass education was an important 
facilitator in the process of national establishment and fortification as well as 
political unification in countries such as Germany or Italy (Novoa and DeJong- 
Lambert 2003: 49). As explained in Chapter Two, many consider national 
identification not a natural attachment whereby people have to learn to think 
of themselves as part of a nation (Dunkerley 2002: 53). Education in this 
context, as Novoa and DeJong-Lambert (2003: 49) point out, has the 
important role of being "... a transmitter of national identity, [ ... ] linking the 
private citizen with the public polity". Similarly, it could be argued that if a 
European identity in whichever form is to persist, the public would have to 
learn an attachment to the EU, which again could be transmitted through the 
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education system. Furthermore, a European dimension in education would 
provide the EU with informed citizens who are able to participate fully in the 
institutions of a modern society, fulfil their duties as European citizens, 
understand how the EU works and understand what is at stake in elections 
(Dunkerley et al 2002: 131). Education therefore enables citizens to contribute 
to society as well as to enjoy its benefits (Dunkerley et al 2002: 131). This has 
been expressed in the 1985 EU Commission's Report Teaching about 
Europe, which states that one of the core educational objectives should be to 
make European citizens aware of the rights and obligations which Community 
institutions imply for them and the influence of the EU on their lives. As 
Shennan (1991: 19) argues "... Europe has already the institutional framework 
[ ... ] to go on shaping the lives of millions of citizens for the indefinite future. 
For this reason [ ... ] European children are entitled to be prepared for life 
within European society. So [ ... ] teaching and learning about Europe must be 
treated as an educational priority [ ... ]". 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that education and training have been 
regarded in recent years as increasingly important tools not only for the 
promotion of European citizenship (Dekker 1993: 45), but also, as the 
European Youth Forum Jeunesse pointed out in their 2002 Vision of 
Education in the Future, as one of the main tools by which societies can help 
young people to come to terms with their European identity. This chapter will 
therefore explore the role of education in creating a European identity as well 
as EU and governmental guidelines regarding a European dimension in 
teaching. Finally, this chapter will analyse the extent to which a European 
dimension has been integrated in selected curricula. 
6.2 Education and young people's attitudes to Europe 
There is some evidence supporting the theory that better educated citizens, 
with a more extensive knowledge about Europe and the EU, tend to be more 
supportive of the EU and be more likely to feel European. For example 
Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission, UK executive summary 2005: 4) 
has shown that, in the UK, 48% of the best educated group, but only 19% of 
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the least educated group saw membership to the EU as a good thing. 
Similarly, 50% of the most educated respondents, but only 22% of the least 
educated group thought that the UK had benefited from EU membership. 49% 
of the best educated group wished to know more about the EU in comparison 
to only 27% to those who left school aged 15 or younger. 43% of the most 
educated, but only 27% of the least educated claimed to understand how the 
EU works. The survey also claims that those with better education tend to be 
more in favour of European political union, the constitution and the euro. 15 It 
must, however, be stressed that opinion polls such as the Eurobarometer are 
unable to establish causal relationships (Harrison 2001: 49). It can therefore 
not be assumed that the Eurobarometer findings indicate that better education 
increases support for European integration. 
Despite this apparent importance of education, little research has been 
carried out that explores the role of education in forming children's 
perceptions. Some studies have shown that schools and teachers are one of 
the key information sources on Europe (Convery et al 1997: 19). For example, 
Barett's (1992) investigation into the acquisition and development of a 
European identity among English children found that all three sampled age 
groups (six, ten and fourteen year olds) agreed that the three most important 
information sources were parents, television and teachers. The fourteen year 
olds even thought the teachers to be the second most important information 
source after the media (Barrett 1992: 363). In a similar study, 16 Convery et al 
(1997: 20) showed that the main information sources on Europe and the EU 
were the media (54.8%) and schools (46.5%). This result varied considerably 
by country. While 48.5% of English pupils claimed to have gained all or most 
of their information on Europe from school, for German pupils this figure was 
significantly lower (41.2%) (Convery et al 1997: 108-109). Nevertheless, the 
result stresses the important role that teachers and school education play in 
informing young people about Europe. Given that one of the most important 
information sources, the media, has a tendency (at least in some countries) to 
15 At the time of writing (May 2006) this information was only available for the UK but not 
Germany 
16 which surveyed 1337 pupils in twenty-five secondary schools (year ten) across the ability 
range in England, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy. 
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give a negative view of the EU or to over- represent EU crises, makes the 
teachers' role in providing balanced and factual information about Europe and 
the EU even more crucial. 
Relatively little research has been carried out to explore the attitudes of 
young people in relation to Europe and the EU (Convery et al 1997: 11-12). 
Nevertheless, as Convery et al (1997: 15) show, the available findings in this 
area indicate that the majority of teenagers respond to the topic with interest 
and a desire to know more. Convery et al (1997: 20) found that the majority of 
their respondents (54.7%) considered themselves quite well informed: 
Table 6.1 How well informed are pupils about Europe (in 
England Germany France Italy Netherlands Spain 
Very well 3.4 2.3 2.8 2.9 2.6 1.2 
informed 
Quite well 53.1 55.6 65.4 61.4 76.7 27.5 
informed 
Not well 38.9 41.5 30.7 32.9 20.7 65.5 
informed 
Not at 11 4.5 0.6 1.1 2.9 0 5.8 
informed 
Source: Convery et al (1997., 108) 
Overall, 67% of the pupils said they would like to know and understand 
more about Europe (Convery et al 1997: 26). When asked how often they 
learned about Europe, 36.6% said a few lessons a week while almost 10% 
said 'never or almost never' (Convery et al 1997: 20). 17 
Chapter Five has already considered general levels of identification 
with Europe. In addition, some studies have assessed in how far school 
children identify with Europe. Convery et al (1997) found that, among 
secondary school pupils, German pupils were least likely to think of 
17 no country specific data available 
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themselves as only German, although it is difficult to ascertain in how far the 
difference can be attributed to a stronger European orientation, weaker 
national identity or relatively strong regional affiliations. 
Table 6.2 Feeling of belonging to [own nationality] (in %) 
Not at all Only partly Yes, totally 
England 4 25.7 70.3 
France 6.7 16.2 77.1 
Germany 18.7 32.7 48.5 
Italy 1.4 13.7 84.9 
Netherlands 0 6 94 
Spain 1.8 5.3 93 
Source: Convery at al (1997: 62) 
The table shows that the majority of secondary school pupils in 
England (70.3%) consider themselves as solely English (or British) in 
comparison to less than half of the German pupils (Convery et al 1997-62). 
Barrett (1992: 358) discovered that although many English children stated that 
they felt European (68% of the fourteen year olds), the most frequent 
explanation for this was geographical (a child was European because 
England was in Europe). On the other hand, 28% of the fourteen year olds 
stated that even though England was part of Europe, they themselves were 
not European. 
Convery et al (1997) also investigated the extent to which pupils 
considered themselves to be European and came to similar conclusions: 
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Table 6.3 Breakdown by country of how European pupils feel (in 
Overall England Germany 
Yes, totally 43.9 18.6 62.6 
Only partly 34.3 41.6 26.3 
Not at all 21.7 39.8 10.5 
Source: Convery et al (1997: 62) 
The percentage of English children, who felt not European at all, was 
the highest in comparison to other countries. English pupils have been found 
to have a much weaker association with the concept of European identity than 
their mainland equivalents (Convery et al 1997: 61). Convery et al (1997: 63) 
offered as possible reasons for this result the comparatively large number of 
non-white respondents in England as well as the influence of the English 
media, which has a tendency to present Europe as an arena of economic- 
political conflict, although both might also apply to other European countries. 
In addition, Morell (1996: 19) has pointed out that young people in the UK 
watch an average of eighteen hours of TV per week with an almost entirely 
Anglo-American schedule, which helps to strengthen traditional Anglo- 
American rather than Anglo-European ties as discussed earlier. 
In any case, the EU acknowledges the link between education, knowledge 
and feeling/being Europeans in several publications, for example in the 1993 
Green Paper on the European dimension of education (COM (93) 457 final) 
which was published following the Maastricht Treaty and its provision for new 
EU competencies in the field of education. The paper stresses that "... the 
mutual understanding of the practices and cultures of other Member States, 
and even the ability to work with those of other nationalities or in another 
setting, are among the most important factors which help young people to 
become integrated into society and to accept more readily their 
responsibilities as European citizens" (COM (93) 457 final 1993: 3). The 
Commission understands European citizenship to be based on shared values 
such as interdependence, democracy, equality, opportunity and mutual 
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respect (COM (93) 457 final 1993: 5). The EU commission (COM (93) 457 final 
1993: 6) recommended that an education for European citizenship ought to 
include European languages, knowledge of other countries, trans-national 
exchanges and a better understanding of Europe today and its future 
construction. 
6.3 EU policy and the European dimension in education 
Despite the Commissions recommendation in relation to the possible contents 
of a European dimension in education, there is considerable debate as to 
what exactly constitutes a 'European education'. According to Bell (1991: 6), 
the four main contributing factors to a European dimension in education are 
often considered to be a) the school curriculum, b) teacher training, c) 
teaching materials and d) strategies (such as exchange programmes etc). 
Others argue that European education could be characterised by two 
approaches "... referred to [ ... ] as the pragmatic and 
identitarian approaches. 
The first consists of [for example] mobility, recognition of diplomas and 
credentials, employability and the enhancement of quality. In the case of the 
latter [ ... ] the focus is placed on what has been called the 
'European 
dimension of education', encompassing more sensitive issues such as 
curriculum content and teacher training" (Novoa and DeJong-Lambert 
2003: 50). To narrow the focus of this paper, this study will concentrate on the 
European dimension in education and more specifically on the European 
dimension in the school curriculum. The focus will be on secondary education 
as according to Barrett (1992: 354), the acquisition of a European identity, if 
this occurs at all, is very unlikely to happen before the age of ten. Shennan 
(1991: 18-19) agrees and states that the secondary school stage is important 
because "... that is when childhood impressions are reinforced and extended, 
while adult attitudes and patterns of behaviour towards the external world are 
certainly determined by adolescent experience". 
The actual implementation of a European dimension in education 
would necessarily have to rely on the existing education systems of the EU 
member states. The difficulty, however, with this is that education is organised 
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on a national basis and, as long as this remains to be the case, it will be 
difficult for Europeans to genuinely imagine themselves as living outside of 
national territorial units (Dunkerley et al 2002: 61). Similarly, Smith (1999: 243) 
argues that the national prerogative to determine the curriculum is one of the 
main barriers to the implementation of a European dimension. He claims that 
without a centralised European state, one cannot expect too much from the 
national education systems in terms of European education. As "... schools 
have [traditionally] served as powerful 'agents of socialisation' by transmitting 
'national' history, 'national' languages, 'national' geography among others" 
(European Youth Forum Jeunesse 2002: 6), it would be difficult to shift the 
focus from the national to the European stage, as will be further analysed in 
the next chapter. 
The EU Commission believes that reforms in key areas such as 
curricular renovation or quality assurance cannot achieve their full potential 
"... if they are designed for a purely national context and disregard the 
broader, new European context' (COM (2002) 779 final: 4). The aim for such 
reforms should be to achieve "... as much convergence as necessary (whilst 
keeping as much diversity as possible)" (COM (2002) 779 final: 22). The EU 
itself, however, is rather reluctant to interfere in issues relating to education. 
As Ryba (1992: 11) observes "... neither the Treaty of Rome itself, nor any 
subsequent Community legislation, gives the Community any supranational 
powers in the field of education, and, for the most part, Member States have 
zealously guarded their educational systems from any supranational 
intervention that might conceivably infringe on their national rights". 
The following brief chronology of EU educational policies is adapted from 
Economou (2003: 118-120), who splits the development of EU education 
policies into four time periods. This overview is by no means complete or 
meant to be comprehensive. As this study is mainly concerned with the 
European dimension in the curriculum, other policy areas, for example those 
concerning European exchange programmes, have been omitted. 
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e 1957- 1976: The early years 
In the early EEC and EC period, any educational recommendations or policy 
initiatives were limited to vocational education and training in conjunction with 
social policy, although there was an interest to promote member state co- 
operation in this area. The Treaty of Rome itself makes no mention of 
education. 
* 1976-1986: Education for the labour market 
During this period, the European Communities set up a number of initiatives 
such as the information network EURYDICE in 1976 and the NARIC 
scheme" in 1984. In 1974-76 the Education Committee was created, which 
was composed of the member states' ministers of education and of the 
European Commission (Ertl 2003: 17). The stronger emphasis on education 
and training was largely due to the economic depression and the realisation 
that many young people entered the labour market without the necessary 
qualifications (Ertl 2003: 18). In 1976 the EC published a Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers of Education concerning an action programme for 
education, which, for the first time, developed the idea of a European 
dimension in primary and secondary education (Bell 1991: 3). This was 
followed in 1983 by the Stuttgart Declaration that recommended the 
improvement of information on European history and culture in order to 
promote a European awareness. 
1986-1992: intensification of educational initiatives to meet the needs 
of the Single European market 
In 1988, the EC released the Resolution on the European Dimension in 
Education, which is one of its most important documents regarding the 
European dimension in education to date. The Resolution invited the Member 
States to integrate the European dimension into the school curriculum, 
teaching material and teacher training. The defined objective was to 
"... strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to 
them the value of European civilisation and of the foundation on which the 
18 improvement of recognition of diplomas and periods of study 
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European peoples intend to base their development [ ... ] in particular [ ... ] the 
principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights" (COM 
(93) 457 final: 17-18). The Resolution claimed that young people ought to be 
made aware of the advantages and the challenges of the European 
Communities. Education ought to improve their knowledge of the Community 
and its Member States in their historical, cultural, economic and social 
aspects and "... bring home to them the significance of the co-operation of the 
member states of the European Community with other countries of Europe 
and the world" (Resolution 88/C 177/02). All Member States were required to 
respond to the Resolution and, generally speaking, were in agreement that 
the European dimension should not be limited to a separate European course, 
but should be delivered cross-curricular in the appropriate areas (Convery et 
al 1997: 7). The German and UK response are discussed further on in greater 
detail. 
* 1992-today: Focus on educational programmes 
The Maastricht Treaty made provision for a generally more supplementary 
role for the EU in the area of education and specified in Article 126 that " ... the 
Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging co-operation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action" (http: //europa. eu. int, accessed 12 
April 2005). The responsibility for the European dimension in education, as 
well as educational content and organisation, however, was left to the 
member states. The role of the EU was to be promotional, encouraging the 
member states to co-operate in the field of education and academic 
recognition. The development of the European dimension was to be 
encouraged particularly though the teaching of European languages. In 
addition, Article 127 of the Maastricht Treaty deals with vocational training and 
exchanges. Again the member states are to be responsible for vocational 
training, but the EU was to stimulate and support vocational integration and 
mobility which would be beneficial for future employment and the common 
market. 
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The Maastricht Treaty makes no mention of a joint European 
curriculum or programmes with identical content (Vaniscotte 1993: 19). 
Instead, the EU Commission argues that curricular renovation should involve 
the integration of a European dimension into all subjects, including the 
possibility for students and trainees to undertake part of their learning in 
another country (COM (2002) 779 final: 22-23). Similarly, the Council of 
Europe recommended in 1983 that schools should make special linkages 
across the disciplines as the European dimension spreads over many 
subjects (Shennan 1991: 29). In addition, Convery et al (1997: 54) contend that 
although the Maastricht Treaty gave legitimacy to the European dimension, it 
equally undermined the 1988 Resolution by extending the principle of 
subsidiarity to education. As a result, "... apart from a few pockets of activity, 
evidence of learning about Europe at any level of sophistication is scarce" 
(Convery et al 1997: 54). Since the Maastricht Treaty, EU initiatives in the field 
of education and training seem to focus on two main objectives: firstly, the 
promotion of new technologies in learning processes and secondly the 
increase of mobility within the EU (Ertl 2003: 30). 
Although this paper concentrates on the educational recommendations of 
EU institutions, it is worth pointing out that the Council of Europe has also 
published a series of papers dealing with education. The Council of Europe 
and especially the standing European Cultural Convention19 carried out a 
range of work in the field of cultural co-operation under inclusion of 
educational initiatives. Of interest here is a five year project entitled 
Secondary education for Europe. This project, launched by the Council for 
Cultural Co-operation in 1991, was seeking to promote educational conditions 
and practices that: 
" provide young people with the knowledge, skills and attitudes they 
need to cope with the major challenges facing European society 
" prepare young people for higher education, mobility, work and 
everyday life in a democratic, multilingual and multicultural Europe 
19 established in 1954 
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make young people aware of their common cultural heritage and their 
common responsibilities as Europeans 
(http: //www. coe. int/t/e/cultural co-operation, accessed 2 January 2005). 
It was envisaged to bring the European dimension into schools through 
materials, teaching guides and case studies covering individual subjects 
(including history, geography, literature), lateral projects (environment, 
international problems) and extracurricular activities (links and exchanges 
between schools etc. ). This project was based on an earlier 1983 
Recommendation by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that 
member states should promote European awareness in secondary schools 
(Shennan 1991: 19). 
In the end, despite the efforts of European institutions, the education 
systems ultimately remain the responsibility of the EU member states. It is 
thus important to assess government attitudes to a European dimension in 
education by examining relevant government guidelines and policies in 
Germany and England. 
6.4 The European dimension in education in Germany and England 
Government guidelines in relation to the European dimension in 
education in Germany 
In Germany, the European dimension has been part of the curriculum for over 
twenty-five years. As previously explained, Germany's constitution, the Basic 
Law, contains a commitment to European integration with schools being 
under the obligation to teach about the importance of European co-operation 
and instil a sense of belonging to Europe (Shennan 1991: 21). 
Educational and cultural legislation is primarily the responsibility of the 
Under, although the Under governments co-operate with each other at 
federal level through the Standing Conference of the Education Ministers 
(Kultusminister Konferenz KIVIK). As part of the KIVIK, a Committee for 
European and International Affairs deals with EU co-operation in relation to 
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education, culture and research. The committee develops common positions 
which may be taken into account in federal consultations (Eurydice 
2002/2003). 
In 1978 the KIVIK adopted the Resolution on Europe in the Classroom, 
which was updated in 1990 in a booklet entitled Europe in the classroom 
(Europa im Unterricht) published in five community languages. The official 
response to the 1988 EEC Resolution was published later in 1992, but directly 
refers to and partly incorporates the earlier 1990 publication. The Europe in 
the classroom document claims that Europe is based on a common historical 
heritage and cultural tradition (KMK 1990: 13). The goal of the European 
Community, according to this document, is the creation of a European Union 
with federal structures (Europe of the Regions), which would guarantee to 
preserve cultural diversity, a balanced economic development and grass root 
decision making in the member states (KMK 1990: 14). As a consequence of 
this political development, European citizens would have to understand 
Europe as a shared 'house' in which "... vital developments concerning their 
lives are taking place in the fields of politics and society, business and culture- 
a house which they have to build and maintain together" (KMK 1990: 14). As 
shown below, such a political declaration is markedly absent from all UK 
official documents relating to the European dimension in education, including 
the UK response to the 1988 EC Resolution. 
The KMK (1990: 15) defines "... raising awareness of the European 
integration process" as one of the tasks of education as well as contributing 
"... towards developing awareness of European identity and fostering 
understanding of the fact that in many spheres of our lives European terms of 
reference apply and that European decisions are necessary". The required 
knowledge, which schools would have to teach, includes: 
" The geographical diversity of Europe 
" Political and social structures of Europe 
" Formative historical forces in Europe and the development of European 
political values such as freedom 
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" Features of a common European culture 
" The multi-lingual nature and cultural wealth of Europe 
" History of the European idea and post-1945 integration 
" Joint action in Europe 
* Roles and working methods of the European institutions 
(KMK 1990: 15-16) 
The document acknowledges the link between knowledge, identity and 
citizenship and declares several times that the aim of education must be "... to 
arouse young people's awareness of a European identity" which also involves 
preparing them to fulfil their tasks as citizens in the European community 
(KMK 1990: 17). According to this document (KMK 1990: 17) the European 
dimension in Germany is statutory part of geography, history, social 
stud ies/pol itics as well as economics and law. Special emphasis is placed on 
languages, especially in the form of bilingual teaching at secondary schools. 
In addition, maths, sciences, technology, religion and philosophy, art, music 
and sports are understood to be part of a common European heritage and as 
such cannot be taught solely along national lines (KMK 1990: 18). As Convery 
et al (1997: 7) note, Germany lists the most impressive number of subjects for 
implementing a European dimension, whereas other countries such as the UK 
limit their responses to the 1988 EC Resolution to a few subjects, mostly 
geography, history and modern languages. 
In addition to the curriculum, the KMK (1990) stipulates that special 
projects such as school partnerships, exchanges, the annual European 
Schools Day competition or visits to European institutions are equally 
important. The document makes numerous recommendations for future 
development including: 
" Improvement of pupil and teacher motivation through first hand 
experiences (bilateral exchanges, foreign language practise etc) 
" Improvement of basic information on Europe/ European integration in both 
teacher and pupil material 
" Taking the KMK resolutions into account when revising curricula 
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" Encouragement of foreign language learning and bilingual teaching 
" Pilot projects to promote Europe in the classroom 
" Encouragement of school partnerships 
" Consideration of the European dimension in teacher training 
(KMK 1990: 19-20) 
This 1990 paper was consolidated in the 1992 government response to 
the 1988 EC Resolution entitled The European Dimension in Education (Zur 
Europtlischen Dimension im Bildungswesen). According to the KMK (1992: 9) 
the priority of their 1991/1992 action programme would be the general 
improvement of the European orientation in the education system. A stronger 
European dimension was envisaged especially for modern language teaching, 
political and cultural education, pupil exchanges, school partnerships and 
teacher exchanges especially in non-modern language subjects. 
The document emphasises that the main aim of the relevant subjeCtS20 
should be to teach a sound basic knowledge of Europe and the European 
Union. Written prior to Eastern enlargement, the document states that a 
European dimension should include Central and Eastern Europe as well as 
the (then) area of the EU (KMK 1992: 13). Some initiatives and pilot projects 
are also listed such as bilingual teaching, special status European schoolS21 
and the European Schools Day competition, which has been held annually 
since 1953 (KMK 1992: 28-29 +42). 
The KMK recommended that textbook publishers should stress the 
European dimension in textbooks and teaching materials and praised the 
exemplary series of materials published by Lower Saxony entitled Europa - 
Materialien fOr den Unterricht (Europe- materials for teaching, KMK 1992: 30). 
Furthermore, it was pointed out that the European dimension was increasingly 
incorporated in teacher training (KMK 1992: 33). 
20 Geography, history, social studies/politics, subjects dealing with economy or law, 
languages including German, maths, sciences, technology, religion and philosophy, art, music 
and sport 
21 Schools with a special European orientation. European schools tend to offer for example 
bilingual teaching, multiple foreign languages, special European projects and exchanges etc. 
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The 1992 German response was followed in 1996 by the KMK 
recommendation Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule 
(Intercultural education in schools, Beschluss der Kultusministerkonferenz 
vom 25.10.1996). The recommendation focused on inter-cultural education, 
which relates both to the increasing number of non-German pupils at German 
schools as well as to the European/global dimension in teaching. The 
document states that in recent years a vast variety of suggestions and 
programmes have been put forward, which aimed at preparing the young 
generation for increasing levels of professional mobility, European integration 
and globalisation (KMK 1996: 3). According to the KMK (1996: 6) it cannot be 
assumed that pupils possess a differentiated knowledge and acceptance of 
other cultural identities, which results in additional tasks for schools and the 
education system. These tasks include: 
" Making pupils aware of their cultural environment 
" Providing pupils with knowledge about other cultures 
" Promoting curiosity, tolerance and respect for other cultures 
" Making pupils aware of prejudice (KMK 1996: 6) 
'Intercultural competence' is regarded as a key qualification for all young 
people and should be an overall task of schools (and not solely the 
responsibility of certain subjects or projects) (KMK 1996: 6). Accordingly, the 
KMK proposed to promote and develop curricula and textbooks, which do not 
marginalise nor demote societies and cultures (KMK 1996: 11). In practice, as 
Soysal (2002: 3) claims, the increasing importance of European issues is 
reflected in some school books to such an extent that the nation has started to 
disappear in favour of Europe and the regions. 
In sum, the German federal government and the KIVIK take a positive 
attitude to the European dimension in education, which is seen as a 
necessary and desirable aspect of modern school teaching. In contrast to the 
UK, the inclusion of a European dimension in teaching is in Germany part of 
the constitution and thus embedded in the political structure of Germany. 
Programmes and recommendations for the incorporation of a European 
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dimension in teaching date back to the 1970s. Since Germany was able to 
draw upon an existing European programme, the German response to the 
1988 EC Resolution incorporated both existing and planned activities and 
policies. The UK response, on the other hand, focused primarily on 
suggestions for initiatives as the next section will show. 
Government guidelines regarding the European dimension in education 
in England 
The British government generally tends to oppose any development of the 
Community's powers in matters of education (Phillips 2003: 76). In terms of a 
European dimension in education, the British approach was, as Economou 
(2003: 122) puts it, "lukewarm", especially as there was no common National 
Curriculum until 1989. The British contribution in the 1970s and 1980s to a 
European dimension in education was largely limited to the foundation of a 
national UK Centre for European Education (UKCEE) in 1978. The UKCEE's 
activities were limited to information dissemination, dealing with requests from 
schools and the European Schools Day competition as well as organising 
national conferences and seminars (Economou 2003: 121). In 1989 the 
UKCEE merged with the Central Bureau for Educational Visits and 
Exchanges (CBEVE) which is now part of the British Council. 
In 1991 the Department for Education and Science (DES, now the 
Department for Education and Skills DfES) published the British response to 
the 1988 EC Resolution entitled The European dimension in Education: A 
statement of the UK Government's Policy and Report of Activities Undertaken 
to Implement the EC Resolution of 24 May 1988 on the European Dimension 
in Education. Although the document, as well as the other papers discussed 
further on, covers education in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, for the purpose of this thesis, only those parts concerning England will 
be discussed. 
The document states that the British government has been and is 
continuing to be active in supporting the 1988 EC Resolution as young 
people, in order "... to benefit fully from closer European co-operation" need to 
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be equipped "... with knowledge, understanding, skills and attitudes which will 
enable them to take up the new opportunities" (DES 1991). However, as 
Convery et al (1997: 9) note, in comparison to the original 1988 EC 
Resolution, some dilution of language has occurred, which probably was a 
result of the comparatively strong Eurosceptic lobby at the time. 
According to the 1991 document, the aims of the government in relation to 
a European dimension in education include: 
Help pupils acquire a view of Europe as a multi-cultural, multi-lingual 
community which includes the UK 
* Encourage awareness of the variety of European histories, geographies 
and cultures 
e Prepare pupils to participate in the economic and social development of 
Europe 
Encourage interest in European languages 
Provide knowledge about the origins, workings and role of the EC 
* Promote a sense of European identity, through first hand experiences 
where appropriate 
* Promote an awareness of the EC's interdependence with the rest of 
Europe and the world 
According to the 1991 document, the government also supports the 
development of the European dimension through policies in the following 
areas: 
" Support for language teaching and learning 
" Support for bilateral links and exchanges through the Central Bureau for 
Educational Visits and Exchanges and the Youth Exchange Centre 22 
" Support for the work of non-governmental organisations, which includes 
the Centre for European Education (UKCEE) and the Education Policy 
Information Centre (EPIC Europe)23 
" Support of relevant conferences and seminars 
22 ceased to exist, now part of the British Council 
23 seems to have ceased to exist 
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Support for and implementation of EC education programmes 
Encouraging Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to develop policies for the 
implementation of the European dimension 
The document declared that a European dimension needs to permeate 
and be integrated into all relevant parts of the curriculum. In addition, the 
document recommended that the European dimension should be a cross- 
curricular theme and that learning a modern foreign language should be 
compulsory for the ages 11-16.24 The document remains vague in relation to 
the school curriculum, as this was still under development at the time. 
Furthermore, the paper argues that the European dimension should be part of 
teacher training and should be reflected in the relevant textbooks and 
materials. Finally the document lists additional initiatives including reminding 
the education authorities of the European Schools Day competition or 
providing support for language festivals. 
In comparison to the German response, which is overall more prescriptive, 
the British response tends to suggest rather than stipulate and frequently uses 
terms such as 'promote' and 'encourage'. The different approach might be 
partly due to the different educational organisation. While in Germany 
educational policy and curriculum content is decided at federal level, in 
England the responsibility for educational policy and thus the implementation 
of a European dimension rests primarily with the Local Education Authorities 
(LEA). Although they have to operate within the framework of the National 
Curriculum, the LEAs and the individual schools have greater freedom in 
deciding teaching content than in Germany. The British government might 
therefore be less inclined to prescribe and thus infringe on the education 
freedom of the LEAs and schools. 
In addition, as Eurydice (2002) points out, there is no specific legislation in 
the UK covering the European dimension in school education. Instead, 
successive governments have published a range of policy documents 
24 from 2004, Modem Foreign Languages is non-statutory for key stage four 
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intended to promote the incorporation of a European or global dimension in 
education. Furthermore, although the global dimension is considered to be 
important, there is no central strategy to co-ordinate support which would 
meet teachers' needs. The Department for International Development (DFID) 
has subsequently set up the Enabling Effective Support (EES) initiative 25 
which was specifically designed to provide teachers with more effective and 
sustained support to incorporate a global dimension into teaching. 
Economou (2003) conducted a study from 1995 to 1998 among officials 
and LEAs in England, Scotland and Wales and found that "... the European 
dimension in education has not been a priority for the British government; 
their main interest has been the implementation of the national curriculum and 
raising standards in numeracy and literacy" (Economou 2003: 15). Based on 
the findings, Economou (2003: 127) concluded that the government has 
basically failed to perform a number of the functions mentioned in the 1991 
DES response to the 1988 EC Resolution including the provision of a 
legislative framework, the inclusion of the European dimension in the 
curriculum and the organisation of conferences. On the other hand, the 
government has encourages exchanges, supported EU programmes, 
published policy models for LEAs and encouraged modern foreign language 
teaching in the curriculum (Economou 2003: 128-129). 
Since 1991, the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) (from 1995- 
2001 the Department for Education and Employment [DfEE]) continued to 
promote the European dimension, which was usually considered to be a non- 
specific aspect of an inclusive international dimension. For example, the 1997 
White Paper Excellence in Schools stated that international work was "... able 
to make a pivotal contribution to the aim of raising standards" (DfEE 1997). 
The White Paper encouraged schools to become involved in international 
partnerships, while teachers were asked to be aware of comparative data on 
international education. Another example is the 1999 DfEE Development 
Agenda for Education (DfEE 1999b), which states that all young people 
25 based on the Government's White Paper on International Development 1997 
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should complete key stage four with a good foundation for lifelong learning, 
work and citizenship within a rapidly changing world. This objective includes a 
specific focus on support for the European Union's SOCRATES26 programme 
and the development of a European dimension in education. The WES 
strategy for 2000 to 2006 reinforced the government's commitment to an 
international dimension in education in terms of "... learning from the best of 
international experience and sharing good practice" (Eurybase 2004/2005). 
The 2001 Green Paper Schools: Building on Success (DfES 2001) states 
that links to schools and teachers in other countries have offered enhanced 
opportunities for both pupils and teachers and have enabled a deeper 
understanding of world class standards. In 2004 the WES published Putting 
the World into World-Class Education - An International Strategy for 
Education, Skills and Children's Services (DfES 2004). The paper 
recommended that international considerations should be integrated into 
mainstream policies and existing programmes of work. One of the main goals 
according to this document is to equip young people and adults for life in a 
global society and work in a global economy (DfES 2004: 7). Although the EU 
is frequently referred to, the main focus of the document is to develop a global 
dimension in education. The terms 'European dimension' or 'European 
identity' are not mentioned, although the paper is committed to fulfilling the 
Lisbon goal to make the EU "... the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- 
based economy in the world" (DfES 2004: 7). The same aim is also addressed 
in the White Paper 21st Century Skills: Realising our potential (DfES 2003). 
Similarly, the DfID initiative Enabling Effective Support (DfID 2003) 
endeavours to increase and improve the global dimension in education. 
As this overview shows, British educational policy and recommendationS27, 
following the initial response to the 1988 EC Resolution, have a tendency to 
submerge the European dimension into a wider global dimension. In addition, 
26 The current SOCRATES 11 programme aims to strengthen the European dimension of 
Higher Education by "... encouraging trans-national co-operation between universities, 
boosting European mobility and improving the transparency and full academic recognition of 
studies and qualifications throughout the Union" (hftp: //ec. europa. eu,, accessed 10 July 2006) 27 at least those relating to England (and Wales) 
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while a large number of German documents directly and often in some detail 
address the European dimension in the curriculum, the majority of British 
government documents focus on other activities such as European 
exchanges. 
Governmental recommendations, however, do not necessarily guarantee 
what is actually being taught at school. School teaching is informed and 
prescribed by the curriculum, although this is also to some degree open to 
interpretation by the school or other educational authority. Therefore it is 
essential to have a closer look at the German and English curriculum in order 
to assess in how far a European dimension has been incorporated. Firstly, 
however, in order to understand the curricular analysis, it is necessary to 
explain the structure and organisation of the school system in Germany and 
England. 
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6.5 The German school system 
Graph 6.1 The German school system 
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As already pointed out, the German Under are responsible for the 
education system, but co-operate at national level through the KMK. The KMK 
has no formal legal status and is a voluntary forum that works toward 
increased harmonisation of the school systems in the different Lander (Lewis 
2001: 150). A 1964 agreement, amended in 1971, guarantees a uniform 
fundamental structure of the school system in Germany (Eurydice 1999: 9). 
The KMK decides which subjects are to be included and the Lander organise 
their respective curriculum within this framework. The decentralised nature of 
the system allows for the development of regional particularities within the 
national framework (Lewis 2001: 150). The educational ministries of the 
Lander supervise educational institutions and have various responsibilities 
including the organisation of schools, the content of the courses and the 
approval of textbooks (Eurydice 1999: 10). 
The administration of schools is usually two-tiered whereby the 
ministries are the upper tier and local/communal school offices (Schulamt) 
form the lower tier (Eurydice 1999: 10). The local authorities are normally 
responsible for administering and funding public sector schools. There are a 
number of consultative bodies such as the teachers' and school conferences 
as well as bodies representing the parents (Eltemvertretungen) and the pupils 
(SchOlervertretungen) (Eurydice 1999: 12). In principle, attending a public 
sector school is free of charge. 
Secondary schooling in most UInder is split according to pupil ability 
into three main school forms, the Hauptschulen, Realschulen and Gymnasien. 
Some Under have also introduced comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen) 
or a special 'orientation phase' at level five and SiX. 28 The educational path of 
a pupil is ultimately chosen by the parents, although schools will usually issue 
a recommendation based on the child's performance. 
28 The orientation phase, which can take the form of a separate school, is a stage of special 
support and observation after which it will be decided which secondary school a pupil should 
attend. 
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All pupils have to attend in total nine years of compulsory schooling 
after which the lowest leaving qualification (Hauptschulabschluss) is available. 
Pupils at Realschulen normally attend school until year ten and leave with the 
Realschulabschluss (or mittlerer Schulabschluss), while pupils at Gymnasien 
attend school until year twelve or thirteen and leave school with the Abitur (A- 
levels). The structure is flexible to a certain degree and allows pupils with 
good leaving qualifications to change to a higher level school to obtain a 
higher qualification. Equally, pupils can change school forms at any stage if 
his/her abilities prove unsuitable for the chosen school form. 
Teaching provision in schools is normally based on classes organised 
by age group. As a rule, pupils have to attend thirty hours of compulsory 
schooling in year seven to ten irrespective of the school form (Eurydice 
1999: 20). At the Gymnasium, compulsory subjects until year ten include 
German, at least two foreign languages, maths, * physics, chemistry, biology, 
geography, history, politics, music, art, sport and religion. In 1997,28.9% of 
all pupils in year eight attended a Gymnasium (Eurydice 1999: 21). 
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6.6 The English school system 
Graph 6.2 The school system in England and Wales 
0 
uJ 
0 
-I 
0 Lo 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
Isi- WITIM tOUCATION INSWOMS HG-EH EXCATICN 
VE (01leges. ferlo(V (Ofltýýes. lpe( bill% QNý 
colitges. odu R edmcmion muts) 
is FUKTHFR EDUCAMN NST ffUMNS 
(ilxrh farin n9kvy%FF reAl(my%rrrtmycal1rgr% school sIxth fo rrn s 
17 %pecliflu rfAlmyi, adidl Hurzihan evoirm) 
16 Yll 
y10 SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
14 y 09 
13 y0a 
- 
12 Y 
"07 
11 y [Irv 
Y05 
Y04 
PRIMARY SCH001.5 Y03 
7 Z 
n 
Y 02 
E U - 
6 %A Ytll 
5 R Recepnon classes in primary schools 
PRE-PRIMARY SEITINGS 
0-5 (nur5cryclasies in prIffury schcolinurscfy 5chciclä, 
Source: http. -Ilwww. oakton. edu, accessed 12 February 2006 
As in Germany, all children in England between the ages of five and 
sixteen are entitled to free education. Additional education (for example A- 
levels) is usually also free of charge up to the age of nineteen. Educational 
legislation is contained in a series of Acts of Parliament. The most recent 
ones are the 1988 Education Reform Act, which introduced the National 
Curriculum, and the 2002 Education Act which increased the schools' 
flexibility with respect to curriculum, staffing and governance. Most of the 
essential education legislation is now contained in the 1996 Education Act, 
which consolidated earlier legislation (Eurydice 2002: 11). 
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The Central Secretary of State for Education and Skills has the overall 
responsibility for the Department for Education and Skills. There are also a 
number of non-departmental public bodies such as the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority (QCA) whose prime duty is to advise the Secretary of 
State on all matters affecting the curriculum, pupil assessment and publicly 
funded qualifications (Eurydice 2002: 12). The provision and organisation of 
schools, however, is normally the responsibility of elected local councils in 
England and Wales which have designated responsibility as Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) (Eurydice 2002: 13). Each school has a school governing 
body, which decides the general direction of the school and its curriculum 
(subject to the requirements of the national curriculum) and oversee the 
management of the school. The individual teachers decide on teaching 
methods and which textbooks they use (Eurydice 2002: 14). 
Compulsory secondary education comprises key stages three and four. 
Key stage three includes year seven to nine and key stage four year ten and 
eleven. The majority of secondary schools are comprehensive schools. Pupils 
may be taught in classes according to their general abilities (streaming) or 
according to their abilities in particular subjects (setting). Every publicly 
funded secondary school must provide the national curriculum, religious 
education, collective worship, sex education and career guidance, but schools 
have the discretion to develop the whole curriculum to reflect their particular 
needs and circumstances (Eurydice 2002: 26). 
In England at key stage three, the national curriculum includes the 
following compulsory subjects: English, maths, science, design and 
technology, information and communication technology (ICT), history, 
geography, modern foreign languages, 
education and (since 2002) citizenship. 
art and design, music, physical 
In key stage four, the national 
curriculum is limited to the following compulsory subjects: English, maths, 
science, ICT, citizenship (since 2002), religious education, sex education, 
careers education, physical education and work related learning. In addition to 
the compulsory subjects, all pupils have to choose several non-statutory 
subjects from a range offered by the school. 
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6.7 The European dimension in the curriculum in Germany and 
England 
The following section will provide a curricular assessment of the European 
dimension for selected subjects. In the case of England, the curriculum 
analysis will assess the most recent National Curriculum for England and 
Wales (1999). In Germany, variations exist between the curricula of the 
1-5nder. Therefore, two Under, namely Lower Saxony and Bavaria, have 
been chosen for further analysis, as both provide a fair representation of the 
majority of West German Under. Lower Saxony in North Germany can be 
described, in general, as Protestant with a tendency to elect SPD-led Under 
governments, while Bavaria in South Germany is largely Catholic and 
characterised by Christian Democrat Under governments. East German 
Under were deliberately excluded as their different development in the 
twentieth century was expected to have a major impact on both the curriculum 
and teacher' attitudes. 29 Since the main three school forms in both I-Ander 
each have a different curriculum, it was decided to focus on the Gymnasium. 
These are all schools providing secondary education leading to the Abitur (A- 
levels) (Lewis 2001: 155). There are usually two stages: the compulsory stage 
including year ten after which pupils receive the mittlerer Schulabschluss, 
which entitles them to proceed to the next stage, the sixth form leading to the 
Abitur (Lewis 2001: 155). As such, the Gymnasium was considered to be the 
German school form that most resembles English comprehensive schools, 
which also often offer compulsory secondary education followed by a sixth 
form. In addition, it must be noted that due to differences between the two 
countries in relation to the length of compulsory education, the curricular 
analysis assesses for England year seven to eleven and, in the case of 
Germany, year seven to ten. 30 
29 It would be interesting to investigate these potential differences between West and East 
German Under regarding the European Dimension in the curriculum in a separate study. 30 At the time of study, Lower Saxony had an orientation phase, which was abolished in 2004. 
Therefore, at the time of analysis, secondary education in Lower Saxony started in year 
seven. In Bavaria, secondary education officially starts in year six. 
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For the purpose of this study, it was decided to focus on the European 
dimension in the subjects of history and politics/citizenship. As Shennan 
(1991: 41) points out, history should be a prime facilitator of the European 
dimension as modern Europe is a product of history; although the European 
dimension does not exclusively mean "... teaching about the past". History 
also helps to explain the present European situation and the values of 
contemporary society. Therefore, history should be a key subject for the 
teaching of the European dimension (Shennan 1991: 41). Other studies have 
shown that history is one of the subjects most frequently used by schools to 
integrate the European dimension (Bordas et al 1993: 98). Similarly, the 
subjects, which were perceived by pupils to provide the most information 
about Europe were geography (78.7%), history (68.5%) and modern 
languages (60%) (Convery et al (1997: 22). 
The second subject, citizenship/politics, has been selected to assess in 
further detail the links between citizenship, knowledge and identity as 
discussed in Chapter Five. At the time of their study, Convery et al (1997: 58) 
found that only Germany and the Netherlands had an explicit political element 
in their curriculum. In the UK, on the other hand, "... anything resembling 
political education is limited to self-exploration and tolerance of others in 
personal and social education courses which are additions to the mainstream 
curriculum and held in low esteem by pupils" (Convery et al 1997: 58). This 
has only changed with the introduction of the statutory citizenship subject for 
key stage three and four in 2002. 
A comparison between the most recent curricula of England (1999), 
Lower Saxony3l (1996/1997) and Bavaria 32 (1990) with regards to the two 
subjects is limited for the following two reasons. Firstly, the chosen subjects 
are not taught uniformly across the three examined curricula. In England, 
history is only compulsory in key stage three (year seven to nine), while in 
31 Gymnasium curriculum 7-10 Geschichte (Niedersaechsisches Kultusministerium 1996 
Rahmenrichtlinien fuer das Gymnasium Schuljahrgaenge 7-1 0, Geschichte) and Politik 
(Niedersaechsisches Kultusministerium 1997 Rahmenrichtlinien fuer das Gymnasium. 
Schuljahrgaenge 7- 10, Politik) 
32 http: //www. km. bayern. de/km/schule/lehrr)laene/, accessed 21 April 2003 
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Lower Saxony and Bavaria history is statutory until the end of compulsory 
secondary education including year ten. Citizenship on the other hand is now 
compulsory in England in key stage three and four (year seven to eleven). In 
Lower Saxony, on the other hand, politics is only taught in year nine and ten, 
while in Bavaria politiCS33 is only taught in year ten. 
Secondly, the two German curricula are far more detailed than the 
English National Curriculum. German curriculum guidelines for all subjects 
generally include the aims of the subject; a list of statutory contents and some 
non-statutory suggestions for each level; the skills to be developed; an 
indication of suitable teaching methods and often suggestions for cross 
curricular co-operation. In addition, many Under such as Bavaria provide two 
curricula, one framework curriculum, which is comparable to an executive 
summary for all subjects, plus more detailed subject curricula. Lower Saxony 
on the other hand only publishes a framework curriculum. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study, the analysis of both L; 5nder used the framework 
curriculum, which proved to be sufficiently comprehensive and detailed in both 
cases. In England, on the other hand, the curriculum is less structured and 
focuses on knowledge, skills and understanding. It prescribes only the main 
topics or case studies for each key stage, but not the statutory contents. 
Instead, the National Curriculum suggests for each main topic some non- 
statutory contents and suitable cross-referencing with other subjects. The 
curricular analysis for Germany is thus inevitably more detailed than the 
analysis of the English National Curriculum. It must also be noted that the 
selected curricula have different publication dates. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that content analysis is invariably 
subjective to some degree, not only due to the selection of included materials 
as described above, but also as it involves the identification and 
categorisation of key phrases and concepts,, which often has to go beyond the 
mere counting of words and involve the interpretation of text in relation to the 
33 In Bavaria, politics is officially called 'social studies' (not to be confused with social studies 
in Lower Saxony which has a different remit). To avoid confusion, the actual terminology will 
be disregarded and the subject will be uniformly referred to as 'politics' or 'citizenship'. 
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purpose of the document, which somewhat limits the generalisability of the 
findings (Harrison 2001: 118). 
The European dimension in the German curriculum 
To examine the selected German curricula for their European content, it will 
be helpful to recall the aims set out by the German response to the 1988 EC 
Resolution. The KMK stated that it was the task of the schools to impart 
knowledge and understanding of the following key points: 
i) the geographical diversity of Europe with its physical, social and 
economic structures 
2) the political and social structures of Europe 
3) influential historical forces in Europe, especially the development of an 
understanding of justice, the role of the state and freedom in Europe 
4) lines of development, features and evidence of a common European 
culture notwithstanding its diversity 
5) the linguistic diversity of Europe and the cultural richness which this 
represents 
6) the history of the European ideal and integration efforts since 1945 
7) the balance of interests and joint action in Europe to resolve economic, 
environmental, social and political problems 
8) the functions and procedures of European institutions 
(httr): //www. eurvdice. orq, accessed 12 May 2004) 
Although the above tasks were directed at all schools, levels and 
subjects, the following analysis will examine in how far these points have 
been included in the history and politics curriculum. For the purpose of this 
analysis, the selected curricula for history and politics have been searched for 
key words and contents of the points listed above. Key point nine in the table 
below has been adopted in addition to the above list and represents 
references to European identity. 
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Table 6.4 Frequency of key points in the German curricula 
(history) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
History (Lower Saxony) 0 8 9 5 2 2 1 0 4 
History (Bavaria) 0 9 7 3 0 3 1 0 0 
Graph 6.3 Frequency of key points in the German curricula 
(history) 
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In both Bavaria and in Lower Saxony, the history curriculum most often 
addresses the political and social structures of Europe, as well as the 
influential historical forces in Europe. In addition, the development of a 
common European culture is also frequently referred to as are, to a lesser 
extent, the European idea and integration effort in the twentieth century. 
The history curriculum of Lower Saxony also mentions a number of 
times the development of a European identity and discusses the importance 
of the EU in the future. For example, the aims of the Lower Saxony history 
curriculum include discussions on cultural European identity whereby shared 
values and histories are hoped to create a European attachment. The 
curriculum states that history teaching should provide pupils with a stimulus 
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for positive identification with the values of European humanism, human and 
citizenship rights as well as the democratic tradition (NKM 1996: 5). Another 
aim of the history curriculum is to investigate and acknowledge sub-national 
and trans-national identities, thus helping pupils to create their own identity 
while accepting 'others' (NKM 1996: 7-8). 
The history curriculum in Lower Saxony is divided into topic areas with 
statutory themes, which span in chronological order the years seven to ten. 
The topic areas are usually phrased in a European rather than purely national 
context. For example, some of the year seven topics read as follows: 
" The origins of European culture in ancient Greece 
" Medieval ways of life including the European city and the European nature 
of the medieval landscape 
" Religion and politics in the European Middle Ages 
The history curriculum states that many pupils often have prejudices about 
European and non-European cultures. One of the aims of teaching should be 
to address and correct such prejudices and create an understanding for the 
Europe of the future (NKM 1996: 35). Furthermore the curriculum claims that 
the acceptance of the unified Germany in Europe and her position in the 
global community will continue to depend on the way Germans deal with the 
National Socialist past. Previous chapters have already highlighted the 
continued importance of this period in relation to national and European 
attitudes, both in Germany and in England. Both the Bavarian and the Lower 
Saxony history curriculum stress the significance of this topic, which is 
considered to inform the political-historical identity search of young 
generations. In relation to this, another statutory part of the Lower Saxony 
curriculum is a discussion of the traditional nation state, which should guide 
pupils to the realisation that the future requires a new concept of nationality 
and that German unification and European integration need to go hand in 
hand (NIVIK 1996: 54). 
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Similarly, the Bavarian history curriculum presents the EU as a 
preferential alternative to nation states and nationalism. This is a reflection 
and dissemination of the government's commitment to European integration 
as previously discussed. The Bavarian history curriculum is also frequently 
phrased in European terms. For example, the topics for year seven include 
the 'Carolingian Empire as a European power' and 'shared religious 
movements and ways of life as unifying European elements in the Middle 
Ages'. Pupils should understand the development of the Carolingian Empire 
as a form of European unification (BMK 1990). In year ten, pupils learn about 
the European idea, European movement and European integration as 
concrete opportunities for a peaceful co-existence of the European nations, 
although the Bavarian history curriculum lacks the frequent references to 
European identity that can be found in the Lower Saxony curriculum. 
The assessment of the politics curriculum inevitably has to be short as 
the subject is only taught for two years in Lower Saxony and one year in 
Bavaria. In Lower Saxony, the aim of the subject is to equip young people 
with the knowledge and skills needed to engage in society and actively 
participate in political decision making processes (NKM 1997: 4). The 
curriculum acknowledges that years seven to ten are a crucial phase in pupils' 
development, during which their social sensibility and differentiated value 
judgements are strongly developed. 
Table 6.5 Frequency of key points in the German curricula 
(politics) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Politics (Lower Saxony) 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 
Politics (Bavaria) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
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Graph 6.4 Frequency of key points in the German curricula 
(politics) 
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In Lower Saxony, one of the statutory politics topics deals with the past 
and future roles of the European states. According to the curriculum, the idea 
of a unified Europe should be presented to the pupils as a historical chance 
and as a model, in which social differences are eroded while preserving 
cultural identities (NKM 1997: 24). The statutory themes include the European 
integration process, regional/national/international unification as well as peace 
keeping with the help of EU, NATO and the UN. Furthermore, suggested 
contents include the Euro, the European institutions, EU Enlargement, the 
role of the unified Germany in Europe as well as the replacement of national 
sovereignty by European legislation. 
In Bavaria, European integration is part of a statutory topic that deals 
with international organisations. Only at specialised social science 
Gymnasien, the politics curriculum is more detailed and includes issues such 
as the decision making processes and institutions of the European 
Community in year ten (BKM 1990). 
The European dimension in the English curriculum 
Traditionally, the English curriculum has always been referred to as "Anglo- 
centric" and "anti-European" (Savvides 2002: 1). Following the UK's response 
to the 1988 EC Resolution, which emphasised the UK's commitment to a 
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European dimension in education, it could have been expected that the 
National Curriculum, introduced in 1994, displayed a stronger European 
focus. According to the 1991 UK response, the aims of the government 
regarding a European dimension in education include: 
" Help pupils acquire a view of Europe as a multi-cultural, multi-lingual 
community which includes the UK 
" Encourage awareness of the variety of European histories, geographies 
and cultures 
" Prepare pupils to participate in the economic and social development of 
Europe 
" Encourage interest in and improve competence in European languages 
" Provide knowledge about the origins, workings and role of the EC 
" Promote a sense of European identity, through first hand experiences 
where appropriate 
" Promote an awareness of the EC's interdependence with the rest of 
Europe and the world (DES 1991) 
Despite this commitment, it would appear, however, that "... the European 
Dimension has been virtually excluded from the [1994] National Curriculum" 
(Morrell 1996: 1). Savvides (2002: 3) agrees and argues that the government's 
attempt to incorporate a European dimension into the 1994 school curriculum 
remained of low priority with limited effect even in areas such as history, 
geography and modern foreign languages. Similarly, Convery et al (1997: 44- 
45) point out that the European dimension in the 1994 curriculum did not 
feature as a theme in its own right, but was part of 'education for citizenship' 
and an aspect of international awareness. This theme, which was one of five 
cross-curricular themes, was to be related to all subject areas of the 
curriculum. The themes, however, were non-statutory and remained so even 
after the Dearing review in 1993 (see below) (Convery et al 1997: 47). 
Furthermore, although cross-curricular guidance papers on citizenships were 
produced, they were "... ignored and had very little influence at all" (Crick 
2003: 18). Before the introduction of citizenship as a compulsory subject in 
2002, most schools included citizenship and politics teaching in their PSE 
202 
(Personal and Social Education) courses (Convery et al 1997: 45), although 
Kenneth Baker (former Secretary of State for Education and architect of the 
National Curriculum) had favoured making citizenship a compulsory subject (a 
suggestion that was dismissed by Thatcher) (Crick 2003: 18). 34 An 
investigation into some PSE course contents, however, has indicated that 
only a minimum amount of attention was being paid to Europe (Convery et al 
1997: 46). According to Morell (1996: 15) the 1994 curriculum in history had no 
reference to the European Union at all. Although the history curriculum for key 
stage three made reference to the European and world context, the key stage 
four section on the twentieth century made no mention of the EU (Morrell 
1996: 16). 
In 1993, Sir Ron Dearing was appointed to 'slim down' the National 
Curriculum, which resulted in the ditching of history and geography, two of the 
most important subjects in relation to the European dimension, as compulsory 
subjects at key stage four (Savvides 2003: 143). Thus, the key stage four topic 
'European integration between 1945-1970' is now non-compulsory (Convery 
et al 1997: 66). 
In recent years, as the British government has become less apprehensive 
toward the EU, the curriculum has obtained a greater European emphasis 
although educational policy retained an emphasis on British national history 
(Soysal 2002: 3). This is also reflected in the latest revisions of the National 
Curriculum which were published in 1999 for implementation in 2000 
(Convery et al 1997: 143). The revised curriculum includes an increased 
European and international dimension with more statutory requirements for 
teaching about Europe in certain subjects such as history, geography, modern 
foreign languages and (from 2002) citizenship. It also includes more cross- 
curricular themes such as global interdependence and the environment. The 
term 'European dimension' is mentioned for the first time in the handbook for 
primary and secondary teachers, which now also acknowledges the 
34 Lord Baker later was a member of the Advisory Group producing the 1998 Crick Report 
(see below). His involvement was described as "... crucial to the group's decision to advise 
that citizenship must be compulsory" (Crick 2003: 18). 
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importance of creating a European identity. It is stated that the school 
curriculum should: 
contribute to the development of pupils' identities through knowledge and 
understanding of the spiritual, moral, social and cultural heritages of British 
society and the local, national, European, Commonwealth and global 
dimensions of their lives 
develop pupils' awareness, understanding of and respect for their 
environments and secure their commitment to sustainable development at 
a personal, local, national and global level (DfEE 1999d: 1 1). 
It is apparent that the reference to a European dimension is less 
pronounced and more subordinated to a global dimension than in the 
discussed German curricula. As Economou (2003: 124) points out, the British 
view of the European dimension refers "... primarily to the acquisition of 
general knowledge about the different European countries and largely ignore 
the present and future of the EEC/EU and Europe", which is explicitly 
mentioned in the German curricula. 
In relation to history teaching, Savvides (2002: 147) explains that the 1999 
history syllabus has been developed quite considerably and includes now new 
study units which offer pupils a greater world perspective in comparison to the 
1994 curriculum. The WEE (1999c) History Key Stages 1-3 teacher booklet 
lists the following examples which "... indicate specific ways in which teaching 
of history can contribute to learning across the curriculum" (DfEE 1999c: 8). 
History teaching should Include 
" teaching "... the role of national and international organisations 
" "... providing opportunities for pupils to discuss the nature and diversity of 
societies in Britain and the wider world" (DfEE 1999c: 8) 
The history curriculum for key stage three states that pupils are not only to 
learn about British history, but also about u ... key aspects of European and 
world history" (DfEE 1999c: 20). The curriculum list of key knowledge, skills 
and understanding include: 
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0" social, cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of the societies studied, 
both in Britain and the wider world" 
"... to identify trends, both within and across different periods, and links 
between local, British, European and world history" (DfEE 1999c: 20) 
These aspects should be taught, during key stage three, through a range of 
statutory studies, one of which is a European and two are world studies. 
Pupils should be taught "... the history of Britain in its European and wider 
world context" (DfEE 1999c: 20). The European and one of the world studies, 
however, has to be pre-1 914, while the other world study must be after 1900. 
The aim of the twentieth century world study is to teach "... some of the 
significant individuals, events and developments from across the twentieth 
century, including the two World Wars, the Holocaust, the Cold War, and their 
impact on Britain, Europe and the wider world" (DfEE 1999c: 22). 
The curriculum also provides non-statutory suggestions for each study. 
As part of the British studies, pupils may learn about the Crusades, the 
Hundred Years War and relations with other European countries in the 
sixteenth century. Examples for the European study include the Roman 
Empire, the Thirty Years War, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, 
German and Italian Unification or European imperialism in the nineteenth 
century. The twentieth century world study includes examples such as the 
Western Front in the First World War; National Socialism in Germany; the 
study of individuals such as Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Gandhi, Mao 
Zedong or Martin Luther King; the fall of the Berlin Wall as well as the 
development of the European Union. 
These suggestions are optional and it is left to the school and the 
individual teachers to decide which examples are being studied (see Chapter 
Seven for a further discussion on implementation). As Savvides (2003: 149) 
points out, there is a possibility that some teachers will choose to ignore some 
or all of them. Therefore teachers may or may not decide to teach about the 
European Union. Furthermore, although the understanding of different 
cultures is a firm part of the curriculum, the emphasis, however, is often 
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international rather than European. In addition, most of the European 
individuals suggested for study are associated with the Second World War 
which does not necessarily promote a positive image of fellow Europeans and 
European countries. 
From 2002, citizenship has become statutory at key stage three and four. 
The decision to include citizenship was taken by the government in 1997, who 
commissioned an independent committee to work out the details. These were 
published in 1998 in the Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of 
Democracy in Schools report (the so-called Crick Report) (Crick 2003: 16). As 
Crick (2003: 16-17) points out, Britain was the last country in Europe to add 
citizenship to the curriculum, although the debate dates back to the 1970s 
when a voluntary movement campaigned for "education for political literacy". 
In the 1970s, Bernard Crick was a leading figure in this campaign, which was 
supported by the Hansard Society35 (Frazer 2003: 66). Generally, in the 
1970s, the drive for political education was prompted by the 1969 People Act 
which lowered the age of majority to 18 (Frazer 2003: 68). The campaign 
asserted that "... it is the need and right of every pupil in school and young 
adult in further education to receive a balanced and realistic political 
education [ ... ] primarily in terms of developing the knowledge, skill and 
disposition that we have called 'political literacy' (Crick and Porter 1978: 27). 
As already pointed out, however, citizenship education was not included in 
the National Curriculum as a statutory subject and was limited to a cross- 
curricular theme until 2002. As Crick (2003: 18) explains, by the late 1990s the 
"time was ripe" for the introduction of citizenship education as the "... common 
man was replacing the gentlemen as the preferred social image". Crick 
(20003: 18) further considers the enthusiasm of the then Secretary of State for 
Education (David Blunkett) as crucial for the acceptance of the 
recommendations made by the 1998 Crick Report. The report defines 
citizenship education as: 
35.... an independent, non-partisan educational charity, which exists to promote effective 
parliamentary democracy" (htti): //www. hansardsoceity. or-q. uk, accessed 14 March 2007) 
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"... the knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of 
participative democracy; the duties, responsibilities, rights and 
development of pupils into citizens; and the value [ ... ] of involvement in the 
local and wider community ... both national and local [ ... ] and the 
relationship of formal political activity to civil society in the context of the 
United Kingdom and Europe; and an awareness of world affairs and global 
issues" (Crick Report 1998: 22). 
These recommendations are reflected in the new citizenship curriculum 
and in the 1999 WEE Teachers Handbook on Citizenship, which states that 
the "... knowledge, skills and understanding in the programme of study identify 
the aspects of citizenship in which pupils make progress [as] 
" becoming informed citizens 
" developing skills of enquiry and communication 
" developing skills of participation and responsible action" (DfEE 1999a: 6) 
In key stage three, one of the aspects of becoming informed citizens is the 
study of "... the world as a global community, and the political, economic, 
environmental and social implication of this, and the role of the European 
Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations" (DfEE 1999a: 14). In key 
stage four, teaching should include " ... the opportunities for individuals and 
voluntary groups to bring about social change locally, nationally, in Europe 
and internationally" as well as "... the United Kingdom's relations in Europe, 
including the European Union, and relations with the Commonwealth and the 
United Nations" (DfEE 1999a: 15). 
In sum, as Savvides (2003: 154) concludes, in England the European 
dimension was firstly introduced in the 1999 revised curriculum in subjects 
such as history, geography and modern foreign languages, although it is still 
missing from many other subjects. Although the new curriculum makes 
suggestions for more European topics, Savvides points out (2003: 148) that, 
as most teachers are not specialised in European history and the topics are 
207 
kept rather vague, it will be difficult for teachers to know what to teach in 
relation to this topic. 
6.8 Defining the European Dimension 
Understanding the concept 'European dimension' in teaching appears to be a 
general problem that persists despite the efforts of European and national 
bodies to provide a workable definition. As Savvides (2002: 4) points out, the 
lack of a definition for educational purposes poses a real problem for theorists 
and practitioners alike. Most schools and teachers would "... want a realistic 
definition, which they can interpret to suit their particular school situation" 
(Shennan 1991: 27). Convery et al (1997: 87) found in their 1994 study among 
trainee teachers that although almost half of the respondents were confident 
that they understood the European dimension in the 1994 National 
Curriculum, a similar number felt uncertain or not sure at all. The findings of 
the present study, which will be discussed in the following chapter, are even 
more discouraging. Half the German and nearly 60% of the English subject 
teachers complained that the lack of a clear definition made the 
implementation of a European dimension difficult. The surveyed head 
teachers even considered the lack of definition to be the most often 
encountered problem when trying to implement a European dimension 
despite the extensive suggestions provided in the curricula as highlighted 
above. 
Both researchers and governmental institutions have long recognised 
this dilemma and have made attempts to define the European dimension for 
educational purposes although some or even most of the suggestions tend to 
be vague and therefore not particularly helpful. The Council of Europe's 
Guidelines on European Awareness (1983) for example recommended that 
knowledge should reflect what is intrinsically distinctive or even unique of 
Europe. Another suggestion is that a European dimension could include 
learning about aspects of Europe's past (relationships and links between 
member states), the present as well as its future (shared common interests) 
(Feneyrou 1993: 32). The curriculum should highlight the distinctive character 
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of Europe's past, whereby common experiences should take precedence over 
divisive factors such as European wars. 
It could be summarised that a curriculum with "... an effective European 
dimension" would incorporate the compulsory teaching of at least one modern 
European language, the cultural differences and similarities of the European 
nations, the history of Europe (with emphasis on postwar European 
integration), European geography, the roles of European citizens (fostering a 
sense of European identity), common European values as well as the EU 
institutions and policies (Savvides 2002: 4). Thus, pupils should learn about 
Europe and its member states as well as the meaning of living and working in 
Europe and being a European (Savvides 2002: 5). 
The concept that Shennan (1991: 27) adopts, attempts to take into 
account some of the complexities of Europe. Shennan (1991: 27) pictures 
Europe as a concept of time (history), area (geography) and culture. These 
concepts would be applied to education through skills (learning for life within 
Europe), knowledge (learning about Europe) and attitudes/values (learning 
through Europe). 'Europe' in this sense does not simply refer to the 
(changing) boundaries of the EU. 
This overview, albeit brief, shows that definitions of a European 
dimension tend to be prone to numerous interpretations. This is a reflection of 
the EU approach to education which places the responsibility for education 
and the European dimension firmly with the national governments, who in turn 
often delegate the implementation of educational policies further to regional or 
local levels. Both the EU and many of the national governments are careful to 
avoid too prescriptive formulae, which often results in general confusion 
among education administrators as well as practitioners such as head and 
subject teachers. Not surprisingly, Convery et al (1996: 55) ask if the lack of a 
clear definition of the European dimension and the lack of central directives 
about its value may be causing the conditions for procrastination. The 
purpose of the following chapter is to explore this question and some of the 
other issues surrounding the practical implementation of a European 
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dimension, using findings from a case study, which has been conducted 
among German and English subject and head teachers, on whom the 
realisation of European or governmental intentions regarding a 'European 
education' often depends. 
6.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored some issues relating to the European dimension in 
education as a possible means to stimulate and foster a European identity 
among young people and future generations of Europeans. The concept is not 
new. Mass education systems have been used at least since the nineteenth 
century by nation states as key political socialisation agents and promoters of 
national identity. Other important facilitators in the process of national 
establishment and fortification included a standardised language and culture 
as well as the mass media. After the EU acknowledged that some form of 
European identity could boost popular support for and popular legitimacy of 
the EU, it has modelled its attempts to create a European identity largely on 
traditional nation state methodology. This, however, is not unproblematic for 
a number of reasons. 
For example, the EU has so far failed to put forward a distinct and 
generally accepted definition of European identity as discussed in Chapter 
Five. Some attempts to generate a European identity, such as the use of 
European symbols and iconography as well as references to shared 
European values appeal to those who support a cultural European identity. 
The attempt to find shared values, historical roots and symbols seems to try to 
establish a 'European myth', or imagined European community to use 
Anderson's (1991) terminology, which mimics the creation of national myths. 
On the other side, it is often argued that a European dimension should be 
incorporated because the EU needs informed citizens who know about their 
rights and obligations as European citizens. Such argumentation appeals to 
those who favour a civic definition of European identity. Thus, the vague 
nature of European identity invariably means that any recommendation 
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relating to its creation as well as their implementation, for example through a 
European dimension in education, will be equally ill-defined. 
Secondly, the above mentioned facilitators of national identity cannot 
simply be transferred to the European sphere. Since the EU motto is 'unity in 
diversity', a standardised culture and language would be undesirable and 
unpopular. Furthermore, and quite essentially, the EU has no formal 
responsibility in the field of education, culture or the mass media, all of which 
are controlled and organised nationally. Any attempt to incorporate European 
elements, for example in education, is the decision and responsibility of the 
member states. The EU role in education is restricted to issuing 
recommendations and proposals. The member state responses to these 
recommendations depend to a considerable degree on the popular and 
governmental attitude to European integration and European identity in 
relation to national identity. 
To analyse this further, this chapter has analysed some of the relevant 
German and English (British) government publications as well as selected 
German curricula and the English National Curriculum for references to the 
European dimension in education. The bulk of the publication analysis 
focussed on the governmental response to the 1988 EC Resolution on the 
European Dimension in Education. The curricular analysis concentrated on 
the subjects of history and citizenship in compulsory secondary education in 
the selected sample. In general, the German response to the 1988 EC 
Resolution was considerably more pro-European and was based on existing 
policies regarding a European dimension in education. This commitment to a 
European dimension in education, which existed in Germany since the 1970s, 
emphasises the overall pro-European attitude in Germany, which has been 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
The British response to the 1988 EC Resolution appears to be similar, 
albeit not as detailed and less prescriptive. Retrospective analysis, however, 
shows that many of the proposals put forward by the British response have 
not materialised or have ceased to exist. The general, more reserved, attitude 
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to a European dimension in education is also reflected in the English National 
Curriculum, which hardly refers to European elements. The focus of the 
English National Curriculum is more on an international dimension. The 
assessed German curricula, by comparison, show a much more pro-active 
attitude to the European dimension in education by assigning education a vital 
role in creating a European identity. Furthermore, the terminology used 
throughout the analysed German curricula has a significantly stronger 
European orientation. While in Germany many European themes are 
statutory, this is not the case in England since the English curriculum is 
considerably less prescriptive and therefore less detailed. In England, 
teachers have more freedom to choose teaching content, which invariably has 
implications for the implementation of a European dimension. These 
implications, as well as other aspects of the practical implementation of the 
European dimension in education, will be analysed in the next chapter. 
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7. Implementing a European dimension in education 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the. foundations of a European dimension in 
education as outlined in EU and governmental guidelines as well as sample 
curricula in England and Germany. EU educational guidelines usually 
consider the rationale for a more European education to be the provision of 
informed citizens; the preparation of young people for life and work in the EU; 
the fostering of support for European integration and laying the foundations 
for a European identity. Based on the 1988 EC Resolution on the European 
Dimension in Education, the member states were invited to integrate 
European elements in their curricula and educational policies, which, as the 
previous chapter has shown, was taken up to varying degrees. The extent to 
which a European dimension was integrated by Germany and England has 
been influenced at least partly by national attitudes towards European 
integration. In England, a latent desire to safeguard national sovereignty and 
identity, as discussed in Chapter Five, has resulted in a certain reluctance to 
Europeanise educational policy, while in Germany a different attitude to 
national identity has resulted in generally more integrationist policies, 
including in the sphere of education. 
The previous chapter has shown that education appears to have an 
influence on young people's attitudes towards Europe. Previous research has 
identified schools as one of the three most important information sources 
about Europe and the EU. In addition, Eurobarometer findings suggest that 
people with higher educational qualifications are more likely to support 
European integration, although, as pointed out before, a causal relationship 
cannot be assumed. Convery et al (1997) have found that the majority of 
young people tend to be interested in Europe and would like to learn more. 
Convery et al (1997) also indicated that the majority of German children 
already feel to some degree European, which, however, is not the case in 
England. 
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Since the member states remain in charge of the education systems 
while the role of the EU is restricted to making recommendations, Soysal 
(2002: 12) claims that so far the attempts of the EU to "Europeanise" 
education have remained largely ineffective. The member states responses to 
the 1988 EC Resolution made it clear that "... in general terms, the main 
emphasis in almost all the countries was on the provision of European content 
within traditional subject areas: learning about Europe rather than learning to 
be Europeans" (Ryba 1992: 15). However, what pupils learn at school about 
Europe does not only depend on the curriculum and on general educational 
policies, but to a considerable degree on the individual schools and teachers. 
This reliance on the local level to implement a European dimension in 
teaching seems to be a particular issue in England, although German 
teachers and schools also have some freedom within the curriculum to 
specialise and select teaching content. 
Since both subject and head teachers are key stake holders in the 
practical implementation of a European dimension, a case study has been 
conducted in Germany and England to gain an insight into a range of topics 
that may affect whether or not European elements are being taught. The 
overall aim of the study was to establish if any significant differences exist 
between England and Germany in relation to, for example, which elements 
are considered by the teachers to be components of a European dimension 
and what is actually being taught or offered by the school. Special emphasis 
has been placed on an investigation of teacher training and knowledge as well 
as personal attitudes to a European dimension in education. Furthermore, 
teachers were asked about any problems they encountered in relation to 
European aspects in teaching. Earlier studies have identified a number of 
potential problems and one of the aims of this study is to establish if any of 
these previously identified problems persist. 
7.2 Methodology 
For the purpose of this study, a questionnaire based survey has been carried 
out among German and English subject and head teachers. Two similar 
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questionnaires were designed, one for subject teachers and one for head 
teachers whereby the head teachers were asked more open-ended questions 
concerning the European dimension at their school. The draft questionnaire 
was presented to a focus group of researchers, teachers and lecturers while 
the German translation was checked by native German speakers. The 
questionnaires were then piloted with a small sample of teachers, lecturers 
and researchers in order to eliminate potential sources of unreliability caused 
by errors in the research design, as well as to check the questionnaires for 
construct and content validity (Harrison 2001: 27). This was particularly 
important as the topic of the research (European dimension) is in itself an 
ambiguous and ill-defined concept, which made a clear terminology even 
more crucial. 
The questionnaires were then dispatched to a sample of two hundred 
Gymnasien in Germany and two hundred secondary comprehensive schools 
in England, which have been chosen at random from online school listings. As 
neither Bavaria nor Lower Saxony has a significant number of comprehensive 
schools, 36 which would have enabled a more direct comparison with England, 
it was decided to focus on the Gymnasium, as explained in Chapter Six. 
The survey was carried out with one hundred English and one hundred 
German head teacherS37 as well as two hundred subject teachers in each 
country with the following distribution: 
4, one hundred English subject teachers (citizenship) 
" one hundred English subject teachers (history) 
" one hundred German subject teachers (history)38 
" one hundred German subject teachers (politiCS)39 
As the study's focus is on compulsory secondary schooling, the teacher 
questionnaire was addressed to subject teachers in key stage three and four 
36 Comprehensive schools were only adopted as a mainstream school form in some German 
Under 
37 fifty each from Bavaria and Lower Saxony 
38 fifty each from Bavaria and Lower Saxony 
39 fifty each from Bavaria and Lower Saxony 
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(Germany year seven to ten). A copy of the English questionnaire for subject 
and for head teachers can be found in Appendix 11. 
Each questionnaire was accompanied by an introductory letter and a 
return envelope. The survey was conducted without reminders, which would 
have been too cost expensive. The questionnaires were sent out after the 
school Easter vacation at the end of April 2004, stipulating a two week return 
deadline (slightly longer for Germany to account for postal delivery times). 
The overall response rate of the study exceeded 30%, which is 
acceptable and adequate since the purpose of this case study was to gain an 
insight and not to make valid generalisations to the rest of the population 
(DIIA 2006). 
Table 7.1: Response rate 
England Germany 
Head teachers 36% (n=36) 53% (n=53) 
Subject teachers 31.5% (n=63) 50.5% (n=101) 
43.4% of the German head teachers were from Bavaria and 43.3% 
from Lower Saxony (13.2% unknown) while 50% of German subject teachers 
were from Bavaria and 44.9% from Lower Saxony (5.1% unknown). As 
discussed in Chapter Six, the two German Under have been chosen to 
increase the representativeness of the German sample and it is therefore not 
intended to assess comparatively the results of both Under. Please note that 
the tables for this chapter, if not printed in the text, can be found in Appendix 1. 
The majority of the English teachers responding to the questionnaire 
taught history, while the majority of German subject teachers taught both 
history and politiCS. 40 Thus it would appear that in Germany the subjects of 
history and politics are usually taught by the same teacher at the school, 
which may result in greater content co-ordination between the two subjects. In 
40 see table 7.2 
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addition, a total of sixteen English and forty-seven German subject teachers 
stated that they were also teaching a variety of other subjects. The majority of 
head teachers (63.9% in England and 86.5% in Germany) were also teaching 
a range of subjects at their school. 
The gender and age profile of the respondents differed considerably. 
The vast majority of German (70.1%), but only 43.9% of English subject 
teachers were male while less than one third of head teachers (32.3% in 
England and 20.6% in Germany) were female . 
41 Both German head and 
subject teachers are generally older than their English colleagues. 61 % of the 
German and around 20% of English subject teachers were over fifty years 
old. 42 By comparison, half of the English and nearly all German (91%) head 
teachers were aged fifty or over. 43 Both the gender and the age profile seem 
to have an impact on the teachers' attitudes towards a European dimension. 
Younger teachers tended to be more likely to include a European dimension 
than their older colleagues, while overall female teachers were less likely to 
include European elements. The latest Eurobarometer 64 (European 
Commission, UK Executive summary 2005: 4) provided similar results. In the 
UK, for example, men as well as younger people were found to be more 
enthusiastic about the EU than women and older generations. 
7.3 Attitudes to a European dimension in teaching 
Importance of a European dimension 
The teachers have been asked which importance they assign to a European 
dimension in teaching, both in general and in their specific subject area. The 
findings show that generally the vast majority of both English and German 
subject teachers described European aspects in education as important, 44 
although German teachers valued them significantly more than their English 
colleagues. While only one in eight English teachers thought that European 
elements in education are very important, this figure rose to around one in 
41 nineteen German respondents preferred not to answer this question 42 
see table 7.3 43 
see table 7.4 " see table 7.5 
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three German teachers. Equally, over 20% of the English but only 3% of the 
German teachers thought that European elements had no particular 
importance as the following graph illustrates: 
Graph 7.1 Importance of a European dimension in general 
(subject teachers) (%) 
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Similarly, while all German head teachers generally believed that 
European aspects in teaching are important, nearly one in seven of their 
English colleagues did not share this opinion. 45 
45 
see table 7.6 
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Graph 7.2 Importance of a European dimension in general 
(head teachers) (%) 
Importance of a European dimension in general 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Very important important Neither Not wry important Not at all important 
o England o Germany 
It could have been expected that subject teachers may consider 
European elements in their subject area to be more important than in general 
teaching since both politics and history are considered to be key subjects for 
the 'Europeanisation' of education. This has been confirmed by the findings of 
this stud Y. 46 
Graph 7.3 Importance of a European dimension in the subject area 
(subject teachers) (%) 
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46 
see table 7.7 
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As before, the German subject teachers deemed the European 
dimension in their subject area as decidedly more important than their English 
colleagues. Nearly every second German but only around every third English 
teacher believed that European aspects are very important in their subject 
area. On the other side, nearly 13% of English but only 1% of German 
teachers dismissed European elements in their subject area as not important. 
Graph 7.4 Importance of a European dimension at the school 
(head teachers) (%) 
Importance of a European dimension at the school 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
CL 40% 
30% 
20% 
10% L 
0% F771 
< 
z ID 3z ý0 
0 ID 
;3 ý2 
0 =` 
;L 1ý 
0Z 
;LI 
0 
;L 
c3 England o Germany 
The findings also show that head teachers thought that European 
aspects at their school were less important than in general teaching. 47 
German head teachers, however, valued the European dimension at their 
school more than English head teachers. Nearly one fifth of English but only 
around 4% of German head teachers attached no particular importance to 
European elements and thus may have given them a comparatively low 
priority at their school. 
The reasons for the different ratings of European aspects varied 
considerably whereby, in general, German teachers provided more elaborate 
answers which tended to be more pro-European. 48 Generally, the reasons 
47 
see table 7.8 
48 in total, forty-three reasons from English subject teachers and 120 from German subject 
teachers 
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given by subject teachers in support for a European dimension in teaching 
can be categorised as follows: 
Graph 7.5 Reasons for the importance of a European dimension 
(subject teachers) 
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a) Economy/ work opportunities. Some teachers, especially in 
Germany, thought that a European dimension in education is 
important to prepare pupils for life and work in the EU and to 
increase their careers chances. 
b) Global orientation. Many pro-European comments made by 
English teachers tend to mirror the English National Curriculum and 
other government guidelines by generally incorporating European 
elements into a global dimension. German teachers, on the other 
hand, seem to consider global and European aspects as distinct 
features. Some German teachers stressed that the EU should be 
strengthened as a counterweight to the USA. 
C) Knowledge of other countries/cultures, to teach tolerance. This 
was the second most important reason given by German teachers 
to support a European dimension. Emphasis was placed on 
teaching tolerance and fostering international understanding 
(Vd1kerverst6ndigung). Tolerance and understanding of other 
cultures was important to some English teachers, who also stressed 
Reasons for the importance of a European dimension 
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the role of education to counter prejudices and improve race 
relations. 
d) Political understanding, influence of EU on political life. 
Understanding European politics and the role of the EU was for 
teachers in both countries the most important reason to include a 
European dimension. English teachers thought that political 
awareness is important and that pupils should understand "how 
things worW'. A few mentioned that "European politics" was part of 
the citizenship curriculum. The German responses were similar 
although in general more pro-European. Many expressed the 
feeling that teaching about European politics is not just a curricular 
requirement but a vital part of education to prepare pupils for their 
roles as European citizens. Pupils should be made aware of the 
current role of the EU and should understand how European 
integration offers new options and how pupils can actively create 
their European environment. Many German teachers pointed out 
that national politics can nowadays only be taught in the European 
context. 
e) European history (history of other member states, historical links 
or history of the EU). Those English teachers, who thought that a 
European element in history is important, stressed that national 
history should be taught by examining links to other countries. 
Emphasis seems to remain on national history, but Britain's place in 
Europe is considered by some as important. However, the few 
examples provided are largely limited to the two world wars in the 
twentieth century. As discussed in Chapter Six, previous research 
has pointed out that English history teaching tends to emphasise 
periods or aspects of European history that often create negative 
images of other European countries. As one English teacher 
pointed out, history tends to concentrate on "... war and conflict in 
Europe, rather than integration". In comparison, German teachers 
focused on those European elements in history teaching, which 
make pupils aware of shared values and experiences. This does no 
simply mean that national history should be taught in context to 
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other countries, but that a 'European history' in its own right as well 
as historical European links and roots should be taught. As one 
teacher put it, pupils should understand "... Europe as a historic- 
cultural community". 
f) Proactive teaching: creation of European identity and support 
for a shared European future, overcoming nationalism. This 
was one of the main reasons for German teachers to support a 
European dimension in teaching. Many considered the creation of a 
European identity to be a principal aim of teaching. Under 
consideration of historical experiences, many teachers believed that 
European identity needed to be developed as an alternative to and 
replacement of nationalism and national identity; although some 
hoped that national and regional identities could continue to exist as 
part of a wider European orientation. Nevertheless, the dismantling 
of any form of nationalism was of crucial importance to many, 
reflecting the general popular and governmental post-war German 
attitude to national identity and the search for alternative 
identifications. In addition, one German teacher explained that 
without a European identity the further political development of the 
EU would be impossible. Quite a few German teachers believed 
that "a shared European future" is the only possible way forward 
and that the nation state should be overcome in order to enable 
European union. In total, two English teachers also mentioned 
European identity, but more broadly in relation to making pupils 
aware of their European identity, rather than actively promoting and 
encouraging such an identity. Regarding Ryba's (1992: 15) 
statement that the emphasis in most EU member states is on 
teaching about Europe and not teaching pupils to be Europeans, it 
would appear that English teachers tend to concentrate on raising 
awareness and teaching about Europe while the German approach 
is somewhat more pro-actively trying to create Europeans. This 
would appear to be successful in so far that German pupils tend to 
feel significantly more European than English pupils. Further 
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research into causal relationships is needed since education is not 
the only agent that informs pupils attitudes to Europe and the EU. 
g) Teaching of a European dimension to secure peace. Only 
German teachers commented on the importance of European 
elements and European integration to secure peace in Europe and 
ensure that "... wars are a thing of the past". 
h) Preparation for an increased role of the EU in the future. Again, 
this was purely a German reason for supporting a European 
dimension. Many teachers believed that the EU will inevitably have 
an increased role in the future and that a "united Europe" is rather 
likely. Education thus needs to prepare pupils for their European 
future. The role of the EU in future will be discussed in more detail 
further on. 
Some subject teachers opposed a European dimension in teaching for 
varied reasons. A few English teachers referred to time constraints and 
curriculum pressures, while another pointed out that European issues are 
irrelevant to pupils, who "find it difficult to relate" and consider politics to be 
"boring". Another English teacher believed that "... overall there are more 
important issues in children's education". Only one German teacher argued 
that a more comprehensive coverage of European elements was not possible 
due to curriculum constraints while another thought that the desirability of a 
'blanket Europeanisation'of all aspects of life might be questionable. 
The head teacher's reasons for supporting a European dimension were 
slightly different: 
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Graph 7.6 Reasons for the importance of a European dimension 
(head teachers) 
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The majority of English head teachers stressed the importance of a 
global dimension, which may incorporate European elements. As one head 
teacher put it: "... we are more concerned with a global (including European) 
dimension rather than being Euro-centred". Emphasis is usually placed on 
raising awareness of European and global issues, broadening horizons and 
understanding other cultures. Political understanding is also considered 
important, although again the emphasis is on making pupils aware of their 
country's position in Europe. A couple of English head teachers argued that 
pupils should have some understanding of European issues since Europe 
would play an important part in their country's future. As one head teacher 
claimed, school teaching needs to "... ensure students understand their 
European context and their rights and responsibilities as citizens of Europe". 
In contrast, both the language and terminology used by both German 
head and subject teachers differed from that of their English counterparts in 
certain ways. The majority of German respondents seemed to embrace a 
European dimension as a necessicity to prepare pupils for their role in a more 
integrated or even united Europe. Their attitude echoed the language used by 
the curricula (especially in Lower Saxony) as outlined in Chapter Six. Further 
European integration and political union were considered by many as 
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inevitable but welcome developments, which, as one German head teacher 
put it "... must urgently be accompanied and complemented by an integration 
of minds and hearts". Therefore both German head and subject teachers tend 
to regard European integration as a viable and welcome alternative to 
nationalism as discussed in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, a couple of German 
head teachers also pointed out that the pupil's 'own' identity (often understood 
as a regional rather than national identity) should be preserved as part of an 
overall European orientation. Still, the majority considered a European 
dimension at school to be imperative in order to enable future European 
integration in terms of cultural integration (understanding, tolerance and 
acceptance) and European identity formation. Quite a few German head 
teachers mentioned that their school has the status of Europaschule '49 and 
thus, as one respondent expressed it, "... the European dimension is tradition 
at our school". By comparison, none of the English head teachers referred to 
the European dimension in teaching as an agent for furthering European 
integration or European identity. 
In addition, several German head teachers believed that schools need 
to teach pupils about shared European historical roots, especially in relation to 
the past destructive force of nation states, and how Europe must now co- 
operate in order to avoid future conflicts. A few head teachers in both 
countries also stressed the importance of teaching about Europe for the future 
careers of the pupils on the European market. 
Overall, only very few head teachers opposed a European dimension. 
Their reasons were mostly related to time constraints due to an already 
overloaded curriculum (in the case of the English head teachers), whereas a 
couple of German head teachers criticised that their school did not quite 
include as many European elements as could be desired. Despite the 
difference in attitudes, the vast majority of subject and head teachers were 
committed to teaching a European dimension with no significant differences 
49 
see Chapter Six 
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between the English and the German responseS50 or between age and 
gender groups. In general, English head teachers tended to be slightly less 
committed than their German colleagues. 
7.4 Implementing a European dimension 
Despite the overall commitment to European aspects in teaching, differences 
as to what is actually being taught by subject teachers are likely to occur 
especially considering the ambiguous and vaguely defined nature of 'the 
European dimension' as pointed out in the previous chapter. In general, the 
majority of both English (80%) and German subject teachers (79%) believe 
that their teaching has a European dimension . 
51 Furthermore, of those who 
are not yet including European elements, 69% of English and 90.5% of 
German teachers would like to do so. 
To further assess what teachers actually teach within the broad label of 
a 'European dimension', the subject teachers were presented with a list of 
potential European aspects and asked to indicate which, if any, they teach. 
Teachers were also asked how important they consider the different elements 
to be. 52 
so see table 7.19 and 7.20 
51 see table 7.18 
52 see table 7.21 and 7.22 
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Graph 7.7 Importance of a European dimension in teaching (subject 
teachers) Germany (%) 
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Graph 7.8 Importance of a European dimension in teaching (subject 
teachers) England (%) 
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As illustrated by the graphs, both German and English teachers 
considered European languages to be the most important contributor to a 
European dimension, followed by discussions on European identity (England) 
and European exchanges as well as the history of European integration 
(Germany). At the other end of the scale, special European projects were 
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generally considered to be least important. Overall, significantly more 
German teachers regarded all European elements (apart from European 
special projects) as important and were also more likely to include them in 
their teaching. 
For example, over 80% of German but only 28% of English teachers 
included the history of European integration. Similarly, 77% of German in 
comparison to 37% of English teachers covered the EU institutions . 
53 Bearing 
in mind that the sample consisted of history and citizenship teachers, it is 
perhaps not surprising that not many included European languages in their 
teaching. Discussion on European identity, however, as well as European 
citizenship rights or EU institutions, which could have been expected in 
citizenship teaching, were included by only just over a third of English 
teachers. The element most commonly taught by English teachers was the 
history of other EU member states. The following graph illustrates the 
percentage of teachers in each country who offer a selection of proposed 
European aspects: 
Graph 7.9 European elements included in teaching (%) 
53 see table 7.23 
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In addition to these proposed elements, a couple of English teachers 
also taught human rights issues, migration and European laws as elements of 
a European orientation. German teachers provided more varied examples of 
additional European elements. They included teaching about recent 
developments in European integration; conflicts between national and 
European politics; the common foreign and defence policy; the Euro; the 
subsidiarity principle; practical aspects of European integration (studying 
abroad etc); models for the future; European economy and ecology; an 
integrated approach to history (how the European states have influenced 
each other); EU policies in relation to individual member states; shared 
European culture and European elections. Some teachers also mentioned 
specific European projects such as the publication of an English school 
newspaper, European competitions, COMENIUS54projects, arrangements for 
work placements abroad and school partnerships. 
The head teachers' opinions were similar. Both German and English 
head teachers generally agreed that European languages, European 
exchanges and special European projects were the most important aspects of 
a European dimension. 55 German head teachers, however, valued teaching 
about EU institutions as well as European exchanges significantly more than 
their English counterparts. 
54 COMENIUS focuses on education (from pre-school and primary to secondary school) and 
supports " ... school partnerships, projects for the training of school education staff, and school 
education networks. It thus aims to enhance the quality of teaching, strengthen its European 
dimension and promote language learning and mobility" (hftD: //ec. europa. eu, accessed 10 
July 2006). 
55 see table 7.24 and 7.25 
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Graph 7.10 European dimension in teaching (head teachers) Germany 
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Graph 7.11 European dimension in teaching (head teachers) England 
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Significantly more German (85%) than English head teachers (74%) 
believed that their school overall had a European dimension 56 mostly in the 
form of exchanges, which were offered by 62% of the English and all of the 
56 
see table 7.26 
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European dimension in teaching (head teachers) England 
German school. 57 English schools most often had exchanges with France and 
Germany and to a lesser extent with Italy and Spain. Similarly, the majority of 
the German exchanges took place with England and France, but Spain, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Poland as well as other East European countries were also 
on offer. In general, the German exchange programme was more diverse with 
a stronger East European focus, which was virtually non-existent at the 
surveyed English schools. A likely explanation for the popularity of exchanges 
with East Europe is the close proximity of Germany to countries such as 
Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary. Apart from exchanges, seventeen 
English as well as eight German head teachers also mentioned other trips 
abroad, ranging from ski and shopping excursions to non-exchange language 
and study stays abroad. It may be possible to infer that while German schools 
focus on exchanges, English schools tend to offer more non-exchange trips 
abroad, but this would need to be investigated further. 
Extra-curricular activities also included a variety of special projects with 
a European focus. Seven English head teachers mentioned collaborative 
special art or music projects, while twenty-one German head teachers listed 
for example European weeks and European collaboration projects as well as 
special talks and seminars on European topics. Ten of the German and three 
of the English schools offered COMENIUS projects/exchanges while four 
German schools also participated in European competitions. Eight of the 
German and two of the English head teachers mentioned their European 
school contacts or partner schools. It is of course possible that more schools 
offered exchanges or European projects, however, not all head teachers 
provided a comprehensive list of European elements at their school. It is also 
likely that head teachers' understanding of a 'European dimension' varied 
given the ambiguities of this concept. 
Apart from exchanges, the second most often mentioned contributor to 
a European dimension at school was the curriculum. The majority of English 
head teachers, who thought that their school's curriculum contained European 
57 in total twenty-four English and forty-eight German head teachers provided details about 
the European dimension at their school 
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elements, referred to specific parts of the curriculum such as "European 
geography", "history in year eight', "looking at links between English and 
European history", "using European statistics for maths exercises" and so 
forth. In comparison, the majority of German head teachers tended to 
consider the entire curriculum to contribute to the European dimension. As 
one German head teacher put it: ".. Jin order to include a European dimension 
in teaching] it really would be enough to teach the curriculum. Europe has an 
important role in most subjects". 
The responses of many German head teachers, however, denote that 
the curriculum as such is not considered part of the school's European 
dimension. This is most likely due to the fact that most German head teachers 
restricted their responses to non-compulsory European elements at their 
school, which are offered in addition to the curriculum (such as exchanges, 
projects etc). The compulsory European aspects of the curriculum, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, almost seem to be taken for granted by 
many head teachers to the point that they are not considered worth 
mentioning as 'special' European elements. English respondents, by contrast, 
tend to list anything with a global or European orientation including specific 
lesson examples. 
An example of this would be language teaching. Only a minority of 
fifteen German head teachers mentioned foreign language teaching as part of 
their schools European dimension. Their responses were mostly limited to 
extra-curricular language offers such as Spanish, Italian or East European 
languages as well as bilingual teaching (which was mentioned by seven 
German head teachers). Hardly anyone, however, referred to the core 
curriculum foreign languages, such as English, which is nevertheless 
compulsory at all schools in the sample. Therefore, it may be possible to 
deduce that statutory language teaching is taken for granted and as such not 
considered to be part of the school's European dimension. By contrast, the 
English head teachers, who thought that languages were part of their school's 
European aspect, referred almost entirely to core modern foreign language 
teaching. Only a few head teachers, mostly from specialist language schools, 
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gave examples of additional language offers such as Spanish or Italian. The 
language specialist schools also tended to offer more exchanges, language 
trips and other European related projects than other schools. 
This following table shows which subjects are most likely considered by 
the head teachers to include European elements: 
Table 7.27: Subjects most likely to include a European dimension 
England Germany 
Subject % Subject % 
English 44.4 German 28.3 
Modern languages 94.4 Modern languages 96.2 
Maths 11.1 Maths 0 
Science 19.4 Science 5.7 
Citizenship 83.3 Social Stud ies/Pol itics 69.8 
History 88.9 History 84.9 
Art 66.7 Art 32.1 
Geography 72.2 Geography 62.3 
PE 16.7 Sport 1.9 
Music 44.4 Music 15.1 
Religious Education 47.2 Religion/Ethics 7.5 
Design and Technology 16.7 
ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology) 
25 
Head teachers in both countries agreed that the subjects most likely to 
include European elements were modern foreign languages, history and 
citizenship/politics. English head teachers, however, believed that many 
subjects (such as PE, Music, Religious Education, Science, Art and Maths) 
incorporated European aspects, while their German counterparts hardly 
selected these subjects at all. This may again originate in the different 
understanding of the European dimension in the curriculum and at the school 
as discussed above. 
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7.5 Barriers to the implementation of a European dimension 
As already examined in the previous chapter, one of the main problems with 
the practical implementation of a European dimension is the lack of a clear 
definition of this concept. In addition, past research has identified a number of 
other problems frequently encountered by teachers trying to incorporate 
European aspects in their teaching. These include anti-European attitudes, 
curriculum and time pressures as well as a lack of information and an 
absence of a statutory basis for a European dimension (Economou 
2003: 136). These are important issues, as they affect, according to Ryba 
(1992: 23), the factors, which really influence classroom teaching, such as 
teacher training, which will be discussed in further detail later on, and the 
development of classroom and other educational practices by the teachers 
themselves. 
The English teachers' main reason for complaint was lack of training 
while the German subject teachers struggled especially with time constraints. 
Another major issue was a shortage of resources despite a general EU and 
governmental commitment to providing appropriate textbooks and materials. 
As Shore (2000: 57) points out, many EU Commissioners dealing with 
education policy supported the idea that textbooks should be written from a 
European point of view to counter "... the nationalistic bias in most [ ... ] 
education systems". In practice, member state governments are responsible 
for textbooks and materials although additional information is available from 
the EU and a range of informal education institutions. In the UK, however, as 
Convery et al (1997: 34) claimed, no provision for special resources had been 
made. In Germany by contrast, according to Soysal (2002: 3), the increasing 
importance of European issues is reflected in some school books to such an 
extent that the nation has started to disappear in favour of Europe and the 
regions. Nevertheless, some German subject teachers bemoaned the lack of 
European textbooks, exam plans and up to date materials. 
In general English teachers were more likely to have encountered 
problems than German teachers. For example, while nearly every second 
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English teacher complaint about time constraints, less than one third of 
German subject teachers had the same problem. 58 Some English subject 
teachers explained that although European elements are important, it was not 
possible to cover any of them in detail within the constraints of the National 
Curriculum and the key stage four exam courses. Similarly, some German 
teachers criticised that politics was often assigned a peripheral role, while 
history was usually only taught for two hours a week in many of the surveyed 
schools. Hardly any teachers, however, complained about lack of own 
commitment or lack of guidance from the head of school. 
The head teachers' responses were very similar. Their main problems 
related to the lack of a clear definition and adequate training. In addition, the 
German head teachers complained especially about the absence of relevant 
resources and the English head teachers about time pressures. 59 As one 
English respondent put it, due to the workload the European dimension is 
"... always competing with other priorities in the eyes of the subject teachers". 
It is worth noting that over half of the English but only around every fifth 
German head teacher considered time constraints to be a major problem. As 
before, this might be due to the common opinion of both English head and 
subject teachers that a European dimension is an additional feature that 
would need to be taught on top of the core curriculum. Their German 
colleagues, however, as pointed out earlier, tend to perceive the European 
dimension as a necessary and integral component of many curriculum 
subjects to such an extent that'Europe' has almost become a 'natural' part of 
education and the pedagogical jargon, echoing the terminology used by 
German governmental policies and the curricula. 
There are other areas of disagreement between the English and the 
German head teachers. For example, a quarter of English head teachers, but 
none of their German colleagues, criticised low levels of teacher commitment. 
In turn, nearly ten per cent of the German but none of the English head 
teachers admitted to lack of personal dedication to European elements. Some 
58 see table 7.9 
59 see table 7.10 
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English head teachers also complained about the deficiency of statutory 
European elements in the National Curriculum as well as a lack of LEA 
support for EU projects such as COMENIUS. A couple of German 
respondents thought that the subject teachers needed to be made more 
aware of the European dimension. Finally, a number of head teacher in both 
countries said that the decision to teach about Europe is usually left to the 
subject teachers. As one English head teacher pointed out "... the teaching of 
a European dimension is largely down to individual teachers as it is not school 
policy yet". 
Channels of Implementation 
This reliance on individual teachers and schools instead of a national 
framework and curriculum to implement a European dimension in education 
has already been mentioned in the previous chapter and deserves further 
attention as this decentralised and informal pattern of implementation seems 
to characterise especially the English approach to the European dimension. 
Convery et al (1997: 34) for example observed that "... what scant evidence 
there is of educating for European citizenship [in England] is found not at 
national, organized level but at best at the individual school level, if not at the 
individual teacher level". While it appears that in Germany the European 
dimension is firmly anchored in the national framework and the Lander 
curricula, the English approach is better described as decentralised with a 
broader, less detailed and less prescriptive outline. The result is that the 
implementation of a European dimension, if left to the discretion of teachers 
(rather than being a visibly examined subject), can be somewhat haphazard, 
while the inclusion of European elements is likely to remain peripheral and 
incidental. 
As explained previously, the UK response to the 1988 EC Resolution 
placed considerable responsibility for the initiation and support of a European 
dimension with the LEAs (Convery et al 1997: 51). Thus, according to 
Economou (2003: 127), although the WES decides policy in relation to the 
European dimension, it does neither have a direct involvement in its delivery 
nor an active interest in its enforcement. Effectively, it has been left to the 
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LEAs to decide whether or not they wish to take the European dimension 
forward. Phillips (2003: 83) agrees and comments that the UK seemed to have 
indicated reluctance at ministerial level to become too closely involved in 
adopting EU policies into national policies. He points out that " ... transmission 
of the policy goes by default and [ ... ] implementation becomes a matter of 
chance, left largely to institutions and individuals who become 'significant 
actors' in taking things forward: without the enthusiasm generated by such 
actors we are left with the impression that very little would happen" (Phillips 
2003: 83). This has been confirmed by the findings of this study which show 
that 51% of English but only 21% of German subject teachers complained 
about a lack of guidance from educational authorities. Convery et al (1997: 51) 
observed that in England some informal support for teaching about Europe 
beyond the national curriculum is available, but that this is usually restricted to 
raising awareness about European initiatives such as SOCRATES. Convery 
et al (1997: 34) argue that it is the lack of national impetus that is hindering an 
education for Europe in England. 
In practice, as Soysal (2002: 2) points out, the Europeanisation of 
education is a process largely happening through informal networks which 
remain unmonitored by intergovernmental structures or EU institutions. Such 
informal networks include teachers' associations, academics, scientific 
experts, other supporting groups and international organisations such as the 
Council of Europe, which work towards promoting European education and 
ideals and help to define and assess diffuse concepts (Soysal 2002: 2). 
Economou (2003: 133-134) agrees and argues that whether or not a European 
dimension is encouraged depends on individuals' interest, enthusiasm and 
effort. The actual implementation of the European dimension in schools can 
be considered as patchy and put into practise primarily through project 
participation and modern foreign language teaching, but fails to be taught as a 
cross-curricular theme which could permeate all subjects (Economou 
2003: 135). On an anecdotal basis, this study seems to confirm that 
considerable differences can exist between schools, especially in England. 
For example, while one English teacher said that the European dimension 
was rarely discussed with regard to citizenship, another teacher explained 
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that both EU institutions and European citizenship rights were part of his 
school's citizenship curriculum, which also offered annual trips to Brussels. 
Another reason for the patchy implementation could be a lack of 
adequate teacher experience and training that would be needed to efficiently 
introduce European aspects into teaching. In fact, 60% of English and 24% of 
German subject teachers in this study reported that they did not have the 
necessary training or knowledge to include European elements in their 
teaching. This actual or perceived gap in training and knowledge is a central 
concern of both subject and head teachers and as such requires further 
analysis. 
Training 
According to Eurydice (2002) the broad content of the initial teacher training in 
England is specified by the government and can be found in the 2002 WES 
and Teacher Training Agency (TTA) document entitled Qualifying to Teach. 
Within this framework, the individual institutions offering teacher training 
courses decide on their curriculum. As there is no compulsory need to cover 
global or European elements, it is up to the institutions if they wish to include 
any in their curriculum. This is the result of a governmental move in 1992 
towards a school-based approach for teacher training under deletion of any 
reference to the European dimension (Convery et al 1997: 91). 
Once training is completed, the dissemination of any information 
regarding European awareness, which may be part of the continued personal 
development or in-service training of teachers, is the responsibility of the 
Education and Training Group of the British Council. This group has 
established, in cooperation with local LEAs, regional in-service training 
networks to provide practical support and opportunities for encouraging 
teachers to use a European and international dimension in schools. In 
addition, the European Association of Teachers (EAT), in collaboration with 
European and international organisations alms to widen teacher knowledge 
about European issues. In the UK, its members focus on providing pupils, 
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through their teachers, with the necessary language skills and training to 
enable them to live and compete for work within the European Market. 
Nevertheless, research by Convery et al (1997: 34) established that 
virtually none of the UK teachers in their study had been on an in-service 
training course dealing with the introduction of a European dimension in 
schools. Similarly, the present study shows that less than one in ten (9.5%) 
English subject teachers had received official training (organised by their 
school or the educational authorities) regarding the inclusions of a European 
dimension into teaching. When asked for the nature of their training, one 
teacher mentioned a LEA and European Bureau organised project on racism 
and xenophobia while another teacher had attended a British Council seminar 
on modern German and European history. A third teacher referred to school 
based material about opportunities for European exchanges. No-one 
mentioned specific EU or European dimension training. As a result, one 
English head teacher complained that his school had to invite external 
speakers for European issues as none of the subject teachers were able to 
cover the subject. 
In Germany, it is considered vital that the European dimension forms part 
of the initial teacher training at University and also of the in-service training of 
teachers. According to Eurydice (2002/2003) "... in-service teacher training 
devotes a lot of attention to European issues, especially in the courses and 
seminars offered by the European Council or the SOCRATES programme of 
the European Union". Teacher training also offers the opportunity to 
participate in bilateral courses which allow teachers to exchange experiences 
with foreign colleagues, such as the German-French qualification programme 
for teachers at schools with bilingual teaching (Eurydice 2002/2003). 
Accordingly, significantly more German subject teachers (25%) said that they 
had been trained to implement a European dimension. Examples for such 
training included: 
Refresher courses, organised by the school, government and other 
funding bodies as well as by the EU in Brussels and Strasbourg or 
other member states 
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Various seminars and conferences, especially on EU East 
enlargement, EU economical policies and the common defence and 
foreign policy 
Special University seminars on European integration 
German-Dutch youth congress on EU integration and enlargement 
German-Polish symposium on National Socialism and its role in 
European history 
Only two German teachers complaint that there was hardly any training on 
offer in their subject area while two other teachers stressed the importance of 
daily self-study (reading the newspapers etc). 
Knowledge 
Since significant numbers of teachers complained about a lack of training, it is 
perhaps not surprising that many teachers also believed that they do not know 
much about 'Europe'. Previously, Convery et al (1997: 91) discovered that 
many trainee teachers considered themselves to be not competent enough to 
teach the European dimension because of a perceived lack of basic 
knowledge. Similarly, the findings of the present study indicate that only 46% 
of English subject and 34% of English head teachers described their 
knowledge of the EU and its institutions as good, compared to 80% of 
60 German subject and 71 % of German head teachers. When asked about 
knowledge of other EU member states, however, there was no significant 
difference between the German and English responses 61 although many 
teachers remarked that they knew more about some member states (such as 
France) than others (such as the new member states). 
The importance of knowledge (and thus ultimately training) can hardly 
be overestimated. Further analysis shows that both head and subject 
teachers with a better knowledge of the EU are significantly more likely to 
consider European elements to be important and are more committed to 
introducing European aspects into their teaching. Subject teachers with more 
knowledge of the EU are also more likely to 'Europeanise' their teaching, 
60 see table 7.11 and 7.12 61 see table 7.13 and 7.14 
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although the head teachers' level of European knowledge does not seem to 
have a significant influence on whether or not a European dimension is 
included at the school. 
Another factor influencing both knowledge and commitment was 
personal attitudes to Europe. Although the majority of teachers in this study 
described themselves as pro-European, the English responses were 
significantly less pro-European than the German responses. 62 Subject 
teachers who were less pro-European or even anti-European were not only 
rating European aspects as less important but were also less likely to include 
a European dimension in their teaching. Furthermore there seems to be a 
connection between knowledge about Europe and personal attitudes. As 
Convery et al (1997: 34+91) found in their study, one of the reasons why many 
trainee teachers thought of themselves as not competent enough to teach 
European aspects was their ambivalent feelings about Europe. According to 
Bell (1991: 11) this was a particular problem in the UK due the traditional 
British insularity, which has been discussed in the previous chapter. In 
addition, although teachers may generally consider European issues to be 
important, they as well as pupils may have insufficient interest in Europe. 
Some teachers said that pupils were not interested in the subject area or have 
a negative image of the EU, which made teaching about Europe difficult and 
often tedious. 
In sum, knowledge of the EU has a significant impact on how subject 
and head teachers rate the importance of and their commitment to teaching a 
European dimension. In general, the study has found that the more teachers 
know about Europe the more likely they are to include European elements in 
their teaching. In addition, personal European attitudes also influence 
teaching whereby pro-European teachers are more likely to include a 
European dimension. The teachers are thus key role models for the pupils 
especially at this crucial stage of the pupil's personal and identity 
development. As discussed, the Eurobarometer surveys have consistently 
62 
see table 7.17 
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found that increased levels of knowledge and awareness are often connected 
to increased levels of support for the EU and European integration. It could be 
deduced that pupils who have been taught about Europe at school in a pro- 
European manner may be more likely to be interested in the EU and maybe 
more likely to support European integration and even develop some form of 
European identity, although further research needs to be conducted to 
establish if there are any significant causal relationships between teaching 
content, teacher attitude and the development of a European identity among 
young people. 
7.6 The future of European education 
Another issue that has often been named as one of the main barriers to the 
implementation of a European dimension is that education remains the 
responsibility of the EU member states whereby the EU itself is basically 
limited to recommendations. It has been pointed out earlier that this has led to 
a patchwork approach across the EU whereby some countries such as 
Germany have, for a variety of reasons, embraced the European dimension 
more than other countries such as England. Some argue that maybe the EU 
should be given more responsibility in the field of education in order to assure 
a more uniform approach to teaching about Europe. Advocates of this 
approach argue that it would guarantee all pupils to be better prepared for life 
in Europe and their role as European citizens. To explore the teachers' 
opinions in relation to the role of the EU, they have been asked if they believe 
that the EU is going to have a bigger impact on everyday life in future and if 
the EU should have more responsibility for educational policy. 
The findings show that German head and subject teachers are 
significantly more likely to believe that the EU will have a bigger impact on 
everyday life in the next ten years than their English colleagues, 63 which 
reflects a general national opinion. For example, the results of Eurobarometer 
58 (European Commission 2003: 56) show that in the UK 21% of people 
63 see table 7.15 and 7.16 
243 
wanted the EU to have a less important role in five years time, 35% hoped it 
would stay the same and only 31 % hoped that the EU might play a more 
important role, which was the second lowest of all EU member states. 64 This 
may be related to the fact that in the UK only 29% have a positive image of 
the EU, which is the third lowest of all member states (European Commission 
2005: 17). By comparison, in Germany only 12% wanted the EU to have a less 
important role, while equal numbers (37% and 38%) hoped that the EU would 
stay the same or have an increased role (European Commission 2003: 56). In 
addition, 40% of Germans have a positive image of the EU (European 
Commission 2005: 17). It is also worth noting that subject teachers with less 
knowledge of the EU tend to think that the future impact of the EU will be the 
same or less. The teachers' opinion about the future of the EU, however, had 
no significant impact on how important they rate European elements in 
education or how committed they are to teaching them. 
When asked if the EU should have a more important future role in 
educational policies, opinions varied greatly. While only one in four English 
subject and one third of English head teachers thought that the EU should 
play a more important role, this wish was expressed by more than half of the 
65 German subject and head teachers. The reasons given for the responses 
also exhibit some significant differences. 
Only very few English subject teachers (five in total) listed possible 
advantages of closer educational co-operation with the EU and other member 
states mostly in relation to sharing best practice. It was argued that an 
increased EU role in education would be beneficial if this would encourage 
tolerance and limit isolation. As one English teacher argued, closer links with 
other EU education systems could "only improve ours". Some teachers, both 
in England and Germany, felt that they could not give an informed opinion due 
to lack of knowledge. The vast majority of English teachers, however, agreed 
that educational policy and the curriculum should remain national policy and 
that the EU should not impose an EU curriculum or have a greater role in 
64 fifteen at the time of this Eurobarometer 65 see table 7.28 and 7.29 
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educational policy. The reasons for preferring a national curriculum varied, 
although three main arguments can be distinguished. 
Firstly, it was believed that an increased role of the EU in educational 
policy would not be possible due to the diversity in Europe. As one English 
teacher explained "... different member states have different school systems" 
which are not necessarily compatible. Another teacher pointed out that U ... the 
continent is too diverse and diversity is not a bad thing". Secondly, it was felt 
by many that further centralisation of education was not preferable. Some 
teachers stressed the educational rights and freedoms of LEAs and schools, 
which were considered to be most appropriate to make educational decisions 
since they can benefit from individual teaching expertise. There was also a 
general consensus among English head teachers that more central 
interference should be regarded as a negative impetus on the educational 
system. As one head teachers put it: "... [there is] too much central 
interference as is... leave education to the professionals". Although some co- 
operation between schools, both nationally and internationally, was 
considered to be useful, it was generally thought that schools should have 
more educational autonomy, not less. This is a reflection of the English 
educational system, where schools enjoy greater freedom concerning 
curricular interpretation than German schools which operate in a much more 
prescriptive and regulated curricular framework. 
Thirdly, some English teachers feared that EU influence might result in 
identity loss, which relates to a general national issue with European 
integration as examined in Chapter Five. One teacher commented that 
"... there is a danger that poor EU policies would lead to loss of national 
identity" and another had "... concerns of loss of identity in traditional sense". 
This may be a reflection of general fears that national identity and sovereignty 
might be lost to a European super-state should further political integration 
take place. As shown in Chapter Five, sovereignty and identity are concepts 
that are often used interchangeably in England and which contain emotive 
associations including notions of self-determination. Thus relenting 
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educational policy to the EU is feared by some as this loss of sovereignty is 
linked to identity loss. 
I Thus the erosion of national identity was cited by some English 
teachers as a reason to oppose an increased role of the EU. Contrary to this, 
the creation of a European identity as a substitute for national identity was 
one of the main reasons for both German head and subject teachers to 
support European education and an increased role of the EU in educational 
policy. Again echoing the guidelines of the German curricula, some teachers 
believed that education should "... reduce the barriers in people's heads" and 
"... help to reduce prejudices against others". In the context of twentieth 
century history, education should "... show the common European roots to 
avoid wars" and create "... a European identity instead of national orientation". 
By teaching about the EU and other European member states, education can 
" ... create the basis for a European identity". Basically, as one teacher put it, 
"... if the European youth shall think and feel European, then the education 
policies have to be European". As examined earlier on and in Chapter Five, 
this is a reflection of the general German attitude to nationalism and European 
integration, which has shown that in post-war Germany the government and 
political elites have tried consistently to Europeanise national identity and 
create support for European integration as a way to overcome Germany's 
nationalistic past. As previously shown, this process has resulted in 
considerably higher levels of pro-European attitudes and a partial 
replacement of national with European feelings of belonging in Germany, 
which cannot be observed to such an extent in England. It must also be 
noted that teaching regenerates and reinforces general national attitudes 
since education is one of the main agents of political socialisation. 
Accordingly, some teachers have assigned education a key role in forming 
young peoples attitudes towards Europe and in fostering European support 
and a European identity. 
In any case, the majority of German subject teachers were in favour of 
an increased role of the EU in educational policy, although some qualified that 
while a degree of European co-operation, such as sharing of good practice, 
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would be welcomed, it should not be accompanied by an increase in 
administration and bureaucratisation. The main argument of both German 
head and subject teachers in favour of an increased role of the EU in 
educational policy stressed that leaving qualifications and degrees should be 
comparable and accepted throughout the EU "... to give young people in 
Europe the same chances" and enable them to work anywhere in Europe. To 
this effect, school systems and teaching targets should be similar to ensure 
that pupils leave school with comparable education levels. As one teacher 
pointed out " ... with increasing economical integration, the job market is 
becoming increasingly European. Therefore, education and training should be 
European". 
Another reason for a more European education relates to the role of 
the EU especially "... as the EU will have a larger impact in future". Some 
German head teachers pointed out that pupils should be prepared for the 
European reality. One subject teacher argued that "... we are citizens of 
Europe, two thirds of our laws come from Brussels, so we ought to know 
about it". Education should "... enable European citizens to orientate 
themselves in Europe", which, as shown in Chapter Six, is one of the main 
aims of EU educational recommendations. In order to achieve this aim, 
education should furthermore "... make Europe more realistic, practical and 
easier to understand". 
The main German argument against further EU influence was that 
educational policies should continue to be the responsibility of the German 
Under within the German federal system according to the EU principle of 
subsidiarity. It would seem that especially in countries where the education 
system is devolved to the regional level, prospects of European educational 
interference raises fears that the subsidiarity principle might be eroded. 
Accordingly, many German head teachers considered the German model, 
whereby the German Under are responsible for educational policy while 
curricular contents and leaving qualifications are co-ordinated by the central 
umbrella organisation of the KIVIK, to be a useful solution that takes regional 
disparities and specialities into account. Therefore, some German head 
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teachers thought that instead of a general European centralisation, a 
European federal model would be a more suitable and workable model for the 
EU. A couple of head teachers thought that maintaining the divergences 
between the educational systems creates a healthy competitive environment. 
7.7 Conclusions 
Overall, the findings of the case study have conclusively demonstrated that 
significant differences exist between the attitudes of the sampled German and 
English teachers towards a European dimension in education. Noteworthy 
differences also exist in relation to what is included in teaching and the 
amount of European elements on offer. In general, the German teachers were 
substantially more pro-European than the English teachers and tended to 
include more European elements in their teaching. The European aspects 
available at German schools were overall more varied and included offers 
such as East European exchanges and bilingual teaching that were not 
available at the vast majority of English schools in the sample. The findings 
confirm the results from the curriculum assessment, as discussed in Chapter 
Six, and illustrate that the European dimension in the observed German 
schools is anchored more firmly in the curriculum and entrenched more 
deeply in teacher's opinions as well as their actual teaching. 
Both the German and English subject teachers in the study believed 
that the most important reason to teach about Europe is to provide pupils with 
an understanding of European politics and the role of the EU. Head teachers' 
opinions varied to a certain degree as they tended to relate European 
elements not to a particular subject but to the overall syllabus of the school. 
English head teachers generally focused on a global dimension of which 
'Europe' was a more or less defined part. This is a reflection of both the 
language used in the English National Curriculum and the traditional national 
extra-European orientation. In comparison, the German head teachers 
emphasised the importance of a European dimension specifically for the 
preparation of young people for life in the EU whereby it is generally 
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understood that the EU will play an increasingly important role in people's 
lives. 
A substantial number of German subject and head teachers believed 
that laying the foundations for a European identity, in order to counteract 
forces of nationalism and to sustain European integration, was a vital part of 
education and an important mission for schools. This is also a commitment 
contained in the German curricula as shown in Chapter Six. Although 
'European identity' as such was mentioned by a couple of English teachers, 
their focus was generally on 'raising awareness' and not on actively fostering 
a European identity. The study concluded that this is largely a result of the 
different national attitudes to European integration and identity, as outlined in 
Chapter Five, which in turn are based on the political and national 
development of the two countries (see Chapter One and Two). The study 
showed that the postwar modification to German national identity and the re- 
orientation towards 'Europe' as a new 'fatherland' has substantially informed 
teachers' attitudes to 'teaching about Europe' and European identity. It can be 
expected that pro-European values and opinions are disseminated to a much 
larger degree by German teachers than by English teachers, which reinforces 
the nationally promoted European orientation in Germany. Although other 
studies have shown that German pupils are indeed in general more pro- 
European and feel more European than their English counterparts, further 
research is needed to establish a causal relationship and to investigate if 
school education has a profound impact on the levels of support for European 
integration. Further research could also extend this study to include other 
subjects, school forms, year groups or nationalities. 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore some of the issues concerning the concept, 
realisation and existence of European identity, which has been the subject of 
frequent debate in recent decades. In particular, the aim was to assess in how 
far school education is a suitable method to foster European identity and 
support for European integration. This assessment included a review of 
previous research and an analysis of documentary material and selected 
curricula. Also, as part of this assessment, the thesis sought to explore 
aspects of and problems with the implementation of a European dimension at 
a sample of secondary schools in Germany and England. 
In this context, the wider aim of the thesis was to investigate whether 
variations in the historic and more recent political and national development in 
England and Germany have led to different attitudes to European integration, 
European identity and subsequently to a European dimension in education. 
The analysis compared the general attitude towards national and European 
identity in England and Germany and assessed which impact these attitudes 
had on the implementation of a European dimension in education. The thesis 
was able to confirm that especially the construction and emergence of 
national identities have had important implications for the study and progress 
of European integration (Diez Medrano 2003: 257). 
In order to reach these aims, the thesis started with an exploration of 
the political and national development in Germany and Britain. This 
assessment was necessary in order to be able to understand how the political 
and national development impacts on attitudes to European integration and 
European identity. Then, in Chapter Three, the thesis looked at the design of 
a variety of European schemes and peace plans that were proposed in the 
last few centuries. This discussion helped to understand why post-1945 
European integration efforts came to fruition. European integration theories as 
well as key post-war events and developments of European integration were 
assessed in Chapter Four. Knowledge of the political concepts and processes 
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of European integration enabled an informed discussion on European identity, 
which was the focus of Chapter Five. Chapter Five established the premise 
for and discussed possible definitions of European identity, particularly in 
relation to national identity in Germany and England. The final two chapters 
were devoted to the case study. Chapter Six explored the usefulness of 
education as a potential facilitator for the creation and promotion of a 
European identity. It assessed the attitude of the EU and of the German and 
British government to a European dimension in education through 
documentary material and curricular analysis. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the case study was restricted to the subjects of history and citizenship in 
secondary compulsory education. Finally, Chapter Seven presented the 
findings of the case study, which had been carried out in the form of 
quantitative research with a sample of German and English secondary 
schools. 
The thesis came to a number of conclusions. The most important can 
be summarised as follows: 
Historic and contemporary political and national developments 
influence attitudes to European integration, European identity and a 
European dimension in education. 
Attitudes to national identity strongly influence attitudes to European 
integration, European identity and to a European dimension in 
education. 
There is as yet no comprehensive, firm and well defined European 
identity, although many people have started to feel European to some 
degree. At the same time, many argue that a European identity is 
required in order to give the EU popular legitimacy and to address the 
so-called 'democratic deficit'. 
Education is a useful tool to create and foster European identity (within 
limitations). 
The documentary material and curricular analysis has shown that a 
European dimension is substantially more incorporated in German than 
in English compulsory secondary education. 
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The case study found that the sampled German teachers and schools 
are significantly more proactive with regards to a European dimension 
in education; they consider a European dimension as more important 
and include it more in their teaching. 
A number of persistent problems exist in relation to the implementation 
of a European dimension in education. These include a lack of 
definition, lack of time, lack of training and knowledge as well as a lack 
of resources. 
8.1 The EU and the nation state 
The first point above included a reference to the political development. It 
would seem therefore most appropriate to start the conclusions by examining 
how the EU and European integration fit into the existing political nation-state 
system in Europe. Chapter One has examined the development of the 
modern liberal-democratic state in Western Europe, particularly in Germany 
and England. It has also assessed some key characteristics and features of 
the modern state such as sovereignty. Although the nation state eventually 
proved to be the dominant political system in Western Europe, Chapter Three 
has shown that many alternative proposals for European governance were 
made, often as a reaction to war and hegemonial tendencies of states and 
rulers. The main rationale and raison d'6tre of these European integration 
plans was a desire to put an end to warfare and to create lasting peace in 
Europe. 
European integration schemes remained unsuccessful until after the 
Second World War, which was an important trigger in the realisation of 
previously theoretical models of European co-operation. It can thus be 
concluded that major upheavals were necessary in order to stimulate this 
consequential alteration to central aspects of the affected states and cultures 
(Diez Medrano 2003: 259). Particular in Germany, the experiences of the Third 
Reich and the Second World War have prompted post-war Germany to 
actively engage in European integration. Nevertheless, Chapter Four has also 
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shown that the European states continued to remain somewhat sceptical of 
relinquishing sovereignty and power to a supranational entity. 
It was therefore of crucial importance that the architects of European 
integration realised that political European integration, as advocated by most 
previous European peace plans, was unrealistic and should be replaced by a 
more pragmatic, functional method in order to appeal to the potential member 
states and gain their approval and co-operation. Economic integration thus 
became the vehicle of European integration, although many advocates of 
European integration, such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, hoped that 
co-operation in one sector might spill-over into related sectors and 
subsequently into the political sphere. Shore (2000: 207) compares these neo- 
functional optimistic beliefs in spill-over and the superiority of supranational 
governance with Enlightenment values and ideals that permeated some 
earlier models for European co-operation and their Eurocentric definitions of 
civilisation. 
Over the past five decades, European integration was characterised by 
both economic and political spill-over; and progressed through stages of 
supranationalism and intergovernmental ism. Today (2006), the EU has 
managed to accumulate considerable amounts of power and a share of 
sovereignty, at least in some policy areas. Many theorists have described the 
EU as being an unparalleled and unique phenomenon. However, this 
'uniqueness', coupled with the 'unfinished' nature of the EU as a work in 
progress, makes a political assessment or even a future prognosis difficult. 
Where will the EU go from here? Is the EU in the process, as Shore 
(2000: 209) asks, of transforming itself into a state? As already pointed out, 
Chapter One analysed some of the key characteristics of the Western liberal- 
democratic state. Of particular interest in relation to the EU is the matter of 
state sovereignty, which has traditionally been defined as indivisible. In 
federal states, such as Germany, internal sovereignty is shared to some 
degree with the federal level, although the national government usually retains 
absolute external sovereignty as well as internal sovereignty in some policy 
areas of national importance (such as defence for example). In Britain, to a 
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lesser degree, autonomy in limited policy areas has been devolved to regional 
governments. The EU, however, has started to challenge the concept and 
definition of state sovereignty on the supranational level. Sovereignty within 
the EU is now shared between the member states and the EU institutions. 
The EU has acquired, as Shore (2000: 209) points out, many characteristics of 
a state, including the power to negotiate and make international treaties, the 
monopoly on decision-making and jurisdiction in some policy areas, the 
establishment of its own currency and so forth. What the EU does not 
possess, and which remains an important prerogative of its member states, is 
the monopoly on "legitimate violence" (Heywood 2002: 87). 
It has also been pointed out that institutional shortcomings in the EU have 
resulted in the EU lacking certain key characteristics of the liberal-democratic 
state, such as a directly elected government and legislature. Although direct 
elections take place to the European Parliament (EP), the EP is not a 
legislature with the same law and policy making powers as national 
parliaments and legislatures. The EU Commission and the Council of 
Ministers remain the most important decision-making institutions of the EU. 
Both are made up of national representatives, who are at best indirectly 
elected via national elections. Shore (2000: 207) proposes that the 
"supranational idealism" shared by many advocates of European integration, 
combined with the EU conception of itself as an evolutionary and 
U ... unfinished project of social and political engineering" obstructs critical 
thinking about such institutional shortcomings. 
The existence and extent of these institutional shortcomings are 
debatable, but it can hardly be disputed that the widening and deepening of 
European integration in the last decades was usually a response to 
favourable economic and political circumstances or the result of support from 
leading politicians and European idealists. European integration as such has 
not happened as a result of popular demand. It has often been argued that 
European integration has been and still is characterised by its top-down elitist 
approach based on popular 'passive consensus' (Leonard 1998: 6). The 
question that arises is if this passive consensus is sufficient to sustain the 
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continued widening and deepening of European integration or even a political 
European Union, should this ever come to pass. Many would argue that the 
existing levels of popular support are insufficient and that European citizens 
should be more 'involved' in European governance. Certainly, Eurobarometer 
surveys have shown that the majority of European citizens feel that 'Europe' 
happens without their participation. To address this problem and to improve 
the popular legitimacy of the EU, it has been argued that a European identity 
is required. 
8.2 National and European identity 
This thesis has investigated a number of issues concerning European identity, 
including the theoretical rationale and possible definitions. It has also 
analysed education as a possible facilitator of European identity. Since 
European identity cannot be analysed out of context, this thesis has also 
investigated European identity in relation to national identity in Germany and 
England. In terms of national development, a number of differences between 
England (or Britain as a whole) and Germany have been noted, which are 
relevant to this thesis. In particular, it has been pointed out that in England 
national identity and the basic foundations of the modern parliamentary 
system developed comparatively early. The early centralised state, with its 
uniform law and national institutions, was one of the main forces that created 
English national identity (Bessel 1996: 27). Modern English national identity 
continues to have emotive attachments to civic concepts such as sovereignty 
and pride in the longevity of the political institutions. English (and British) 
national identity is thus politicised and intrinsically linked with political, and 
often sensitive, issues such as sovereignty and power (Shore 2000: 225). This 
has been a particular issue in Britain were opposition to European integration 
is often based on fears of sovereignty and identity loss, although this also 
stems from a lack of identification with 'Europe' in the first place since Britain 
has traditionally felt more closely related with the Empire and the 
Commonwealth than her European neighbours, which resulted in a persistent 
feeling of 'being different'from continental Europe (Diez Medrano 2003: 255). 
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In comparison, the first German Empire was created much later (in 
1871), which for the first time enabled the development of a state-centred 
German national identity. Previously, Germany consisted of practically 
independent territorial states whereby national identity was an elite concept, 
which focused almost entirely on cultural aspects. Even after 1871, national 
identity continued to be associated with ethno-cultural concepts, pseudo- 
historical national myths and notions of the German Volk. In the twentieth 
century, Germany underwent a series of radical and often traumatic political 
changes, which had a crucial impact on national identity. Modern German 
national identity has been extensively reformed by the experiences of Third 
Reich nationalism and the Second World War. In the post-war period, the 
negative connotations now associated with nationalism prompted a general 
search for an alternative 'fatherland' and a generally more positive attitudes to 
a European identity. Subsequently, post-war German governments linked 
German political and national rehabilitation to a firm commitment to European 
integration. Therefore, this thesis has shown that in Germany, European 
integration was considered to be a viable alternative to the nation-state with, 
as Shore (2000: 211) puts it, "... the promise of salvation through the creation 
of what, it is hoped, will eventually develop into the United States of Europe". 
In general, however, as many opinion polls have shown, many Europeans 
continue to focus their loyalty and attachment on the nation state. 
Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005: 26-27) found that national 
pride is on the increase with 87% of EU citizens indicating that they are proud 
to be citizens of their country. Overall 41% identify with their own nationality 
only, although an additional 48% identify with their nationality and also with 
'Europe' (European Commission 2005: 47). These results have not changed 
much over the last decade. In 1993,40% identified with their own nationality 
only and 45% with their nationality and also with 'Europe' (European 
Commission 1993: 97). 66 As Dunkerley et al (2002: 8) point out "... for the near 
future it is difficult to imagine the EU emerging as a contender to nations and 
nation-states for the loyalties of EU citizens". Nevertheless, a majority of 63% 
66 Earlier Eurobarometer statistics for this particular question are not available. 
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of European citizens are proud to be Europeans (European Commission 
2005: 49). 
But what is a 'European'? As this thesis has shown, the definitions of 
'Europe', 'European' and 'European identity' are subject to considerable 
debate. It is generally considered, in the context of European identity, that 
'Europe' is not just a geographical location, but an emotive concept that can 
be interpreted in a variety of ways. Chapter Five has illustrated that those who 
advocate a cultural European identity, seek to define 'Europe' as an 
accumulation of European values, European culture and shared historic roots. 
Others base their definition of a European identity on the rights and 
obligations inherent in European citizenship. Alternatively, there are those 
who would argue that a European cultural identity is an elitist concept, which 
has, similarly to the concept of European citizenship, little meaning or 
relevance to most people's lives (Leonard 1998: 6-7). The unfinished and 
changing nature of the EU makes identification with it even more difficult, 
although it must be noted that 'Europe' and the EU are not necessarily one 
and the same thing. Some warn that a focus on EU identity would exclude 
those Europeans that remain outside the EU. 
Overall, it must be concluded that there is at present no generic 
definition of 'Europe' or of a European identity. People who describe 
themselves as European do so for a variety of reasons based on different 
associations that they personally have with 'Europe' or the EU. Considering 
the rich socio-cultural diversity in Europe, which the EU is anxious to 
preserve, maybe European identity is destined to remain somewhat vague, 
illusive and loosely based on a pool of common factors which offers a 'pick 
and mix' approach to European identity. 
Why a European identity? 
This thesis has also explored the rationale of a European identity. This thesis 
has illustrated that one of the main reasons for advocating the creation and 
promotion of a European identity and 'European public' is the perceived need 
to bestow popular legitimacy to an otherwise elite-driven European project 
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and to create popular support, rather than mere 'passive consensus', that 
would sustain the widening and deepening of European integration. 
Public opinion polls, such as the European Commission's 
Eurobarometer, consistently show that although the EU continues to 
accumulate more power, many EU citizens do not feel involved or well 
informed. Although 50% of all European citizens believe that EU membership 
is a good thing (European Commission 2005: 53), 52% of European citizens 
claim not to understand how the EU works and 64% would like to know more 
about the EU (European Commission 2005: 85-97). 59% believe that their 
voice does not count in the EU and 72% do not feel involved (European 
Commission 2005: 34-36). Furthermore, only 45% of European citizens (25% 
in the UK and 39% in Germany) trust the EU (European Commission 
2005: 29). 67 44% have a positive image of the EU while 20% have a negative 
image (European Commission 2005: 67). 
Many of those, who believe that there should be a (stronger) European 
identity, argue that the credibility of the EU as well as its ability to mobilise 
people and win consent "... hinges on the development of a more tangible and 
coherent sense of shared identity among the peoples of Europe whose 
interests the Union claims to serve" (Shore 2000: 222). Others, for example 
Van Oudenaren (2000: 16), argue that the success of the widening and 
deepening of the EU will be determined in part by the extent to which a 
European identity emerges. Although speculations about the political future of 
the EU are hypothetical, Nugent (2003: 502) claims that the absence of a firm 
European identity would make the construction and maintenance of a strong 
and fully effective European political system very difficult. There are thus 
important and pertinent claims that establish, at least in theory, the need for a 
European identity; although it has to be pointed out that this line of 
argumentation is not universally supported. Some critics have argued that the 
creation of a European public or identity on its own would not resolve the 
67 However, trust in national governments was even lower at 31 % (European Commission 
2005: 24) 
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problem of popular legitimacy, which can, in this view, only be addressed by 
institutional reform. 
European identity creation 
Most of the research in this area has concentrated on those agents of political 
socialisation which have been used in the past, especially in the nineteenth 
century, as part of the nation building process. As Chapter Two has shown, 
these agents, which include for example a standardised language, the 
creation of a mass education system and a mass media, were used to 
disseminate national identity, in the form of a uniform culture and society with 
standardised symbols and national myths, from the originating nucleus of the 
political and intellectual elites to the wider public. In short, they helped to 
establish a distinct socio-cultural entity, usually related to a particular territorial 
area, which enabled both group identification and separation from 'others'. In 
the past, as Chapter Five has illustrated, the EU has largely adapted such 
traditional top down approaches to identity and has focused on the 
establishment of a European iconography in the form of a flag, an anthem, a 
European passport and recently a European currency. 
There are, however, several problems with the adaptation of the national 
methodology in terms of identity construction. First of all, national identity is 
extensively based on a shared and somewhat uniform culture. Although 
proposals have been made for the creation of a culturally based European 
identity, Chapter Five has shown that such a concept would be highly illusive 
and debatable. Many of the commonly cited 'European' values may have 
originated in Europe, but are now more or less global values, which makes an 
identification with Europe or the EU difficult. Secondly, the EU has no direct 
control over many of the above mentioned agents. For example, two of the 
most important, the mass media and mass education, remain firmly the 
responsibility of the member states. Thirdly, it has been pointed out that the 
formula is too simplistic. European identity and solidarity, it has been argued, 
cannot be generated solely by raising awareness of a shared cultural 
heritage, political values or a shared citizenship, but instead has to be earned 
gradually through political actions (Shore 2000: 225-226). 
259 
8.3 European identity and education 
In light of these arguments, this thesis has examined in how far education, as 
one of the agents used by nation states to create and promote national 
identity, could also be used to create a European identity or foster popular 
support for 'Europe'. Chapter Six has shown that there is empirical evidence 
that the level of education and knowledge about 'Europe' influences people's 
attitudes to 'Europe'. Research has indicated that European citizens with 
higher levels of education and knowledge about 'Europe' are more likely to 
feel European and more likely to be in favour of European integration. 
Similarly, Eurobarometer 64 (European Commission 2005: 29) found that only 
38% of those who left education prior to reaching the age of 16, but 60% of 
those still studying, tended to trust the EU. Those who studied longer also 
tended to be more in favour of EU membership (European Commission 
2005: 55). Again, it must be noted, that the findings do not establish a direct 
causal relationship. Therefore, the underlying assumption that knowledge 
about 'Europe' or even a European orientation automatically generates 
support for the EU is flawed and requires further validation. 
Nevertheless, the EU has promoted for some time now a European 
dimension in education. One of its arguments for promoting the inclusion of 
European elements is that the EU needs educated citizens whose education 
and training has prepared them for life and work in the European community. 
Since education policy is the responsibility of the member states, the EU role 
in education is largely limited to recommendations and proposals. In relation 
to the thesis, the most notable of these recommendations was the 1988 EC 
Resolution on the European dimension in the curriculum. It invited the 
member states to respond with proposals and actions plans for the 
incorporation of a European dimension in education. 
Despite the fact that the governmental responses to the 1988 
Resolution were generally positive, Convery et al (1997: 96) concluded that 
there was limited evidence of coherent implementation, particularly in the UK. 
This has been confirmed by the thesis. The findings of the case study as well 
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as the documentary material and curricular analysis indicate that in England 
the implementation of a European dimension in education is patchy and relies 
on individual teachers' commitment, interest and interpretation of the National 
Curriculum. The National Curriculum itself does not contain many references 
to a European dimension in education. Its suggestions for teaching content 
are non statutory, which means that teachers can decide whether or not to 
include European examples and study units. The documentary analysis has 
provided little evidence of governmental guidance in relation to European 
elements in teaching. This can at least partly be explained by the 
decentralised nature of the English education system, which allows the Local 
Education Authorities a considerable amount of freedom to develop 
educational policy within the national framework. 
By comparison, the thesis has shown that in Germany the 
implementation of a European dimension in education is much more regulated 
by the respective curricula. The analysed German curricula are considerably 
more prescriptive and contain a significant amount of statutory European 
themes and teaching units. Overall, the language and terminology used by the 
assessed German curricula (and also by the German documentary material) 
is more European and stresses the importance of a European dimension in 
order to prepare young pupils for their role as European citizens and to 
actively promote a European identity. Such references are markedly absent 
from the English National Curriculum. Since the German curricula are more 
prescriptive, the freedom of schools and individual teachers in choosing 
teaching content is more restricted than in England. Individual teachers 
therefore have more guidance in relation to a European dimension and the 
channels of implementation are clearer. Nevertheless, actual implementation 
still depends to a great extent on the commitment, training and knowledge of 
the teachers. The findings of the case study show that German teacher 
training tends to have greater European focus than English teacher training. 
Subsequently, German teachers tend to feel better informed about the EU 
and its institutions. The importance of knowledge and training is vital as the 
analysis shows that teachers with a greater knowledge of the EU are 
significantly more likely to consider European elements to be important and 
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are more committed to introducing European aspects into their teaching. The 
thesis has confirmed that German teachers include significantly more 
European aspects in their teaching. An important reason for this is that many 
German teachers considered it a matter of fact that the EU will continue to 
affect young people in the future. Therefore the need to understand the 
fundamental changes instigated by the EU is believed to be a bona fide 
necessity and not as such a matter of opinion. Furthermore, my research 
shows that many German teachers believed that the promotion of a European 
identity is or should be an integral part of teaching. English teachers, by 
comparison, were significantly less pro-European and included less European 
elements in their teaching. Hardly any reported that they had relevant 
European (in-service) training. Although some English teachers 
acknowledged and considered it important that pupils should be made aware 
of the workings of the EU, their approach was not pro-active and was 
essentially limited to'raising awareness'. 
As this thesis was able to show, one of the most important reasons for 
the difference in attitude between the two countries, and the subsequent 
difference in implementation, are different national attitudes to European 
integration and European identity. It has already been shown above that 
attitudes towards 'Europe' are not simply a reflection of values and identities 
of a "uniformly understood reality", but are "... filtered by national and 
subnational cultures" (Diez Medrano 2003: 249). It is only by taking into 
account these filters, which reflect national "... self-perceptions, collective 
memories, and current preoccupations" (Diez Medrano 2003: 249), that 
attitudes towards European integration and identity can be fully understood. 
The same 'national bias' also applies to education professionals, education 
itself as well as teaching content as shown in Chapter Seven. This 'national 
bias' can pose an obstacle to the hope of utilising the mass education 
systems for the purpose of stimulating a generic European knowledge base 
and identity. As illustrated in Chapter Six and Seven, considerable national 
differences persist not only in relation to the European dimension in the 
curriculum, but also regarding the teachers' evaluation of 'Europe' in teaching. 
It has been noted that especially the experience of the Second World War had 
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a profound impact on both German and British national identity and attitudes 
to European integration. Many German teachers in the sample regarded 
European integration and European identity as welcome solutions to 
nationalism and national hegemonies. They believed that education has an 
important role in dismantling nationalism, which has negative associations in 
modern Germany as Chapter Two has shown. In addition, many German 
teachers (but none of the English teachers) stated that a European dimension 
is important to continue the peace process in Europe and to prepare pupils for 
a more united Europe of the future. Although many English teachers believed 
a European dimension to be important to raise awareness of the EU, it is 
often considered as part of a global dimension. This is at least partly due to 
the overall Anglo-American orientation in England as pointed out in Chapter 
Five. 
Apart from these differences, Chapter Seven has shown that the 
majority of teachers in both countries believe that their teaching has a 
European dimension. German teachers, however, were significantly more 
likely to include a range of European elements in their teaching. For example, 
over 80% of German but only 28% of English teachers taught the history of 
European integration. Similarly, 77% of German but only 37% of English 
teachers taught their pupils about the EU institutions. The case study 
indicated that German schools offered more European activities and events 
such as exchanges, foreign languages, bilingual teaching etc. Overall, the 
thesis can conclude that European elements and a European dimension 
permeate German teaching to a much greater extent and are more prominent 
in teacher attitudes than in England. 
Nevertheless, problems with the implementation of a European 
dimension persist in both countries. Earlier studies have already indicted that 
some of the most prominent problems included a lack of time, lack of 
resources, lack of training, anti-European attitudes and the lack of a clear 
definition. This thesis can confirm that the main problem for English teachers 
is a lack of training, while the German teachers complained mostly about time 
constraints. Another main concern was the lack of relevant and appropriate 
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resources. In general, however, English teachers were significantly more 
likely to have encountered problems than German teachers. It has already 
been pointed out that one of the main reasons for this is the lack of adequate 
European training in England as well as the more informal and less 
prescriptive channels of implementation. Still, the majority of English teachers 
expressed the opinion that schools should not loose their autonomy and that 
the EU should therefore not have an increased role in education. Some 
English teachers also feared that an increased EU role in education might 
lead to further loss of national sovereignty and identity. By comparison, the 
majority of the German teachers thought that the EU role in education should 
be increased. Most German teachers believed that more European co- 
ordination in educational matters would be recommendable to ensure that 
leaving qualifications are compatible across Europe. Many also hoped that an 
increasingly 'Europeanised' education might stimulate the growth of a 
European identity. Again, this demonstrates how different attitudes to national 
identity can shape attitudes to a European dimension in education and EU 
policy. 
8.4 Further research and concluding remarks 
This thesis has established the link between political and national 
development and attitudes to national identity, European identity and 
education. It has shown that these attitudes have a significant impact on the 
implementation of a European dimension in education. As already pointed 
out, further research is needed to establish whether a causal relationship 
between European elements in teaching and their impact on young peoples' 
attitudes towards the EU and their acquisition of a European identity exists. In 
relation to Germany, further research could be undertaken in order to 
compare West and East German curricula and attitudes. Similar research by 
Diez Medrano (2003: 250) has already indicated that significant differences 
exist between East and West German attitudes to European integration. While 
many West Germans consider European integration as an opportunity to 
regain international trust and to overcome any potential nationalistic 
tendencies, this conceptual isation appears to be missing in East Germany. It 
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would be interesting to investigate if this difference is reflected in East 
German curricula, teacher attitudes and actual teaching content. Further 
research could also extent this case study to include other countries, subjects, 
stages or school types. 
To conclude, this thesis agrees with Shore's (2000: 232) assessment 
that the EU is not yet a "citizen's Europe" and whether it ever will be is 
" ... ultimately bound up with the future of the nation-state". This thesis 
has 
indicatively shown that at least in Germany a socio-cultural as well as political 
re-orientation has taken place whereby 'Europe' has started to gain some 
prominence alongside the nation state and national identity. Considering that 
this change was triggered largely by the traumatic events of the 1930s and 
1940s, it remains to be seen in how far this momentum can be sustained. 
Recent Eurobarometer opinion polls have already indicated that support for 
the EU in Germany has decreased somewhat, although the reasons for this 
development are unclear and cannot conclusively linked to a national revival. 
There are multiple other factors that would have an influence and are 
important to many European citizens and governments alike including the 
uncertain outcomes of European integration, debates over future enlargement 
and political union as well as issues relating to national politics and the 
economy. 
Support for the 'European project' as well as European identity are 
therefore not straight forward concepts that can be easily explained. Their 
complex nature makes any attempt to promote or even define European 
identity a most difficult undertaking. Education most certainly will continue to 
be an important facilitator, but, as this thesis has shown, there is still a long 
way to go before a European identity comes to challenge national identity as 
the locus of collective self-identification. Moreover, not everyone involved is 
convinced that this is the right road to take. 
265 
Appendix 1: Additional tables for Chapter Seven 
Table 7.2: Subjects taught by subject teachers 
History Citizenship Teaching both 
England 44.4% 28.6% 25.4% 
Germany 23.8% 17.8% 56.4% 
Table 7.3: Age distribution (subject teachers) 
30 years and under 31-49 50 years and over 
England 21.4% 59% 19.7% 
Germany 3% 35.6% 61.4% 
Table 7.4: Age distribution (head teachers) 
30 years and under 31-49 50 years and over 
England 0% 50% 50% 
Germany 0% 9.4% 90.6% 
Table 7.5: Importance of a European dimension in teaching In general 
(subject teachers) 
Very 
important 
important Neither Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important 
England 12.7% 66.7% 19% 1.6% 0% 
Germany 34.7% 62.4% 3% 0% 0% 
Table 7.6: Importance of a European dimension in teaching In general 
(head teachers) 
Very 
important 
important Neither Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important 
England 25% 61.1% 11.1% 2.8% 0% 
Germany 28.3% 69.8% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 7.7: Importance of a European dimension in teaching In the 
specific subject area (subject teachers) 
Very 
important 
important Neither Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important 
England 30.6% 56.5% 9.7% 3.2% 0% 
Germany 47% 52% 1% 0% 0% 
Table 7.8: Importance of a European dimension in teaching at the school 
(head teachers) 
Very 
important 
important Neither Not very 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
England 22.2% 58.3% 13.9% 5.6% 0% 
Germany 24.5% 69.8% 3.8% 0% 0% 
Table 7.9: Problems with implementing a European dimension into 
teaching (subject teachers) 
Problem England Germany 
Lack of resources 58.7% 30.7% 
Lack of training 60.3% 23.8% 
No clear definition of "European dimension" 57.1% 50.5% 
Lack of guidance from the educational authorities 50.8% 20.8% 
Lack of guidance from head of school 11.1% 5.9% 
Lack of own commitment 9.5% 8.9% 
It is not Important 0% 0% 
I am not sure what a "European dimension" Is 19% 9.9% 
No time 46% 29.7% 
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Table 7.10: Problems with implementing a European dimension into 
teaching (head teachers) 
Problem England Germany 
Lack of resources 33.3% 50.9% 
Lack of training 47.2% 30.2% 
No clear definition of "European dimension" 55.6% 54.1% 
Lack of guidance from the educational authorities 19.4% 15.1% 
Lack of teacher commitment 25% 0% 
Lack of own commitment 0% 9.4% 
It is not important 0% 1.9% 
1 am not sure what a "European dimension" Is 13.9% 7.5% 
No time 55.6% 20.8% 
Table 7.11: Knowledge of the EU and EU institutions (subject teachers) 
very good good neither bad very bad 
England 7.9% 38.1% 44.4% 7.9% 1.6% 
Germany 20.8% 60.4% 18.8% 0% 0% 
Table 7.12: Knowledge of the EU and EU institutions (head teachers) 
Very good good Neither bad Very bad 
England 5.7% 28.6% 60% 5.7% 0% 
Germany 11.5% 59.6% 28.8% 0% 0% 
Table 7.13: Knowledge of other EU member states (subject teachers) 
very good good neither bad very bad 
England 7.9% 39.7% 39.7% 11.1% 1.6% 
Germany 4.2% 44.2% 50.5% 
I 
1.1% 0% 
Table 7.14: Knowledge of other EU member states (head teachers) 
Country Very good good Neither bad Very bad 
England 11.4% 31.4% 45.7% 11.4% 0% 
Germany 3.8% 57.7% 36.5% 1.9% 0% 
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Table 7.15: How will the EU impact on everyday life change in the next 
ten years (subject teachers) 
Country bigger impact the same less Impact 
England 80% 20% 0% 
Germany 90.1% 7.9% 2% 
Table 7.16: How will the EU impact on everyday life change in the next 
ten years (head teachers) 
Country bigger impact the same less Impact 
England 75.8% 21.2% 3% 
Germany 90.4% 9.6% 0% 
Table 7.17: European attitudes (subject teachers) 
Very pro- 
European 
Pro- 
European 
Neither Anti- 
European 
Very Anti- 
European 
England 12% 60% 21.7% 5% 1.7% 
Germany 16% 74% 6% 4% 0% 
Table 7.18: Inclusion of a European dimension in teaching (subject 
teachers) 
yes no not sure 
England 79.4% 15.9% 4.8% 
Germany 78.8% 7.1% 14.1% 
Table 7.19: Commitment to a European dimension in teaching (subject 
teachers) 
Very 
committed 
committed Neither Not very 
committed 
Not at all 
committed 
England 14.8% 62.3% 16.4% 4.9% 1.6% 
Germany 8.3% 69.8% 17.7% 4.2% 0% 
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Table 7.20: Commitment to a European dimension in teaching (head 
teachers) 
Very 
committed 
committed Neither Not very 
committed 
Not at all 
committed 
England 22.9% 57.1% 14.3% 5.7% 0% 
Germany 21.2% 75% 3.8% 0% 0% 
Table 7.21: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (English 
subject teachers) 
Very 
important 
Important Neither Not very 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
Included In 
teaching 
Europeanianguages 56.9% 27.6% 15.5% 0% 0% 17.5% 
History of other EU member states 21.1% 38.6% 29.8% 10.5% 0% 47.6% 
History of European Integration 14% 36.8% 29.8% 15.8% 1.8% 28.6% 
EU Institutions 17.2% 25.9% 36.2% 17.2% 3.4% 36.5% 
European exchanges 27.3% 29.1% 23.6% 16.4% 3.6% 14.3% 
Special European projects 9.8% 25.5% 35.3% 25.5% 3.9% 9.5% 
European citizenship rights 28.1% 29.8% 22.8% 17.5% 1.8% 36.5% 
Discussions on European Identity 1 27.3% 41.8% 18.2% 10.9% 1.8% 141.3% 
Table 7.22: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (German 
subject teachers) 
Very 
Important 
Important Neither Not very 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
Included in 
teaching 
Europeanlanguages 69.1% 19.6% 7.2% 3.1% 1% 25.7% 
History of other EU member states 20.2% 41.4% 34.3% 4% 0% 61.4% 
History of European Integration 38.6% 50.5% 9.9% 1% 0%- 84.2% 
EU Institutions 34.7% 45.5% 17.8% 2% 0% 77.2% 
European exchanges 61.4% 30.7% 5% 1% 2% 34.7% 
Special European projects 14.7% 42.1% 28.4% 12.6% 2.1% 30.7% 
European citizenship rights 25% 46% 21% 8% 0% 35.6% 
Discussions on European Identity 28% 43% 22% 6% 1 1% 1 58.4% 
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Table 7.23: Aspects of a European dimension included in teaching 
Included in te aching 
Germany England 
Europeanlanguages 25.7% 17.5% 
History of other EU member states 61.4% 47.6% 
History of European integration 84.2% 28.6% 
EU institutions 77.2% 36.5% 
European exchanges 34.7% 14.3% 
Special European projects 30.7% 9.5% 
jEuro ean citizenship rights 135.6% 36.5% 
IDiscussions on European identity 158.4% 41.3%1 
Table 7.24: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (English 
head teachers) 
Very 
Important 
Important Neither Not very 
Important 
Not at all 
Important 
Europeanianguages 80.6% 19.4% 0% 0% 0% 
History of other EU member states 19.4% 27.8% 38.9% 13.9% 0% 
History of European Integration 16.7% 36.1% 30.6% 11.1% 5.6% 
EU institutions 5.6% 30.6% 38.9% 19.4% 5.6% 
European exchanges 38.9% 44.4% 13.9% 2.8% 0% 
Special European projects 11.1% 50% 22.2% 16.7% 0% 
European citizenship rights 16.7% 41.7% 30.6% 8.3% 2.8% 
Discussions on European Identity 26.5% 26.5% 29.4% 14.7% 2.9% 
Table 7.25: Importance of aspects of a European dimension (German 
head teachers) 
Very 
Important 
Important Neither Not very 
important 
Not at all 
Important 
Europeanlanguages 75.5% 18.9% 3.8% 1.9% 0% 
History of other EU member states 17.3% 40.4% 32.7% 1 9.6% 0% 
History of European Integration 24.5% 30.2% 37.7% 7.5% 0% 
EU institutions 22.6% 32.1% 37.7% 7.5% 0% 
European exchanges 81.1% 18.9% 0% 0% 0% 
Special European projects 23.5% 37.3% 29.4% 9.8% 0% 
European citizenship rights 17.6% 37.3% 33.3% 9.8% 2% 
Discussions on European Identity 1 19.6% 33.3% 33.3% 13.7% % 
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Table 7.26: Schools with a European dimension 
yes no not sure 
England 73.5% 17.6% 8.8% 
Germany 84.6% 5.8% 9.6% 
Table 7.28: The future role of the EU in education (subject teachers) 
more important role less important role not sure 
England 25.8% 37.1% 37.1% 
Germany 55.6% 29.3% 15.2% 
Table 7.29: The future role of the EU in education (head teachers) 
yes no not sure 
England 36.4% 33.3% 30.3% 
Germany 51.9% 38.5% 9.6% 
272 
Appendix ll: Questionnaires 
a) Subject teacher questionnaire 
b) Head Teacher questionnaire 
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Survey: The European dimension in secondary schoolinq 
This questionnaire is for subject teachers (history or citizenship, key stage 3 or 4). 1 would 
greatly appreciate it if you could take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire and return it 
to me in the envelope provided. All answers are confidential. Please feel free to continue your 
answers on separate sheets of paper. 
I)Do you El teach history ? El teach citizenship ? 13 other, please specify, 
2) Are you El male female 
3) Your age group El 30 and under 31-49 El 50 and over 
4) The school you are teaching at: 
Name of school 
Town 
5) What is your nationality: 
6) Which Is your mother tongue: 
7) In relation to the EU, would you describe yourself as: 
11 very anti-European El anti-European El neither El pro-European 13 very pro- European 
8) What would you consider to be a "European dimension" In teaching? Please rate the following 
factors by importance and also indicate (if applicable) if you are including any of these factors In your 
teaching: 
very important not at all important included in teaching 
European languages 0 El 11 11 11 11 
History of other EU member states El 13 11 El El 11 
History of European integration El 11 El 11 1-: 1 El 
EU institutions 0 11 11 El El El 
European exchanges El El El El El 11 
Special European projects El El El 1: 1 El 11 
European citizenship rights El El 11 El 11 11 
Discussions on European identity C El 11 El 
Other: 
9) Overall, would you sa that you include a European dimension In your teaching? 
0 yes 13 no 
ff 
not sure 
9b) If you selected "no" or "not sure", would you like to Introduce a European dimension in your 
teaching? 
11 yes El no please specify why not. - 
9c) Have you had any official training (organised by your school or the educational authorities) for the 
integration of a European dimension into your teaching? 
0 yes 11 no 11 not sure 
If "yes", what was the nature of the training? 
10) How important would you rate a European dimension in teaching in general? 
11 very important El important El neither El unimportant El very unimportant 
10b) and in your specific subject area? 
11 very important El important El neither El unimportant El very unimportant 
1) Please explain the way you rate the importance/unimportance of a European dimension In 
11) How Committed are you to a European dimension in teaching: 
11 very committed 1: 1 committed 11 neither El not very committed 11 not at all committed 
12) In your opinion what are the problems associated with integrating a European dimension Into 
teaching, both in general and in your specific case? Please tick all that apply 
1: 1 Lack of resources 13 Lack of training 1: 1 No clear definition of "European dimension" 
El Lack of guidance from the educational authorities El Lack of guidance from head of school 
Lack of own commitment It is not important El I am not sure what a "European dimension" is 
No time Other, please specify: 
13) Have you travelled to other European countries in the last year? F-1 yes 11 no 
14) How would you rat our knowledoe of the EU and its institutions? 
11 very good 
Hgood 11 average El bad 11 very bad 
15) How would you rat our knowledqe of other EU member states? 
11 very good 
Bgood 
1: 1 average 11 bad El very bad 
16) In comparison to today, how will the impact of the EU on everyday life change over 
the next ten years in your opinion? 
1: 1 EU will have a bigger impact El impact will be about the same El EU will have less impact 
17) Should the EU have a more Important role in educational policies in the future? 
11 yes 1: 1 no El not sure 
Please explain your opinion on the role of the EU in educational policies: 
18) Which newspaper(s) do you regularly read? 1 
19) Do you have any other comments about the European dimension in education? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
Survey: The European dimension in secondary schoolinq 
I would greatly appreciate it if you could take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire and 
return it to me in the envelope provided. All answers are confidential. Please feel free to 
continue your answers on separate sheets of paper. 
I)Do you also teach at your school? 13 no 13 yes, please specify the subject: 
2)Areyou El male 13 female 
3) Your age group 30 and under 1131-49 1150 and over 
4)Yourschool: 
Name of school 
Town 
5) What would you consider to be a "European dimension" in teaching? Please rate the following 
factors by importance very J ortant not at all important ff M El 11 1: 1 European languages 
History of other EU member states 11 13 El 11 1: 1 
History of European integration 11 00 13 13 
EU institutions 11 El El El El 
European exchanges El El 13 E3 11 
Special European projects 13 El El 13 El 
European citizenship rights El D El 13 11 
Discussions on European identity 13 E3 E3 0 E3 
Other: 
11 
6) How important would you rate teaching a European dimension in general? 
11 very important 11 important El neither 0 unimportant E3 very unimportant 
6b) and how important would you rate a European dimension in teaching at your school? 
13 very important 1: 1 important 1: 1 neither D unimportant 13 very unimportant 
6c) Please explain the way you rate the importance/unimportance of a European dimension in 
teaching at your school: 
Row committed are you to a European dimension in teaching: 
11 very committed E3 committed 11 neither 0 not very committed El not at all committed 
8) In your opinion, what are the problems associated with integrating a European dimension Into 
teaching, both in general and in your specific case? Please tick all that apply 
11 Lack of resources 13 Lack of training 1: 1 No clear definition of "European dimension" 
Lack of guidance from the educational authorities El Lack of teacher commitment 
Lack of own commitment El It is not important E3 I am not sure what a "European dimension" is 
El No time 11 Other, please specify: 
9) Overall, would you that your school has included a European dimension In the teaching? 
11 yes El no 
sff 
not sure 
9b) If you selected "yes", please explain in further detail how a European dimension is included Into 
your curriculum. If your school also has any European extra-curricular activities (exchanges, study 
visits, project weeks etc), please give details: 
9c) Which subjects would you consider most likely to include a European dimension? Please tick all 
that appý 
English El Modern languages D Maths El science Citizenship 
1: 1 History El Art El ICT El Geography Music 
1: 1 PE El Religious Education El Design and Technology 
10) Have you travelled to other European countries in the last year? 1: 1 yes no 
11) How would you rat our knowled of the EU and its institutions? 
1: 1 very good 
Hgood 11 
average El bad El very bad 
12)Howwouldyourat ourknowled of other EU member states? 
11 very good 
Bgood M 
average El bad 1: 1 very bad 
13) In comparison to today, how will the impact of the EU on everyday life change over 
the next ten years In your opinion? 1: 1 EU will have a bigger impact 11 impact will be about the same 11 EU will have less impact 
14) Should the EU have a more important role in educational policies in the future? 1: 1 yes El no D not sure 
Please explain your opinion on the role of the EU in educational policies: 
15) Which newspaper(s) do you regularly read? i 
16) Do you have any other comments about the European dimension In education? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
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